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ABSTRACT 
 This study explored differences in conceptualizing safety cultures in pediatric hospitals 
and specialty units from an interprofessional perspective on a national level. Errors in the 
pediatric population can quickly cause harm and frequently lead to adverse events (AEs). 
Research has explored the problems of patient harm and identified strategies to prevent those 
harms; but sustainable improvements, particularly in pediatric settings, have not been achieved. 
This cross-sectional descriptive study used national data from the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture’s 2016 dataset developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
measuring 12 dimensions of safety culture. The extracted sample included responses from 6,862 
pediatric registered nurses (RNs), physician assistants/nurse practitioners (PAs/NPs), physicians 
(MDs) and Administrators/Managers across the U.S. Analysis determined that the overall safety 
culture in pediatric hospitals and specialty units was neutral to poor in the U.S. from the 
perception of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers. RNs, PAs/NPs and MDs had 
similar perceptions of safety culture for 9 of the 12 dimensions, which differed from those of 
their Administrators/Managers. Within this group of frontline professionals, RNs and MDs 
differed in their perceptions of safety culture for 7 of the 12 dimensions. Despite these findings, 
professionals continued to report AEs suggesting that even within the poor safety culture milieu, 
these professional groups were concerned about their young patients’ care needs and strived to 
improve the quality and safety of patient care. Hospitals with adequate staffing and a nonpunitive 
response to errors were found to be related to the professionals’ overall perception of safety.
xvi 
 
Findings from this study have the potential to guide future research on improving safety cultures 
within pediatric care settings by developing strategies to address gaps in nursing and medical 
education, practice management and hospital policy development.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare in the U.S. has been shown to be wasteful, unreliable and error-prone, leading 
to morbidity and mortality rates that are unwarranted and at costs that are unsustainable (Ziedel, 
2011). In the United States, patients’ expectations of high quality care are not always supported 
as the healthcare system is a paradox of excellent, technologically advanced treatments coupled 
with poor health outcomes that stem from adverse events (AEs) or preventable errors (Zeidel, 
2011). An AE is an injury caused by medical care. Adverse events do not imply error, 
negligence, or poor quality of the care but rather that an undesirable clinical outcome occurred as 
a result of some aspect of diagnosis or therapy, and not due to an underlying disease process 
(National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015). 
In the last decade, researchers have focused on preventing the occurrence of such events 
in the adult setting. There has been a paucity of research that addresses the factors that contribute 
to AEs or errors in pediatric settings (Cimiotti, Barton, Gorman, Sloane, & Aiken, 2014; Grant, 
Donaldson, & Larsen, 2006; Woods, Thomas, Holl, Altman, & Brennan, 2005).  
Studies have determined that the safety culture within and throughout the U.S. healthcare 
system needs to be improved to effectively address the unprecedented levels of patient harm 
(James, 2013; Makary & Daniel, 2016; Nanji, Patel, Shaikh, Seger, & Bates, 2016; National 
Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The definition of safety culture that has 
been widely accepted throughout literature is the “product of individual and group values, 
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attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to 
and the style of proficiency of an organization’s health and safety management” (Health and 
Safety Commission, 1993; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015, p. xii).  
This chapter will discuss the overall problem of patient safety in the U. S. and how issues 
relating to patient safety affect the pediatric population. In addition, the impact that a hospital’s 
safety culture has on the safety of patients will be examined, with a particular emphasis on the 
safety culture within pediatric care facilities. This chapter will conclude with this study’s 
hypotheses and research questions. 
Patient Safety is a Public Health Issue 
For over 15 years, patient safety in the U.S. has remained a critical public health issue 
(Aspden, Corrigan, Wolcott, & Erickson, 2004; Chassin & Loeb, 2013; Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 1999; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015). This section will discuss the 
significance of patient safety in the U.S., followed by an assessment of the financial burden of 
errors on both patients and the healthcare system. A review of factors within the current 
healthcare system that have contributed to this public health concern will complete this section.  
Significance of Patient Safety 
Following the release of a landmark report by the Institute of Medicine, Congress 
charged the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to improve the safety of 
patient care and reduce medical errors (MEs) through research and collaborative partnerships 
with healthcare institutions across the country (Aspden et al., 2004; Kohn et al., 1999; Larrison, 
Xiang, Gustafson, Lardiere, & Jordan, 2017; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Sedman 
et al., 2005). An ME is “an act of commission (doing something wrong) or omission (failing to 
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do the right thing) that leads to an undesirable outcome or potential for such an outcome” 
(National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015, p. xii). Research has estimated that in a New York 
cohort, up to 98,000 (3.7%) people died following patient safety failures related to medical 
therapy, with further research suggesting that this figure was grossly underestimated (Kohn et al., 
1999; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Takata, Mason, Taketomo, Logsdon, & Sharek, 
2008).  
To update these findings, James (2013) performed a systematic review of literature on 
studies published between 2008 and 2011 that identified hospital-related AEs. James (2013) 
found that over 440,000 patients each year suffered from a preventable AE that contributed to 
their death (James, 2013). It has been estimated by researchers that MEs are the third largest 
cause of death in the U.S. (Makary & Daniel, 2016). The AHRQ (2015) found that one in ten 
patients could experience an AE that could result in harm such as an infection, pressure ulcer, 
fall or adverse drug event, leading to additional medical care (National Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015; AHRQ, 2015). Although there has been progress in reducing some hospital-
acquired conditions, the U.S. has been ranked behind most industrialized countries on many 
measures relating to patient care outcomes, quality and efficiency (Davis, Stremikis, Squires, & 
Schoen, 2014; Sutcliffe, Paine, & Pronovost, 2016). 
U.S. Healthcare Continues to Rank Last  
In a comparative analysis evaluating the perceptions of hospitalized patients and 
physicians about their experiences, researchers concluded that the U.S. healthcare system ranked 
consistently last out of the 11 high income countries for access, quality and outcomes, with this 
ranking unchanged from similar analyses completed in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2014 and 2017 
4 
 
 
(Schneider, Sarnak, Squires, Shah, & Doty, 2017). This report also ranked the U.S. last in 
healthcare outcomes, of which included the occurrence of serious reportable events (SREs). 
SREs are unmistakable, serious, usually preventable, devastating to patients and indicate there 
was a serious underlying organizational safety problem related to the incident (National Quality 
Forum, 2011). Examples of SREs would be the death or grave injury of a patient associated with 
a medication error, blood product or fall while under hospital care (National Quality Forum, 
2011). An intraoperative or immediate postoperative death of a normal healthy person would be 
another SRE (Lembitz & Clarke, 2009).  
The occurrence of SREs within the surgical suite will be highlighted in this section. This 
will be followed by a discussion on how MEs are associated with the misdiagnosing of patients’ 
conditions and the significant financial burden such errors place on the U.S. healthcare system. 
This section concludes with an orientation to the current safety culture within U.S. hospitals and 
how this culture has contributed to the poor care experienced in the U.S.  
SREs cause reimbursement denial. In an effort to motivate hospitals to accelerate 
improvements surrounding the safety of patient care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) adopted a nonreimbursable policy for particular incidents patients may 
experience (Lembitz & Clarke, 2009). The National Quality Forum publishes a list of SREs with 
the intent of facilitating uniform and comparable public reporting that enables systematic 
learning on procedures that have been shown to improve the overall quality and safety of 
healthcare organizations and systems (National Quality Forum, 2011). 
Patients are harmed during surgical procedures. Undergoing surgical procedures in 
the U.S. places patients at high risk for experiencing an AE. (Lembitz & Clarke, 2009; Nanji et 
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al., 2016). In a prospective observational study, randomly selected surgical procedures were 
observed at a 1,046-bed tertiary care academic medical center with the purpose of identifying 
medication errors and adverse drug events (Nanji et al., 2016). Following observation of 227 
operations, retrospective chart reviews were performed on all cases. During the 277 
observations, 3,671 medication administrations were observed. Upon a chart review of these 
medication administrations, 193 (5.3%) were implicated in medication errors or adverse drug 
events, which were missed during the observational phase of the study. Of these medication 
errors or adverse drug events, 153 (79.3%) were preventable and 40 (20.7%) were 
nonpreventable (Nanji et al., 2016). Of these 153 errors, 99 (64.7%) were serious and 51 (33.3%) 
were significant with 3 (2.0%) considered life threatening (Nanji et al., 2016). ‘Serious’ was 
defined as an event with the potential to cause symptoms that were associated with a level of 
harm that was not life threatening. ‘Significant’ was defined as an event that had the potential to 
cause patients harmful symptoms but posed little or no threat to their overall function. ‘Life 
threatening’ was an event that had the potential to cause symptoms that if not treated would place 
the patient at risk of death (Nanji et al., 2016). In other words, one in 20 perioperative 
medication administrations included a medication error or an adverse drug event (Nanji et al., 
2016). Researchers found that more than one third of the medication errors led to observed 
adverse drug events with the remaining two thirds having the potential for patient harm (Nanji et 
al., 2016). These findings were found to be a markedly higher percentage than that found in 
previous retrospective studies that examined errors in operative suites, suggesting that this trend 
was not decreasing (Nanji et al., 2016; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015).  
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Patients are harmed through diagnostic errors. Many patients experience MEs 
through diagnostic errors, which have been linked to regrettable outcomes (National Patient 
Safety Foundation, 2015; Singh & Thomas, 2014). In a retrospective analysis of three previously 
published clinic-based population databases, researchers estimated the frequency of diagnostic 
errors in the adult population following the synthesis of data from three previous clinic-based 
population studies (Murphy et al., 2014; Singh & Thomas, 2014). These publications were 
chosen as each used similar conceptual definitions for diagnostic errors (Singh et al., 2012). This 
population-based analysis concluded that over 5% of the U.S. adult outpatient population, or 
over 12 million patients, experienced a diagnostic error annually. This equates to approximately 
one in every 20 adults. Of this group, half of the estimated errors had the potential to cause 
significant harm, such as prescribing the wrong medication dose to an infant or child. Such 
foundational evidence is pivotal in encouraging health care organizations and policy makers to 
significantly strengthen efforts to measure such occurrences and derive new processes to reduce 
diagnostic errors (Singh & Thomas, 2014).  
Medical errors create a significant cost burden. Along with the pain and suffering 
experienced from MEs by patients and families, researchers at the Institute of Medicine found 
that such poor outcomes have created a significant cost burden to the U.S. healthcare system. 
This monetary liability was estimated at over $10 billion a year and may be greatly under-
estimated due to the difficulty of approximating costs relating to “unreliable, highly variable, and 
poorly coordinated care” (Kohn et al., 1999; Zeidel, 2011, p. 2). The U.S. spends more on 
healthcare than 11 leading industrialized countries, such as Canada, Norway and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), but only ranks seventh in the quality of that care (Schneider et al., 2017).  
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In research by Schneider et al. (2017) at the Commonwealth Fund, it was noted that 
payment systems in the other countries surveyed rewarded high quality care monetarily when 
collaborative approaches to managing chronic conditions were demonstrated. With the passage 
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the U.S., similar initiatives were implemented, with new 
policies introduced over a period of years. Such strategies were designed to encourage 
comparable measures regarding the quality and efficiency of patient care.  
Although the ACA supports programs that are concerned with the development of 
preventive health measures for persons with various chronic conditions, such as diabetes, 
hypertension and asthma, the delivery models, policies and payment arrangements that are 
intended to enhance the overall quality of care have impacted hospital’s financial structures 
speeding organizations to consolidate or close their doors (Barlas, 2014; Davis, Collins, 
Stremikis, Rustgi, & Nuzum, 2009; Davis et al., 2014). To date, improvements in diagnosing, 
treating and caring for patients through provisions within the ACA have yet to be aligned with a 
reduction in the cost of care or an improvement in the quality, efficiency and safety of patient 
care (Davis et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2014). With revisions to the ACA anticipated, hospitals face 
great uncertainty regarding future reimbursements. This uncertainty will impact patient’s access 
to care and care delivery, setting the groundwork for a public health crisis. With competitive 
market forces, payment incentives, evolving Medicare and Medicaid Services, and developing 
regulatory standards from The Joint Commission, there is a strong impetus for health systems to 
accelerate learning cultures and adopt best practices that reduce healthcare costs (Martin & 
Abore, 2016).  
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Poor hospital safety cultures negatively affect care. A hospital’s poor safety culture 
will negatively affect the care at that institution. As noted on page two of this chapter, a safety 
culture has been defined as the “product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to and the style of 
proficiency of an organization’s health and safety management” (Health and Safety Commission, 
1993; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015, p. xii).  
Research from multiple studies found that a hospital’s safety culture is linked to the 
number of AEs and MEs reported at that facility, thereby affecting the quality of patient care 
(DiCuccio, 2015; Hansen, Williams, & Singer, 2011; Mardon, Khanna, Sorra, Dyer, & 
Famolaro, 2010; Sorra, Khanna, Dyer, Mardon, & Famolaro, 2012). In a systematic review of 17 
studies, DiCuccio (2015) found that evidence supported the relationship between a safety culture 
and nurse-sensitive patient outcomes at both the hospital and nursing unit levels, supporting the 
concept that a poor safety culture is associated with poor patient outcomes.  
A study by Sorra et al. (2012) evaluated 519 records from the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture (HSOPSC) comparative database and an additional 927 records from the 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) database (Sorra et al., 
2012). This analysis found that a relationship existed between a hospital’s care team and the 
safety culture patients perceived (Sorra et al., 2012). In this study, patients’ positive perception 
of a hospital’s safety culture tended to have a positive effect on the assessment of their care, as 
reflected in the CAHPS hospital surveys (Sorra et al., 2012).  
Conversely, such findings suggest that hospitals with poor safety cultures would be 
perceived badly by patients, with this perception reflected in their care experience. Research by 
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Sorra et al. (2012) suggests that a hospital’s safety culture is critical to providing the perception 
of quality patient care.  
The Joint Commission. Understanding the relationship between a hospital’s safety 
culture and the occurrence of errors was the impetus behind the development of the ten hospital 
standards that organizations must realize before achieving accreditation by The Joint 
Commission (2012). One of these recommendations directs leaders to provide opportunities for 
employees to participate in safety and quality initiatives (The Joint Commission, 2008b; The 
Joint Commission, 2012). In addition, The Joint Commission recommends administrators and 
managers develop a code of conduct for their institution that defines acceptable behaviors and 
behaviors that are disruptive, which undermine a safety culture (The Joint Commission, 2008b; 
The Joint Commission, 2012). These new standards also advised hospitals and health systems to 
create programs that periodically measure their institution’s safety culture and systematically 
design improvement plans that are measured over time. 
Summary  
Despite efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of patient care, the U.S. healthcare 
system remains unsafe and has been regularly ranked last among studied nations (National 
Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Schneider et al., 2017; Zeidel, 2011). Patients are being harmed 
at alarming rates in both inpatient and outpatient settings, with the actual number of errors not 
accurately measured. With poor care outcomes having been linked to a negative safety culture, 
improving the culture could improve care outcomes and patients’ overall care experiences 
(DiCuccio, 2015; Hansen et al., 2011; Mardon et al., 2010; Sorra & Dyer, 2010; Sorra et al., 
2012).  
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In advancing knowledge regarding safety culture, health care organizations can 
facilitate the development of safer health systems that support practitioners in providing quality 
care. Such new knowledge has the potential to reduce morbidity and mortality rates and improve 
patient’s perceptions of their care.  
Unsafe Patient Care Is a Systems Issue 
The current healthcare system is wasteful and error prone (Zeidel, 2011). There is 
urgency for organizational leaders and practitioners to engage in the transformation of hospitals 
into environments where all patients receive the best quality of care every time they are admitted 
(Hines, Luna, Lofthus, Marquardt, & Stelmokas, 2008). Improving patient safety requires a total 
systems approach where leadership unfailingly prioritizes the organization’s safety culture and 
the well-being of all members of the patient care team (AHRQ, 2013; Clancy, Margolis, & 
Miller, 2013; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Zeidel, 2011).  
Today in the U.S., patient care has become technically complex with care poorly 
integrated between specialties and within hospital units (James, 2013). Practitioners are required 
to provide more care with fewer resources while keeping in mind the organization’s productivity 
pressures and budgetary constraints (Milton, 2013; Peterson, Teman, & Connors, 2012). In an 
effort to influence improvements at a systems level, many healthcare leaders have adopted a 
safety model developed by high-reliability organizations (HROs).  
An HRO is a system that operates in hazardous conditions, such as in nuclear power 
plants or flying an aircraft, but involves fewer AEs than other systems operating in similar 
environments (Reason, 2000). High reliability is established by supporting particular human 
practices that build a climate of trust and respect among workers. There is a coordination of 
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work, both upstream and down, creating elements in daily practices that shape organizational 
cultures. Such principles empower individuals to recognize problems early and manage them 
decisively (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Under this system, hospital leadership can support the 
successful reduction of errors in high-risk environments through the use of standard protocols, 
checklists, pre- and post-procedural briefings, incident reporting and daily huddles (Goldenhar, 
Brady, Sutcliffe, & Muething, 2013; Henrickson, Wadhera, & Elbardissi, 2009; Pronovost et al., 
2006; Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Although many organizations and clinicians within the healthcare 
milieu have embraced such improvement plans, the implementation and success of these 
initiatives have been fragmented. Healthcare persists with low-reliability lacking fundamental 
underpinnings such as teamwork, error reporting and process improvement techniques found in 
HROs (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). High-reliability organizations are systems that operate in 
hazardous conditions and have fewer than their share of AEs. Such systems have an intrinsic 
“safety health” that can withstand operational dangers while still achieving their intent (Reason, 
2000, p. 770). 
Healthcare Lacks Underpinnings of Trust and Respect 
Today’s U.S. healthcare leaders have made progress towards improving care outcomes, 
but lack a firm understanding of how to achieve high reliability (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). High 
reliability organizations are designed to work within systems that anticipate, contain and recover 
from mistakes (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). High-reliability 
organizations work to understand the nature of the employees’ work and create detailed 
operating procedures with contingency plans that use the tools of science and technology to 
shape employee behaviors with the goal of avoiding errors (Sutcliff et al., 2016). With minimal 
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scrutiny, HROs can influence safety by cultivating practices within a climate of trust and respect, 
where workers pass along communications that are necessary to thoughtfully organize reliable 
performance (Sutcliff et al., 2016). Such interactions are moments where trust is generated and 
where dialogue between professionals can sharpen or hinder one’s sensitivity to unexpected 
discrepancies.  
It is within such atmospheres that vigilant direction regarding safety issues between the 
hospital’s management and healthcare teams can exist, enabling employees to recognize 
emerging problems early and manage them more decisively (Sutcliff et al., 2016). It is within 
such atmospheres that cultures of trust develop, which has been lacking in U.S. hospitals and 
healthcare systems (Sutcliff et al., 2016).  
High-performance work environments within HROs. Hospital settings are 
considered high performance work environments (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006; Huselid, 
1995). In such environments, strategic human resource management dedicates specific practices 
that can affect positive changes in organizational-wide practices (Combs et al., 2006). Examples 
of such enhancements include incentive compensation for hospital employees or training for care 
management units that are highly specialized. Additional improvements focus on improving 
hospital unit work environments and encouraging employees’ participation in the development 
of patient care delivery models (Combs et al., 2006). To improve high-performance work 
environments, two interactive overlapping processes must be considered (Combs et al., 2006; 
Delery & Shaw, 2001). First, employees must be given the knowledge, skills and training to 
perform their job tasks. Secondly, the internal social structure, or organizational culture, must 
facilitate communication and cooperation among employees creating the socio-relational 
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foundation that can identify and manage complications decisively (Combs et al., 2006; Evans & 
Davis, 2005; Sutcliffe et al., 2016). It is this social-relational foundation that contributes to a 
hospital’s safety culture but is currently lacking in this country’s attempt to reform patient care. 
If healthcare administrators, managers and practitioners are to adopt practices from this ultra-safe 
model, they must genuinely and systematically work to establish a culture that is built on the 
social-relational foundation other HROs have found to be effective (Sutcliffe et al., 2016).  
Inadequate Understanding of Medical Errors as a Systems Issue 
When a patient’s care goes well, the acts of competent physicians are celebrated, despite 
the organization and complexity of the care (Dekker, 2011; Gawande, 2002). When errors occur, 
human ineptness points to persons providing direct patient care, blaming individuals for having 
failed to hold the complex, pressurized, organizational patchwork together (Dekker, 2011; 
Gawande, 2002). For sustained improvements to be realized, hospital leadership must gain an 
understanding of the system factors that influence decision-making and the delivery of patient 
care, both of which are primary steps in reducing errors (Grant et al., 2006; Mardon, et al., 2010; 
Peterson et al., 2012). With factors identified that influence patient safety, healthcare leaders can 
focus concerted efforts on improving front-line employees’ psychological, behavioral and 
situational perceptions of the care environment, which has been found to be effective in 
supporting safety cultures in other ultra-safe organizations (Sutcliff et al., 2016).  
Impediments to Developing a Culture of Safety 
The U.S. has created an environment in which interdisciplinary team members are unable 
to sustain their deep capacity for quality, compassionate care due to obstructed settings that do 
not support a culture of trust (Shapiro, Whittemore, Lawrence, & Tsen, 2014). As an HRO, 
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hospitals must maintain a commitment to safety at all levels, from frontline employees to 
hospital leadership. Barriers to a hospital’s safety culture include ineffective teamwork through 
siloed care, poor communication and disruptive behaviors, which will be discussed further in this 
section.  
Professional Silos Impede Safety Culture  
Historically within the U.S. healthcare setting, patient harms were considered inevitable, 
professional silos were considered natural, and patients were kept safe by individual heroism 
rather than thoughtful designs (Pronovost, Ravitz, Stoll, & Kennedy, 2015; Zeidel, 2011). A silo 
refers to “a system, process, or department that operates in isolation from others” (“Silo,” 2018). 
As a result of such silos, one professional group, such as the neurology team, may not understand 
the particular facts of another specialty, such as hematology, although both are involved in 
treating a cancer diagnosis for their mutual patient. This lack of collaboration between staff at all 
levels of care hinders the culture of healthcare institutions (Peterson et al., 2012).  
Following the introduction of safety initiatives by healthcare organizations throughout the 
U.S., silos have been maintained and contribute to the inadequately coordinated, highly variable 
care and ineffective practices within institutions and between professionals (Pronovost et al., 
2015). It is such poorly coordinated interdisciplinary care that creates the troubling hospital 
culture that contributes to patient harm (Fewster-Thuente & Velsor-Friedrich, 2008; AHRQ, 
2013; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Pronovost et al., The Joint Commission, 2008b; 
2015; Zeidel, 2011).  
The term interprofessional is defined as a model of team communication and 
collaboration that takes place among many disciplines and is used in the planning of patient-
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focused care (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). The defining attributes of collaborative care include 
having a shared influence in the care of a patient that is based on knowledge and the shared 
authority of professional roles (Fewster-Thuente & Velsor-Friedrich, 2008; Henneman, Lee, & 
Cohen, 1995, Kraus, 1980). Interprofessional communication is a critical process used by 
healthcare professionals to collaborate on the delivery of healthcare services (Siarkowski-Amer, 
2013). This model of team communication and collaboration takes place among the many 
disciplines involved in the planning of patient-focused care and can be practical in academic as 
well as healthcare settings (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). Poor communication can result in MEs and 
AEs due to the lack of transparency in care and creates an unsafe work environment for hospital 
employees (Shapiro et al., 2014; The Joint Commission, 2008b). Communication that is 
disrespectful and disruptive will hinder the development of a safety culture, as this section will 
discuss further. 
Disruptive Behaviors Impede Safety Cultures 
The U.S healthcare milieu has a history of tolerance and indifference to poorly 
coordinated interprofessional care that creates the troubling hospital culture that contributes to 
patient harm (Porto & Lauve, 2006; The Joint Commission, 2008b). Such conduct is seen in 
profane and disrespectful language, demeaning behaviors, sexual innuendos, racial or ethnic 
jokes and outbursts of anger. These actions can undermine a caregiver’s self-confidence, disrupt 
patient care and create a patient safety concern (Porto & Lauve, 2006). Porto and Lauve (2006) 
found that 40% of clinicians remained quiet or passive during patient care events involving 
disruptive behaviors rather than question an intimidating individual’s decision (Institute of Safe 
Medication Practices, 2003; Porto & Lauve, 2006; The Joint Commission, 2008b).  
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Intimidating and disruptive behaviors exist in both genders and among various levels of 
healthcare professionals, such as administrators, pharmacists, therapists and support staff 
(Institute of Safe Medication Practices, 2003; Rosenstein & O’Daniel, 2005). These negative 
actions decrease job satisfaction and ultimately increase the occurrence of preventable AEs, as 
well as the cost of care (Mark et al., 2007; Profit et al., 2014; Rosenstein & O’Daniel, 2005; The 
Joint Commission, 2008b). Incivility negatively influences employee’s health, job satisfaction, 
productivity, turnover rate and commitment to their profession. Qualified clinicians, 
administrators and managers may seek alternative employment in more professional 
environments when surrounded by such negative behavior (Rosenstein & O’Daniel, 2005; The 
Joint Commission, 2008b). 
A negative work environment also creates a financial burden for the healthcare 
organization, which is estimated at $23.8 billion annually in the U.S. This amount covered direct 
and indirect costs such as absenteeism, turnover, lost productivity and legal action associated 
with uncivil and violent workplace behaviors (Sheehan, McCarthy, Barker, & Henderson, 2001; 
Spence-Laschinger, Wong, Cummings, & Grau, 2014). Intimidating and disruptive behaviors 
contributes to medical errors and the psychological distress of professionals, which is reflected in 
the safety culture of the institution (The Joint Commission, 2008b). 
Poor Teamwork Impedes Safety Cultures  
 Poor teamwork within a facility can also impede the safety culture at that institution. To 
examine the relationship between an organization’s culture, interprofessional teamwork and job 
satisfaction, researchers surveyed 272 employees that were involved in patient care. This was a 
multicenter, cross-sectional study that took place in Germany (Korner, Wirtz, Bengel, & Goritz, 
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2015). Following the analysis of the survey data, investigators found a hospital’s culture 
influenced how interprofessional teams worked together, which in turn impacted job satisfaction 
(Korner et al., 2015). In addition, an employee’s job satisfaction influenced their personal 
attitudes and care practices, which impacted the quality and safety of patient treatments and 
clinical outcomes (Korner et al., 2015). Korner et al. (2015) found that interprofessional 
teamwork was supported by an organization’s culture, which was an independent predictor of the 
employee’s job satisfaction (Korner et al., 2015).  
Summary 
The efforts to create an environment that promotes safety has been impeded in the U.S. 
with disruptive behaviors that prevent team members to sustain their sincere desire to deliver 
quality, compassionate care. Excellence in care requires effective communication and teamwork, 
which integrates organizational functions, professional groups and care specialists into one 
coherent team (Grant et al., 2006). For quality and safety measures to improve in the U.S., 
healthcare organizations must recognize and evaluate the disruptive behaviors that threaten 
patient safety and understand the perceptions of their institution’s safety culture to determine 
priority areas to improve (Sorra & Dyer, 2010; The Joint Commission, 2008b).  
Healthcare for Children Can Be Unsafe 
The pediatric population is susceptible to and is at a high risk of experiencing AEs due to 
their small size, dependence on adult communication, need for individually calculated 
medication dosages and unique physiological status (Cimiotti et al., 2014; Kaushal, Bates, 
Abramson, Soukup, & Goldman, 2008; Leonard, 2010; Woods et al., 2005). In this section, the 
multiple factors that place children at a high risk for AEs and MEs will be discussed, which 
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include the risk factors associated with the care of this unique and vulnerable population. This 
section will conclude with a discussion on parental perceptions of their child’s care and how the 
hospital’s safety culture impacts that view.  
Pediatric Specialty is More at Risk for Errors  
Children are more at risk of experiencing AEs due to multiple risk factors. With an 
estimated 1.8 million children admitted to hospitals annually in the U.S. (Cimiotti et al., 2014), it 
is imperative to understand the nuances related to safety concerns within the pediatric 
population. In an attempt to understand the significant role AEs play in this specialty group, 
investigators examined a subset of data taken from the Utah-Colorado study, representing over 
3,700 pediatric hospitalizations (Woods et al., 2005). They found that 1% of hospitalized 
children had experienced an AE, of which 0.6% were preventable (Woods et al., 2005). If 
extrapolated to the entire nation, that figure would represent 70,000 children experiencing an AE 
annually, of which 42,000 would have been preventable (Leonard, 2010; Woods et al., 2005).  
Pediatric epidemiology differs from that of adults. Neonates and infants who experience 
lengthy hospitalizations and complex medication schedules, and who are critically ill, are at an 
increased risk for an adverse drug error. This greater risk is due to the general lack of evidence 
on pharmacotherapeutic interventions in this unique population and the lack of neonate-specific 
medication formulations (Chedoe et al., 2007). In addition, neonates are at an increased risk for 
an adverse drug error due to their immature hepatic, renal and immune systems that alter the 
pharmacological activity of drugs, which may further complicate their care management (Chedoe 
et al., 2007; Leonard, 2010; The Joint Commission, 2008a). The hospitalized child has a three 
times greater chance of experiencing an adverse medication error than an adult, which is 
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equivalent to one out of every 6.4 medication orders (Kaushal et al., 2008; Marino, Reinhardt, & 
Eichelberger, 2004). These figures are disturbing because such errors were found to be 
preventable (Kaushal et al., 2008; Kaushal et al., 2001; Marino et al., 2004).  
Pediatric dosing is tailored based on the child’s weight and the proficiency of a 
practitioner to perform such weight-based calculations (Gonzales, 2010; Kaushal et al., 2008; 
Leonard, 2010; Marino et al., 2004; The Joint Commission, 2008a). Often children are treated in 
predominantly adult-centered care facilities, where staff may not be adequately trained in safe 
pediatric medication practices (Leonard, 2010). Such training does not guarantee error 
avoidance, as skills in compounding medications and calculating weight-based doses may not be 
reinforced due to the infrequency of providing care to this population (Leonard, 2010).  
  Children’s communication is significantly limited. Due to their developmental age, 
communication is challenging for the very young, placing them at risk for an AE (Gonzales, 
2010). Most pediatric patients are incapable of expressing to professionals any symptoms they 
are experiencing or concerns they have relative to their care. For instance, symptoms such as 
itching in the throat or having difficulty swallowing could be symptomatic of an allergic reaction 
(Gonzales, 2010). If the child is unable to communicate effectively, such symptoms could lead to 
a sentinel event if not addressed in a timely manner.  
  The Joint Commission defines a sentinel event as a patient safety event that reaches a 
patient and results in death, permanent harm or severe temporary harm, in which interventions 
are required to sustain life (The Joint Commission, 2016). Children unable to effectively 
communicate are at an increased risk of experiencing such events due to their inability to express 
symptoms through words. These young patients are often sedated or intubated, preventing their 
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ability to cry, which may be their only effective mode of communicating discomfort at their 
young ages.  
 Frequently, communication for this population is done through surrogates, such as the 
patient’s parents or guardians, who in turn must have an accurate assessment of their child’s 
experiences to effectively intervene on their behalf. When caring for neonates, infants and 
children, clinicians must evaluate nonverbal, as well as verbal cues, to effectively assess the 
progress and effect of treatments.  
Woods et al. (2005) found that infants and children had a greater chance of experiencing 
a diagnostic-related preventable error compared with a non-elderly adult. This may be due to the 
varied presentation of symptoms this population experiences or their inability to communicate 
their symptoms effectively, as was mentioned earlier. This risk of diagnostic-related errors has 
led parents to become more active in their children’s care throughout their hospitalization 
(Woods et al., 2005).  
Research regarding the association of the pediatric interventions and AEs and MEs is 
limited. The equipment and medications used in pediatric care may contribute to AEs and MEs 
(Clancy et al., 2013). Most drugs, biologic agents and medical devices used in children’s care 
have been tested and marketed for the adult population through randomized controlled trials 
(Clancy et al., 2013). Similar testing modalities are used less often for the pediatric population 
due to multiple factors (Clancy et al., 2013). For instance, many chronic conditions for the 
pediatric population are rare, limiting the number of providers who accurately treat the disorder 
(Clancy et al., 2013; Gonzales, 2010). In addition, research to improve care practices for such 
conditions involves the study of care encounters within this population. The strict regulatory and 
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consenting procedures for participation in pediatric research are unappealing to investigators, 
thereby limiting investigative interests and the ability of developing evidence-based care 
practices (Clancy et al., 2013).  
Hospital Safety Cultures Experienced Negatively by Parents and Guardians 
Schmidt (2010) identified the concept of “watching over” in the adult hospital setting. In 
this study nurses were found to “watch over” their patient’s care to assure the desired outcomes 
were achieved (Schmidt, 2010). Parents and guardians of hospitalized children have perceived 
the risks that surround their children’s care and have responded with similar needs to “watch 
over” their child’s care during hospitalizations (Cox et al., 2013). Cox et al. (2013) uncovered 
this phenomenon in the pediatric specialty whereby 39% of parents surveyed agreed or strongly 
agreed that they needed to “watch over” the care of their children during hospitalizations to be 
assured their children were safe. This need was of particular necessity during the change of work 
shifts or during any transition of their child’s care, such as from one department to another (Cox 
et al., 2013).  
Another study examined the proportion of parental concern about MEs during their 
child’s hospitalization and whether there was an association between such a concern and the 
parent’s self-efficacy when interacting with the physicians (Tarini, Lorano, & Christakis, 2009). 
This study found that approximately two-thirds of the parents surveyed believed they needed to 
“watch over” their child’s care to aid in preventing errors (Tarini et al., 2009). A bivariate 
analysis found that when interacting with physicians, nonwhite parents who were fluent in 
English were significantly (p = 0.002) more concerned about medical errors and perceived the 
need to “watch over” their child, as they were concerned the care was not safe. 
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Finally, researchers found that parents often reported MEs and preventable MEs that 
were not otherwise documented in the child’s electronic medical record (Khan et al., 2016). Of 
the 383 parents surveyed, 34 parents (8.9%) reported safety incidents. Following a chart review, 
62% of those incidents, or 23 cases, were determined by physician reviewers to be MEs. Another 
24%, or nine cases, were related to the quality of their child’s care. Khan et al. (2016) 
determined that 30% of the 34 cases found, or 1.8 out of every 100 admissions, was involved in 
an ME that caused harm in the pediatric population, supporting the parental concerns (Cox et al., 
2013; Tarini et al. 2009). Pediatric complications often relate to longer admissions that not only 
drive up the cost of care but also increase the chance that additional complications may occur 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; Zeidel, 2011). Tarini et al. (2009) suggests that to 
better understand an organization’s current safety systems, hospital leadership may want to invite 
the participation of families in the evaluation process.  
Summary  
Many safety initiatives have focused on improving healthcare in the adult population, but 
there have been limited advances specifically addressing the complex nature of the pediatric 
population and their particular risk for AEs and MEs (Cimiotti et al., 2014; Cox et al., 2013; 
Kaushal, 2008; Marino et al., 2004; Peterson et al., 2012; Woods et al., 2005). Care for a 
hospitalized child requires explicit communication skills that hone in on both verbal and 
nonverbal cues. Medications and care methodologies need to be tailored to the pediatric 
population with additional considerations for their unique physiological status (Peterson et al., 
2012).  
Pediatric practitioners are rendering care in environments that are increasingly complex 
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with multiple opportunities to cause unintended harm through interprofessional care that is 
poorly communicated and coordinated (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011). Such 
complexities contribute to high rates of MEs, which can increase the cost and length of a hospital 
stay and intensify parental anxieties surrounding their child’s care practices (American Academy 
of Pediatrics, 2011; Khan et al., 2016; Tarini et al., 2009; Zeidel, 2011). Although multiple 
efforts to improve the quality and safety in patient care have been introduced, there has not been 
a sustainable improvement within pediatric settings (Kaushal et al., 2008; Kaushal et al., 2001; 
Leonard, 2010; Peterson et al., 2012; Woods et al., 2008).  
Research suggests that AEs “may result from problems in the practice, products and 
procedures, or systems” found within the hospital milieu (Leape, Bates, & Cullen, 1995; Reason, 
2000; Xuanyue, Yanli, Hao, Pengli, & Mingming, 2013, p. 43). Supporting safe care and 
reducing MEs and AEs in the clinical practice environment requires system wide actions that 
involve all levels of management and healthcare teams to actively participate in performance 
improvement and risk management (Smits, Christiaans-Dingelhoff, Wagner, Van der Wal, & 
Groenewegen, 2008; Xuanyue et al., 2013). Hospitals existing within blame-free environments 
will encourage employees to learn from their mistakes and create improvements in practices that 
will prevent future human and system errors (Kohn et al., 1999; National Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015; Shapiro, et al., 2014). Thus, improving a hospital’s safety culture could 
impact the communication and collaboration patterns of healthcare providers, thereby reducing 
the occurrence errors.  
Research Is Needed to Improve Pediatric Hospitals’ Safety Culture 
A successful safety culture is hindered in the U.S. by the combination of complex care 
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processes, intricate healthcare technologies and professional fragmentation with traditional siloed 
care that is augmented by a well-entrenched hierarchical authoritarian structure with vague 
accountability, thereby creating barriers to teamwork and individual accountability (Brilli et al., 
2010; Hughes, 2008; Zeidel, 2011). The U.S. is far behind other countries with regards to 
improvements in the quality and safety of health care, but with provisions within the ACA 
specifically addressing deficits in communication and collaboration, a decline in SREs and 
improved health outcomes can be expected. Much of the literature regarding patient safety 
culture within hospital settings has been focused on adult settings. There is a paucity of research 
regarding the safety culture within pediatric hospital settings. With the safety of pediatric care 
not well studied, understanding methods and practices that will improve care delivery to this 
population is crucial.  
A child’s safety during their hospitalization can be related to the safety culture 
experienced by employees and practitioners within that HRO. The way people relate to one 
another in work environments will account for the kind of information and level of safety they 
ultimately produce; and to improve the pediatric hospital safety culture, a total systems approach 
is required (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). This approach would 
be one that transforms interprofessional communication and collaboration patterns within 
organizations that surround the care of this vulnerable population (Clancy et al., 2013; National 
Patient Safety Foundation, 2015). By gaining a greater understanding of the concept of safety 
culture within the pediatric hospital setting, key stakeholders have the potential to gain 
knowledge leading to marked improvements in the morbidity and mortality rates for children. 
25 
 
 
With fewer errors, less time will be required by specialists and staff to remedy and report events 
resulting in fewer hospitalizations and lower healthcare costs. 
Research surrounding a hospital’s safety culture has not examined the nuances that 
pertain to the pediatric specialty, or the professional subcultures unique to the pediatric care 
setting. Research in understanding the perceptions of safety culture in the pediatric hospital 
setting will provide a distinct view that can prioritize safety initiatives and guide future research 
and policy development specific to this population. Such improvements will impact the 
occurrence of AEs and MEs, improving the quality and safety of patient care. 
Research Aims and Hypotheses  
The central aim for this study is to describe the safety culture of pediatric settings. It is 
hypothesized that the safety culture of a pediatric hospital or hospital unit is perceived differently 
based on professional role within that institution. In addition, it is hypothesized that the safety 
culture of pediatric hospitals or hospital units impact outcomes including the perceived 
Frequency of Event Reporting and Overall Perceptions of Safety. 
Four professionals groups (RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers) were 
chosen due to the strategic impact each has on the quality and safety of patient care and the fact 
that the survey identified those roles. This study will examine 2016 data from U.S. pediatric 
hospitals and specialty units and will address four research aims. 
Aim 1: Describe the 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as 
perceived by RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers employed within U.S. pediatric 
hospitals and specialty units. 
Aim 2: Determine whether there is a significant difference in the perception of the 10 
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safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as experienced by RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs 
and Administrators/Managers working within pediatric hospitals and specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is a difference in the perception of the 10 safety culture dimensions 
and two outcome dimensions as experienced by pediatric RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers working within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty units.  
Aim 3: Determine the association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome 
dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals and 
specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and one 
outcome dimension: Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units. 
Aim 4: Determine the association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A hospital’s safety culture is the overall behavior of individuals and organizations that is 
based on common beliefs and values (Cooper, 2000; Nieva & Sorra, 2003; Xuanyue, et al., 
2013). A positive safety culture guides the many discretionary behaviors of healthcare 
professionals toward viewing patient safety as a priority. To improve a hospital’s safety culture, 
it is first crucial to understand how this concept is defined. Therefore, the first half of this chapter 
will examine the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of safety culture and how this 
concept is understood within the context of a hospital’s safety culture. It will also describe the 
theoretical framework used for this study.  
The second half of this chapter will review current literature on the theme of safety 
culture with an emphasis on initiatives and research surrounding the pediatric safety culture in 
U.S. hospitals. Most of the research regarding the culture of institutions is related to adult care 
and identifying the problems associated with poor safety culture, as described in Chapter One. 
Little research has been published devoted to the safety culture of hospitals and hospital units 
that care for the pediatric population.  
Philosophical and Theoretical Base of Hospital Safety Culture 
The origin of hospital safety culture can be traced to the ancient and medieval 
philosophical tenets of Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero and Ockham. These great minds brought 
forward the introspective dimension that individuals can choose to do the right act, for the right
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reason. In healthcare, this notion is carried one step further. When managing the infirm, one must 
primum non nocere [“First do no harm”] (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013, p. 8). This phrase 
partly defines the principle of nonmaleficence, a directive to all healthcare practitioners to use 
sound clinical judgment when treating the infirm (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). This historical 
philosophical perspective will guide a discussion of contemporary theoretical models found to be 
successful in the development of a safety culture and an overview of how such models can 
support current hospital safety initiatives.  
Philosophical Development of Right Reason: Socrates (469 B.C. – 399 B.C.)   
Socrates believed true wisdom would come to each of us when we realize how little we 
understand about life, ourselves, and the world around us. He stated, “an unexamined life is not 
worth living” (Audi, 2001e, p. 860) and encouraged introspection in all areas that concern day-
to-day life. Within his school of Socratic Intellectualism, moral goodness or virtue were 
considered an exclusive kind of knowledge with the implication that if one knows what is good 
and evil, one cannot fail to be a good person and act in a morally upright way (Audi, 2001e). It 
was here that Plato (427 B.C.-347 B.C.), a student of Socrates, began the exploration of good and 
virtue (Audi, 2001d). 
Aristotle (384 B.C. – 322 B.C.) 
Aristotle, studying Socrates under Plato, discussed the concept of an innate truth in his 
two heralded works, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics (Audi, 2001a). In these works, 
Aristotle sought to remind individuals that to be virtuous, one must choose actions in the right 
way. He held that most agents innately know the right action unless they are evil or malicious 
(Audi, 2001a). In contrast to Plato’s ideal of moral goodness, Aristotle believed goodness was 
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innate. Rational self-government was based on the belief that morally virtuous actions involve 
the agent’s free coordination of choice for the right reason. This choice can be influenced by a 
person’s emotional makeup and moral character (Audi, 2001a). With rational self-government, 
when one knows what is to be true, one has a responsibility to act on that knowledge (Audi, 
2001a). Aristotle adds to this discussion by focusing on individuals’ free choice based on 
justification, or “right reason,” guided by their innate moral character (Audi, 2001a).  
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C. – 43 B.C.) 
Marcus Tullius Cicero was a great Roman philosopher, lawyer, statesman, orator and 
genius of the written word, with tenets similar to those supported by the writings of the classical 
Greek philosophers (Lane, 2014). In his discussion of Plato’s, The Republic (52 B.C.), Cicero 
states that true law is right reason and is universal, unchanging and everlasting (Audi, 2001b; 
Lane, 2014). Cicero reflected an understanding of the classical philosophers by noting that right 
reason, or universal laws of behavior, commands people to their duty to do what is right and 
follow that law and prohibits them from doing otherwise (Audi, 2001b; Lane, 2014).  
William of Ockham (1287 A.D. – 1347 A.D.) 
William of Ockham, England, was a prominent medieval philosopher and Catholic monk 
who combined these classical Greek and Roman philosophies with his beliefs in Christianity. 
Ockham believed in “a modified right reason theory,” where one’s cognitive faculties, such as 
the senses and intellect, were always working, and through such perceptions, a God-given power 
would provide the innate knowledge for judgments that would direct a person’s behavior (Audi, 
2001c, p. 629; Spade & Panaccio, 2016). Ockham’s principle of parsimony suggests that actions 
do not need to be complex. With a parsimonious model, the chance of introducing 
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inconsistencies, ambiguities and redundancies in a process can be reduced, thereby increasing the 
probability of problem solving (Gans, 2004). Therefore, choosing the right reason is God-given 
and parsimonious if one uses cognitive abilities to focus on the innate knowledge of an issue.  
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) 
The early teachings of Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero and William of Ockham are consistent 
with deontological Kantian traditions. According to Kant, the principle of duty is absolute and 
would trump any situation that may conflict with other ethical considerations (Benjamin & 
Curtis, 2010). Kant believed man is grounded in reason and, as part of a balanced, authentic life, 
has a supreme duty to respect other human beings and do what is innately right (Benjamin & 
Curtis, 2010). All philosophers discussed above supported the belief that individuals choose the 
right reason guided by individual virtue (Aristotle) or with a duty to follow universal laws (Plato 
Cicero, Ockham, and Kant).  
Individualism and Solidarity in the New World 
Following the European enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th centuries, settlers 
were anxious to arrive in America to start new lives in an environment that celebrated 
independence. Around the time of the Revolutionary War, these settlers began to feel a tension 
between the tenets of individualism and those of solidarity (Sabin, 2012). Individualism supports 
the freedom of parties to speak in reasonable, deliberate, respectful manners and to act in 
solidarity for the good of the whole (Sabin, 2012). Solidarity is defined as a feeling of 
cohesiveness and unity that is recognized by persons who share the same interests and goals. 
These individuals that are united by the same goals come together in groups to perform acts they 
agree are correct (“Solidarity,” 2016). These concepts of individualism and solidarity provide the 
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foundation for the political and moral thinking of today’s U.S. health policies where 
individualized care and professional silos obscure the free exchange of data crucial to 
coordinated care (“Silo,” 2018; Sabin, 2012; Zeidel, 2011).  
Medical care in the U.S. was built on the tradition of individualism, which values 
independent reasoning over the collaboration of thoughts (Bleakley, 2010). For example, 
physicians have been educated to develop their unique skills by handcrafting a specific 
diagnostic and treatment regimen optimized for each individual patient (Zeidel, 2011). This 
paradigm, also called the “Craft Model,” supports tailored treatment plans that are fashioned by 
medical providers to deliver the best outcomes for their patients (Zeidel, 2011). However, the 
Craft Model lacks collaboration of care. Without a collaborative approach to care, what is the 
right reason for a specific treatment in one specialty may not align well with another. It is this 
lack of collaboration and the associated limited communication that has led to the high rates of 
errors, poor outcomes and massive waste of healthcare resources seen in the U.S. today 
(Bleakley, 2010; Chassin & Loeb, 2013; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Kohn et al., 
1999; Zeidel, 2011).  
Systematic improvements must be developed and maintained in all levels of hospital 
care. A culture must be articulated in which everyone is working to improve care practices daily, 
and where empowered frontline staff seeks to improve the processes of care. Through systematic 
improvements, multidisciplinary teams will create protocols that will reduce variation in care 
practices, leaving variation of practices required by the individual needs of patients (Zeidel, 
2011).  
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Summary of Philosophical Arguments 
Socrates believed that true wisdom was available to every person, if they took time to 
examine their world around them. It was through this examination that Socrates understood that 
one recognized what was good and evil in one’s actions. Aristotle suggested that for man to be 
wise and virtuous, wisdom must be used to select the right action for the right reason. Cicero 
built upon this, but from a Platonic perspective by weaving the concept of universal laws into 
this discussion. According to Cicero, such laws, when combined with an innate understanding of 
right and wrong, command people to veer from wrongdoing. Ockham introduced a modified 
right reason and interjected the notion that man’s actions do not need to be complex. Through 
God-given powers, Ockham claimed, it will become acutely apparent to man what actions are 
deemed acceptable. Such deontological principles guide healthcare practitioners today to primum 
non nocere (Benjamin & Curtis, 2010). 
The U.S. medical model has historically aligned with the philosophical tenets of right 
reason. However, through individualistic principles unique to the U.S., healthcare providers 
tailor patient care goals consistent with professional goals held within specialties. Such 
individualized care has created siloed care, which has contributed to poor interprofessional 
communication (Leape et al., 2009).  
The philosophical tenet of right reason is foundational to creating a safety culture where 
professional goals are consistent between professions, and each profession serves to meet their 
patients’ needs. The lack of collaboration seen in today’s healthcare milieu has created a tension 
between professionals, which has contributed to patient harm. The concept of safety culture is 
grounded in the philosophical beliefs of right reason. To improve the collaborative practices of 
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healthcare professionals, understanding how safety culture is perceived within professional 
domains may guide future research and policy development in patient safety.  
Concept of Hospital Safety Culture 
The concept of interest for this study is the safety culture of hospitals, specifically 
pediatric hospitals or hospital units. This section will include a safety culture conceptual model 
developed by the U.K.’s Health and Safety Executive (2005) from the writings of Cooper (2000). 
This model has been adopted and discussed in the landmark report To Err is Human (Kohn et al., 
1999) and has been referenced most recently by the National Patient Safety Foundation (2015).  
In addition, Reason’s (2000) theoretical model of safety within high-reliability 
organizations (HRO) and how this model relates to the occurrence of AEs within hospital 
settings will also be presented, providing the justification for studying safety culture as it relates 
to AEs. This section will conclude with a description of the conceptual framework used for this 
study, which was derived from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) 
Hospital Survey of Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC). 
Safety Culture Conceptual Model 
Safety culture is a subculture of an organization’s culture. Organizational culture is 
defined as the shared behaviors, beliefs, attitudes and values regarding the goals, functions and 
procedures that are characteristic to a particular organization (Cooper, 2000). It is believed that 
with a well-developed and business-specific organizational culture, managers and employees 
alike will be committed to becoming more efficient in their performance, thereby improving the 
overall productivity of the organization (Cooper, 2000).  
Within organizations, subcultures emerge, creating hierarchical levels and organizational 
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roles that often do not reflect the behaviors, beliefs, attitudes or values being shared by the 
organization as a whole (Cooper, 2000). Such subcultures either align or are at odds with the 
dominating culture of the organization. Therefore, one organizational culture does not exist; 
instead, there is a dominant culture made up of multiple subcultures. A hospital safety culture 
would be one such subculture.  
A safety culture is defined as “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programs” (see Figure 1) (Cooper, 2000, p. 
114; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015, p. xii; Health and Safety Executive, 2005, p. 4). 
An organization displaying a positive safety culture characteristically ensures that 
communications are founded on mutual trust and shared perceptions of the importance of safety. 
There is a communal confidence in the efficacy of the preventive measures found within the 
organization (Health and Safety Executive, 2005).  
As depicted in Figure 1, an organization’s safety culture has three interrelated facets: the 
psychological aspects, the behavioral aspects and the situational aspects. The arrows connecting 
these sub-concepts reflect how they interrelate, with no sub-concept mutually exclusive from the 
others (Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety Executive, 2005). The graphic also portrays each sub-
concept of a safety culture. A discussion of the psychological, behavioral and situational aspects 
of a safety culture, and how each category might be viewed in the healthcare milieu, follows this 
graphic.  
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Figure 1. Safety culture abstraction developed by the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety 
Executive (2005) 
 
Psychological aspects are concerned with “the way people feel” about the safety 
environment and the safety management systems. They include the beliefs, attitudes, values and 
perceptions of individuals and groups at all levels of the organization. This sub-concept is often 
termed the organization’s safety climate (Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety Commission, 1993; 
Health and Safety Executive, 2005; Jordan et al., 2009). A safety climate reflects how 
individuals perceive their social environment within the organization and has an impact on their 
individual psychological well-being (James & James, 1989; Jordan et al., 2009). For example, 
when members of an organization, or unit within the organization, share the same perceptions of 
an event or an environment, an organizational climate emerges. These perceptions can 
characterize how individual employees see their roles, how they relate to one another, and the 
sense of fairness that is perceived within the organization (Glisson et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 
2009). Organizational climates with high role conflict and poor perceived fairness and clarity 
deter the development of a positive safety culture (Jordan et al., 2009).  
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Behavioral aspects of safety culture are related to “what people do” within the 
organization (Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Health and Safety Executive, 
2005). This sub-concept includes safety-related activities, actions and behaviors. In a hospital 
setting, behavioral aspects might be related to a hand-washing procedure that would be 
performed prior to patient care. Another example of a safety-related activity would be the correct 
documentation in the patient’s electronic medical record of the time that medication was 
administered. These, and a multitude of other staff activities, directly impact a hospital’s overall 
safety. 
Situational aspects of an organization’s culture are the third sub-concept. They include 
the policies, operating procedures, management communication and workflow systems that are 
prevalent within the patient care system of the hospital (Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety 
Commission, 1993; Health and Safety Executive, 2005). These traits are sometimes referred to as 
corporate factors. An example of a situational aspect would be the presence of an outdated policy 
on medication administration. In this case, if a nurse followed an outdated policy, the current and 
approved medication administration process would be violated and could cause patient harm. 
Another example would be related to the reporting hierarchy for a critical lab value. In most 
hospitals, policies regarding the delivery of a critical lab value state that the result must be 
reported to a licensed independent practitioner (LIP). A LIP is a physician or nurse practitioner 
who is permitted by law, regulation, or his or her organization to provide care to patients without 
direction or supervision (The Joint Commission, n.d.). If this policy is not followed, information 
could be given to an unauthorized employee, delaying treatment and causing patient harm. To 
prevent errors in care management, a hospital’s policies, operating procedures, management 
37 
 
 
communication and workflow systems must be current, accessible and followed by the care 
team.  
This uncomplicated model has been well accepted for over a decade and provides a 
useful graphic depicting the concept of safety culture (Health and Safety Executive, 2005; 
National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015). Since an organization’s safety culture is associated 
with AEs and MEs, healthcare has shown an increased interest in this topic as a means to reduce 
the potential for both large-scale adversities, such as the bacterial contamination of hospital units 
and accidents associated with routine care (Cooper, 2000; Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012; Singla, 
Kitch, Weissman, & Campbell, 2006; Xuanyue et al., 2013).  
To truly understand the factors that impact the safety of children’s care, it is important to 
study the overall safety culture of hospitals and hospital units and the professional safety 
subcultures experienced by particular groups and specialties.  
The Reason Model: Linking Safety Culture and Adverse Events 
The Reason Model introduces the concept of AEs as they relate to safety culture. AEs 
were once thought of as a singular occurrence with unique etiologies and outcomes, but Reason 
(1990) suggests that such consequences occur from multiple events that are involved in the 
complex socio-technological systems where humans collaborate with scientific and high-tech 
processes. Reason (1990) was confident that when such events occurred, front-line operators, 
such as the nursing staff, were rarely to blame. Major disasters that took place within a wide 
range of high risk organizations (HRO), such as nuclear power plants, chemical installations, 
spacecraft missions, commercial and military aircraft, offshore oil platforms and railway 
networks, all share a number of important features in their safety breaches (Reason, 1990). 
38 
 
 
Errors in these HROs occurred within systems that employed precise coordination of many 
human and mechanical elements, with automated shutdown mechanisms and physical barriers in 
place to prevent catastrophic events (Reason, 1990). Accidents in these HROs were found to 
arise from multiple conflicting events that occur in sequence and that together breach the 
system’s defense mechanisms (Reason, 1997). Humans played a dominant role in these failures, 
even when faulty equipment caused a breach. Reason (1997) found that once the cause of a 
system’s failure was examined, investigators frequently found that human interventions could 
have prevented or mitigated the disastrous outcome (Reason, 1997).  
Swiss Cheese Model/Human Factor Model with Active and Latent Conditions 
After closely examining the failures surrounding several catastrophes, Reason (1998) 
developed the Swiss Cheese Model (Figure 2) that divided the causal proceedings leading to AEs 
into active and latent conditions. Active conditions, or activities at the sharp end of care, are 
errors and violations that have an immediate negative effect and are often associated with front-
line workers (Dekker, 2011; Reason, 1990). In a hospital, active conditions would involve, but 
are not limited to, the activities of pharmacists, the nursing staff and physicians. The failure of 
medical equipment, such as an x-ray machine or a bedside rail, can also be examples of an active 
condition.  
Latent conditions are errors that stem from decisions or actions that may have lain 
dormant for a period of time but become evident when triggered by an active condition. For 
example, a latent condition could be a lapse in communication between professionals or policies 
that are no longer relevant to care (Reason, 1990). Latent conditions (Dekker, 2011) are present 
in the system at all times, long before AEs are recognized (see Figure 2; Reason, 1990). 
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Although it is difficult to change the values, attitudes and perceptions of their workforce, 
organizations can change the conditions in which people work. Reason (1990) recognized a need 
for HROs to develop a safety culture that empowers personnel to speak up and report errors and 
near misses in a nonpunitive environment. This includes identifying both latent and active 
conditions. A safety culture relates to other organizational cultures. Specifically, a safe culture is 
an informed culture, which in turn depends upon creating an effective reporting culture (Reason, 
1998). This reporting culture must then be supported by a just culture that is willing to learn from 
near misses and errors. Employees that work in just cultures trust that reporting an incident will 
not be met with a punitive response from management (Reason, 1998).  
Figure 2. Reason’s (1998) Swiss Cheese Model/Human Factor Model depicting latent and active 
conditions preceding accidents 
 
Note: see https://tinyurl.com/ycun92pq. 
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To achieve an informed culture, employees must feel free to report errors or near misses 
(Reason, 1998). These reporting systems must be confidential, de-identified and collected by a 
separate agency. Once reported, the system needs to collect, analyze and disseminate the 
knowledge that is gained from incidents in rapid, useful and intelligent reports. These reports are 
valuable for cultures that welcome learning because they provide suggestions on prospects that 
may improve their organization’s ability to function safely (Reason, 1998). Reason’s Model 
(1998) places hospital leadership in crucial positions to successfully decrease the occurrence of 
AEs by developing reporting systems where employees can learn from errors. This model 
provides the theoretical justification for studying the association of safety culture to errors that 
impact patients’ safety.  
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Conceptual Model 
The AHRQ created a survey with the purpose of identifying the latent conditions that 
lead to AEs in patient care, which led to the AHRQ HSOPSC conceptual model. A sample of 
this survey can be seen in Appendix A. The AHRQ literature review, tool development and 
psychometric analyses are described in detail later in this chapter. The HSOPSC conceptual 
model is based on an employee’s individual’s perceptions of safety culture working in a hospital 
setting, as shown in Figure 3 (Blegen, Gearhart, O’Brien, Sehgal, & Alldredge, 2009; Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Through factor analysis, researchers grouped individual’s 
perceptions of safety culture into four categories: “Your Work Area,” “Supervisor/Manager,” 
“Communication” and “Your Hospital.” Within these four structures were 10 dimensions 
describing the employees’ perception of safety culture. There were also two dimensions 
functioning as outcome measures: “Frequency of Event Reporting” and “Overall Perceptions of 
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Safety” (Sorra & Nieva, 2004), totaling 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome 
dimensions (see Appendix B). The 42 items in the tool operationalize each dimension. A detailed 
description and an example of each dimension will follow.  
Figure 3. HSOPSC conceptual model 
 
Your Work Area category of safety culture. Through factor analyses, researchers 
identified five dimensions that measure the perceptions of safety culture that pertain to an 
employee’s work area (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Work 
areas, or units, are defined as areas of the organization that are not considered departments and 
provide specialized patient care (“Hospital units,” 2012). Examples are the intensive care unit, a 
surgical unit, or the neonatal intensive care unit. The definition of each dimension, along with 
examples of hospital scenarios operationalizing the concept, will provide clarification and are 
discussed below.  
1. Teamwork Within Hospital Units. In this dimension, all levels of staff within a unit, 
such as the neonatal care unit, support one another, treat each other with respect, and work  
 Your Work Area 
• Teamwork Within Hospital Units (4 items) 
• Staffing (4 items) 
• Organiza onal Learning-Con nuous Improvement (3 items) 
• Nonpuni ve Response to Error (3 items) 
• Hospital Management Support for Pa ent Safety (3 items) 
Supervisor/Manager  
• Expecta ons & Ac ons Promo ng Safety (4 items) 
Communica on 
• Communica on Openness (3 items) 
• Feedback & Communica on About Error (3 items) 
Your Hospital 
• Teamwork Across Hospital Units (4items) 
• Hospital Handoffs & Transi ons (4 items) 
Outcome Dimensions 
• Frequency of Event 
Repor ng (3 items) 
 
• Overall Percep ons 
of Safety (4 items) 
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together as a team (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). When caring 
for a neonate, the nursing staff may develop clear care goals. These goals and treatment options 
would need to be passed onto other staff members, from shift to shift, to maintain safe care. In 
such a unit, nursing staff needs to respect and support one another and collaborate on care 
methods and goals for the well-being of the neonate.  
2. Staffing. The Staffing dimension examines staffing practices at the institution and 
whether there is enough staff to handle the workload. The items in this dimension also probe to 
understand whether individuals believe that the work hours scheduled for their unit are 
appropriate and support quality patient care (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010). Finally, this dimension evaluates whether patient care teams are made up of 
temporary staff and if such ad hoc staffing is best for their patient population. Research has 
shown that care is safer when nurse-to-patient ratios are reasonable (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). 
Nurses perceive a safe work environment when management understands the safety needs that 
surround patient care and the importance of adequate staffing (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). 
3. Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement. In this dimension, researchers 
sought to examine whether employees believed their organization learns from mistakes and 
whether such errors have the possibility of leading to changes that can elevate the effectiveness 
of a hospital (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). An example of 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement could be related to medication 
administration. If medication was delivered to the wrong patient, a root cause analysis of the 
event could identify the origin of the error and changes could be instituted to improve that 
process. This practice of learning from mistakes can only take place in environments that value 
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and promote safe patient care.  
4. Nonpunitive Response to Error. This dimension assesses the extent to which staff 
members perceive that any mistakes they have made would not be held against them and kept in 
their personnel files (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). As before, 
in the event a medication error has occurred, an employee would report this error if he or she 
believed there would be no punitive actions taken. For this error to have occurred, there likely 
was a flaw in the system. To actively participate in improving a flawed system, employees need 
to believe there will be no repercussions if they are to report such deficiencies (Reason, 2000). 
With such transparent work environments, a culture of safety can flourish.  
5. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety. This dimension assesses whether 
hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety and confirms that 
patient safety is a top priority (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). 
As was defined earlier in this chapter, an organization’s climate is a distinct construct that is 
concerned with the way hospital employees perceive the social setting within the organization 
(Denison, 1996; Jordan et al., 2009). A safety culture would have an environment supported with 
actions of hospital management that clearly demonstrates to the staff that safety is a top priority. 
Such actions might be seen with management actively supporting appropriate nurse-to-staff 
ratios or a pay scale that is competitive, thereby improving the safety climate. 
Supervisor/Manager category of safety culture. Through factor analyses, researchers 
identified this category as having one factor, or dimension, that measured employees’ 
perceptions of their supervisors’ or managers’ expectations, actions and willingness to promote 
patient safety and safe care (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This category was 
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defined by the perception of hospital supervisors and managers listening to staff’s suggestions on 
ways to improve patient safety. In addition, this dimension inquires whether employees believe 
these suggestions are seriously considered and eventually implemented in future practices 
guidelines (see Figure 3). Hospitals with strong safety cultures employ supervisors and managers 
that actively praise their staff for following patient safety procedures and reward employees that 
promote safe care (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). An example 
of a reward might be a financial bonus to any employee who speaks up when a breach in safety 
procedures has been witnessed. Employees must believe they are safe when they report such 
events with such actions appreciated by their supervisors and managers. 
Communication category of safety culture. Communication can be defined as the 
exchange of information, thoughts and feelings among people using speech or other means 
(Kourkouta & Papathanasiou, 2014). Through factor analyses, researchers identified two factors, 
or dimensions, that measure the perceptions of safety culture that pertains to communication 
within the hospital: Communication Openness and Feedback and Communication About Error. 
These dimensions are discussed below (see Figure 3) (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
1. Communication Openness. In this dimension, staff members freely speak up if they 
see something that negatively affects patient care and are free to question authority about a safety 
breach (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). A work environment 
with intimidating and disruptive behaviors preventing communication can foster errors (The 
Joint Commission, 2008b). An example of Communication Openness might involve a nurse 
questioning an aspect of a physician’s care. With open communication, the physician would not 
be offended by this question, but through interprofessional dialogue, would clarify the reason for 
45 
 
 
the decision, improving the nurse’s understanding and comfort level with the treatment (Sorra et 
al., 2016; The Joint Commission, 2008b).  
2. Feedback and Communication About Error. In this dimension, staff are informed of 
errors and provide feedback on how errors can be prevented. In addition, staff are informed of 
changes that were put into place to prevent future events (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 
2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). An example of this dimension could involve a manager discussing 
the occurrence of an error with a practitioner who made the error. This nonpunitive discussion 
would involve all members implicated in the event. If changes were deemed necessary, the new 
processes instituted would be communicated throughout the hospital to prevent similar 
occurrences in the future. 
Your Hospital category of safety culture. This category evaluates the perceptions 
individual employees have of the hospital where they are currently employed. Through factor 
analyses, researchers identified this category as having two factors, or dimensions, that measured 
employees’ perceptions of their hospital (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This 
category contains two dimensions: “Teamwork Across Hospital Units” and “Hospital Handoffs 
and Transitions” (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). A description 
of these dimensions and examples of how each dimension might be experienced within a hospital 
setting will clarify this aspect of the conceptual framework and are discussed below. 
1. Teamwork Across Hospital Units. In this dimension, hospital units cooperate and 
coordinate with one another to provide the best care for patients. This dimension includes 
whether hospital systems foster teamwork between hospital units or between specialty groups 
(Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Here the differences between 
46 
 
 
individual issues and system issues are set aside for the well-being of the patient. To accomplish 
such solidarity, patient care teams must effectively collaborate with teams in other units, 
explicitly articulating and agreeing upon goals, objectives, roles, processes and outcomes 
(Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). Clearly defined and deliberate strategies and systems must be in place 
to navigate the sometimes unavoidable ideological differences between team members across 
units that can create a sub-safety culture. For example, if a practitioner in hematology does not 
clearly articulate a patient’s important clinical findings to a surgeon prior to surgery, the fact that 
the patient is a hemophilic might be overlooked, placing the patient at an increased risk of 
experiencing an unnecessary bleeding during surgery. Clear, effective communication between 
such hospital units is necessary to assure patient care is safe from one specialty to another. 
2. Hospital Handoffs and Transitions. This dimension relates to whether practitioners 
believe important patient information is transferred from one care provider to another across 
hospital units and during the change of shifts (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010). A handoff is defined as the process of transferring the responsibility for care from 
one practitioner to another or from one unit to another (“Handoffs and signouts,” 2016). 
Transitions are defined as the movement of patients between health care practitioners and 
settings, such as hospital units and across medical specialties, as their condition and care needs 
change (“Handoffs and signouts,” 2016). For example, a patient might receive care from a 
physician in an outpatient setting, then transition to a hospital physician or specialist and work 
with a distinct nursing team during an inpatient stay before once again transitioning to a skilled-
care facility (The Joint Commission, 2012).  
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If during one of these transitions or handoffs a patient experiences an adverse reaction to 
a medication, this event should be passed on to the care teams on the following shifts, or between 
units if the patient is transferred. If this information is not passed forward, the transition or 
handoff could compromise the patient’s safety. Ineffective transitions and handoffs often 
originate from poor hospital cultures and lead to an increase in errors, hospital readmission rates 
and cost of care (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2008; The Joint Commission, 2012).  
Outcomes dimensions. As described in Chapter One, a hospital’s safety culture affects 
quality outcomes at that institution and whether errors are reported (DiCuccio, 2015; Hansen et 
al., 2011; Mardon et al., 2010; Sorra et al., 2012; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Quality outcomes are 
often related to the occurrence of SREs, as discussed in Chapter One. Examples of such events 
would be a patient’s death or serious injury following the unsafe administration of a blood 
product and a patient’s death or serious injury associated with a medication error (National 
Quality Forum, 2011). The HSOPSC has two dimensions that address outcomes and are 
discussed below (see Figure 3).  
1. Frequency of Event Reporting. This dimension evaluates staff’s perception of how 
frequently events are reported. Errors are measured from three perspectives: how often mistakes 
are caught and reported before they affect the patient, how often mistakes that have no potential 
harm to a patient are reported, and how often mistakes are reported that could have harmed a 
patient, but did not (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010).  
For instance, a physical therapist may have provided care to the wrong patient. This 
therapy provided no harm to the patient. The therapy was an ME, but may not have been 
reported, as the patient was not harmed. Not reporting such an error could cause problems for 
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other patients that may have experienced a similar mishap or may have been harmed when the 
wrong care was provided. Understanding why this care was provided to the wrong patient would 
be of interest to the organization and to healthcare personnel.  
2. Overall Perceptions of Safety. This outcome dimension is defined as the general sense 
individuals have of their organization’s error-prevention procedures and systems (Blegen et al., 
2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The National Patient Safety Foundation (2015) 
defines patient safety as “the freedom from accidental or preventable injuries produced by 
medical care” (p. xii). This dimension examines the perceptions individuals have regarding the 
care they deliver and whether the safety of patients is sacrificed due to procedures and systems 
that fail to support their care. Employees who believe management lacks a true concern for 
safety is problematic for hospitals, causing job dissatisfaction, high turnover rates for employees 
and patient harm (Sarac, Flin, Mearns, & Jackson, 2011; Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). 
Summary 
Hospital employees have perceptions of safety culture that are created through the 
interweaving of 10 dimensions that together form the values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behavior found within their facility and their work units (see Figure 
3). These perceptions fall into four unique categories (Your Work Area, Supervisor/Manager, 
Communication, Your Hospital) that determine healthcare professionals’ commitment to and the 
style and proficiency of their hospital’s health and safety management systems (Health and 
Safety Commission, 1993; Health and Safety Executive, 2005). The 10 safety culture dimensions 
within these categories impact the two outcome dimensions, labeled Frequency of Event 
Reporting and Overall Perceptions of Safety (Hansen et al., 2011; Mardon et al., 2010). 
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Perceptions of safety culture have been found to influence employees’ reporting of safety events 
and their view of their hospital’s overall safety (DiCuccio, 2015; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Research 
identified that hospital staff will more frequently report an error in nonpunitive cultures and 
where feedback regarding change is proposed as a result of the report (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; The 
Joint Commission, 2008b). Such findings suggest that more AEs would be reported in hospitals 
with positive safety cultures (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). 
The factor structures for the 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions 
found within the HSOPSC have been identified by multiple psychometric analyses, supporting 
the conceptual model (see Figure 3) and will be described further in the Literature Review.  
Literature Review 
The literature review was based on a literature search using several sources and 
approaches. First, reviews of safety culture instruments that are used to measure the culture of 
healthcare organizations were identified and examined (see Appendix C). The databases of the 
Health and Psychosocial Instrument (HAPI) and PsychINFO were used to locate the actual tool 
and the supportive psychometric testing. In addition, multiple attempts were made through 
emails and phone calls to researchers familiar with these tools to obtain any reliability and 
validity data that would support these instruments.  
Next, publications from the AHRQ’s HSOPSC Research Reference List (2016) on the 
psychometric properties of the tool were included (see Appendix D). This was an international 
search that uncovered surveys that were adapted for particular cultures and then compared to the 
original tool. Of interest to this study were survey composites linked to the safety culture within 
pediatric freestanding hospitals or hospital units (AHRQ, 2016).  
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Finally, the electronic databases of PubMed and CINAHL were used to systematically 
identify peer-reviewed articles that described the concept and theoretical framework of hospital 
safety culture within pediatric freestanding hospitals or hospital units (see Appendix E). The key 
terms used to identify pertinent studies were “hospital safety culture” and “organizational 
culture,” published in English regarding hospital care in the U.S. within the past ten years, for the 
population ranging from birth through 18 years of age. Also included in this review were articles 
that assessed the pediatric hospital safety culture found within the AHRQ’s HSOPSC Research 
Reference List (2016). Throughout the research process, studies were identified from 
bibliographies of pertinent articles focusing on the central concept of safety culture within the 
pediatric care setting, as highlighted in Chapter One.  
Review of Safety Culture Instruments 
The Joint Commission’s directive to hospital leadership to progressively monitor 
safety culture is of great importance to healthcare organizations across the country (The 
Joint Commission, 2017). Administering a survey can be an efficient methodology for 
such monitoring as long as the survey is valid, reliable, accessible, easy to understand and 
easy to administer and interpret. Thus, a review of the current safety culture tools that are 
available for the healthcare milieu will be the next phase of this literature review, along 
with the name of the tool selected for this study.  
There are 45 tools available that evaluate an organization’s safety culture (Singla 
et al., 2006). These tools were used in industries such as nuclear power plants, the 
railways industry and in aviation. There were nine surveys identified in this literature 
review that examined the safety culture within hospital settings. These nine surveys were 
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then evaluated further for this study. A description of these surveys, the number of 
subscales examined, the target population and available reliability and validity findings 
are found in Appendix C. A brief discussion on each tool will assist in identifying the 
final safety culture tool that was used in this research. 
Safety culture instruments for healthcare. Of these nine surveys, seven were 
publicly available and quantitatively assessed patient safety cultures in healthcare settings 
(Appendix C) (Singla et al., 2006). The Press Ganey Safety Culture survey (2009) is a 
proprietary survey that was included in this review because it was administered to 
pediatric practitioners (Peterson, et al., 2012). The Press Ganey survey evaluates 13 
dimensions of safety culture measured on a Likert scale, which are listed in Appendix C. 
Multiple attempts were made both through email and over the phone to obtain additional 
information on the tools constructs, but these attempts went unanswered. Thus, the 
reliability and validity of this tool are not known. 
The Veteran Affairs Patient Safety Culture Survey (PSCS) contains 65 questions 
and covers 14 dimensions of safety culture measured on a five-point scale (Appendix C) 
(Singla et al., 2006). The survey emphasizes management commitment, nonpunitive 
response, overall perceptions of safety, work pressure, detection infrastructure, human 
factors and compliance with rules and procedures. Psychometric properties were 
completed on this tool, but this author was not able obtain them (T. Tawzer, personal 
communication, March 14, 2017).  
The Veterans Health Administration Patient Safety Questionnaire consists of 112 
questions and examines 18 dimensions measured on a five-point Likert scale (Appendix 
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C). This was reportedly developed from instruments in current use, with an emphasis on 
management commitment, overall perceptions, nonpunitive response to error, reporting, 
human factors and communication openness. Psychometrics of this tool has not been 
reported (Singla, et al., 2006). 
The HSOPSC (see Appendix A) has 42 questions and measures 12 safety culture 
dimensions on a five-point Likert scale (Appendix B) (Blegen et al., 2009). Following a 
pilot study, the survey was found to display high internal consistency by factor analysis 
with acceptable reliability (0.63–0.84) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This tool emphasizes 
institutional and managerial commitment to safety, handoffs and transitions and 
teamwork. Multiple psychometric analyses in the U.S. and worldwide confirm acceptable 
reliability and validity of this tool (Blegen et al., 2009; Nie et al., 2013; Robida, 2013; 
Vlayen, Hellings, Claes, Abdou, & Schrooten, 2015).  
The Teamwork and Patient Safety Attitudes Survey has 24 questions measured on 
a five-point Likert scale (Appendix B). Analysis of this tool’s psychometric properties 
yielded four factors: (a) employees’ perception of teamwork, (b) collaboration and 
decision-making, (c) interdepartmental or unit teamwork, and (d) the assertiveness of 
hospital leaders. The primary focus of this tool is on communication openness and 
teamwork (Kaissi, Johnson, & Kirschbaum, 2003; Singla et al., 2006).  
The Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ) contains 
60 questions, uses a five-point Likert scale, and addresses 14 dimensions of safety culture 
with an emphasis on teamwork, communication openness and employees’ beliefs about 
errors and AEs in the operating room (see Appendix C) (Flin, Fletcher, McGeorge, 
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Sutherland, & Patey, 2003). Psychometric analysis demonstrated low reliability and an 
inter-item matrix that was too low for exploratory factor structures. The specificity of the 
tool’s audience would make this a poor choice for this study (Flin et al., 2003).  
Another specifically designed survey evaluating healthcare safety culture was the 
Trainee Supplemental Survey, developed by Boston Children’s Hospital (Appendix C) 
(Singla et al., 2006). This survey contains 41 questions using a five-point Likert scale and 
covers six dimensions primarily focusing on the adequacy of communication, training 
and supervision of resident physicians (Singla et al., 2006). Psychometrics were not 
reported on this tool (Singla et al., 2006). Once again, the specificity of this survey’s 
focus hinders its value in assessing the various professional roles in this proposed study. 
The Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ) was developed at the University of 
Texas following widespread interest in measuring the attitudes of providers (Appendix C) 
(Sexton et al., 2006). Developers modeled this tool after a questionnaire developed for 
commercial aviation, which examines the communication and collaborative decision-
making processes that takes place within airline crew performance (Sexton et al., 2006). 
The SAQ is a 65-item tool measured on a five-point Likert scale. Demographic 
information on the sample was also collected. This tool can be used by healthcare 
organizations to measure caregiver attitudes relating to six patient safety domains that 
were identified through pilot testing and exploratory factor analyses (see Appendix C). 
Although the SAQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties, has been widely 
accepted by researchers, and is publicly available for use, it does not have a publicly 
available database, which is necessary for this research (E. Sedlock, personal 
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communication, January 3, 2017; Sexton et al., 2006).  
The last survey highlighted is the Culture of Safety Survey developed by Weingart, 
Farbstein, David and Phillip (2004). This tool had 27 questions measured on a five-point Likert 
scale and evaluated hospital leadership, salience, a nonpunitive environment and the reporting and 
communication mechanisms within the institution (Appendix C) (Weingart, Farbstein, David & 
Phillip, 2004). There were no psychometric properties reported on this tool. 
Although research specific adaptations have been made to many of these tools, 
modified versions were not included in this review. From the nine surveys identified for 
healthcare use, only the HSOPSC and the SAQ carried solid psychometric evidence, were 
publicly available, were widely used, and evaluated multiple safety culture dimensions, 
which are necessary components for this research (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012; Halligan 
& Zeceivic, 2011; Singla et al., 2006; Sorra & Dyer, 2010).  
Conclusion of research on safety culture instruments. The HSOPSC is the only 
publicly available survey with a national database accepted worldwide, with reliable and 
valid psychometric findings (Hellings, Schrooten, Klazinga, & Vleugels, 2010; Occelli et 
al., 2013; Smits, et al., 2008; Vlayen, et al., 2015; Waterson, Griffiths, Stride, Murphy, & 
Hignett, 2010). In addition, Westat® cleans and manages the national database, which is 
available upon request (see Appendix F). Westat® is an independent contractor that 
provides a national repository for this tool (Westat®, 2017). The HSOPSC is a self-
administered tool that is funded by the AHRQ, requires 10–15 minutes to complete, and 
is available in electronic or paper format allowing for easy administration and minimal 
intrusion into an employee’s daily routine (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). These key factors were 
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pivotal in the selection of the HSOPSC for this research in which the perceptions of 
pediatric hospital administrators and practitioners across the U.S. will be assessed. A 
discussion on the development of this instrument will provide further evidence to support 
the tool’s psychometric properties. 
Review of the Development of the HSOPSC: Pilot Study 
The underlying construct, or phenomenon, that the HSOPSC was designed to measure 
was the latent variables of the hospital culture of patient safety (Waltz, Strickland, & Lenz, 
2010). The HSOPSC was developed to estimate at one point in time the actual magnitude of this 
unobservable construct (Waltz et al., 2010). Researchers were interested in developing a short 
survey instrument that was based on this phenomenon of interest, measuring meaningful, 
independent and reliable safety culture dimensions (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The tool was 
designed to measure the attitudes and actions that are appropriate and inappropriate in a facility 
and to illuminate what processes and procedures regarding patient safety are rewarded and 
punished (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). This task was sponsored by the Medical Errors Workgroup of 
the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC) and was funded and supervised by the 
AHRQ (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Literature review for pilot tool. To develop the tool, the Medical Errors Workgroup of 
the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force began with a literature review in areas related 
to the management of accidents in the nuclear and manufacturing industries, employees’ health 
and safety, organizational climate and culture, safety climate and culture, MEs and event 
reporting (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). In addition, surveys of existing safety climate and safety 
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culture, including published and unpublished tools and those available across the Internet, were 
also reviewed (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010).  
Two psychometric analyses were also conducted on previously published healthcare 
safety culture surveys to guide the development of the HSOPSC’s key dimensions of safety 
culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Waltz, et al., 2010). One survey was developed and administered 
by Westat® for the Medical Event Reporting System for Transfusion Medicine (MERS-TM). 
The second study was developed and administered by the Veterans Health Administration 
(VHA) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This dataset consisted of 6,161 staff responses from 160 VHA 
hospitals across the country (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). These two datasets were analyzed 
independently with the psychometric findings presented to AHRQ in a technical report (Burr, 
Sorra, & Nieva, 2002; Sorra & Nieva, 2002). Results from this report significantly influenced the 
safety culture dimensions and types of items that were included in the HSOPS pilot version 
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004). 
Testing pilot tool. Based on the literature review, including the examination of published 
and unpublished safety culture instruments and the psychometric analyses from the MERS-TM 
and the VHA safety culture surveys, key dimensions of a hospital’s safety culture were identified 
for inclusion in the draft version of the tool (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The draft survey was then 
cognitively tested and reviewed by researchers, hospital administrators and hospital employees 
from various areas and units regarding how they experienced their hospital’s safety culture 
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
At the conclusion of these reviews, a pilot survey was produced, including two single-
item outcome measures and 14 multiple item dimensions of patient safety (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). 
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The survey contained items and questions that used a five-point Likert scale for agreement 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) or frequency (never to always) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This 
tool was pilot-tested with 21 hospitals from six states that varied by teaching status and bed size 
(see Table 1) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Table 1. Pilot Study: Teaching Status and Bed Size of 21 Hospitals  
Hospital < 300 Beds 301-500 Beds > 500 Beds 
Teaching 5 3 6 
Non-Teaching 5 1 1 
 
There were 4,983 surveys administered, with 1,437 (29%) surveys completed. 
Respondents were mostly female (81%). Most had direct interaction with patients, averaging 43 
years old; were currently working in the intensive care unit (18%), surgical unit (15%), general 
medicine (12%) or other hospital units (14%); and had worked at their respective hospital for an 
average of 10 years (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Psychometric analysis of pilot tool. The goal for researchers was to have three to five 
items, or questions, measuring each safety culture dimension. The analysis included exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), fit indices, composite scores with 
intercorrelations, and internal consistency reliability coefficient for the 12 safety culture 
dimensions identified in the confirmatory factor model (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Exploratory factor analysis and principal component extraction of pilot tool. An EFA 
was performed in which researchers evaluated the dimensionality of the survey (Sorra & Nieva, 
2004). To maximize the independence of the dimensions within the survey, PCA along with 
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varimax rotation were used (DeVellis, 2012). The EFA with the PCA identified the multiple 
dimensions in the tool and suggested many of the a priori item groupings identified in the 
literature review did, in fact, fall into 14 distinct factors, with acceptable eigenvalues that were 
greater than or equal to 1.0. The total variance explained by these 14 factors was 64.5%, with 
most items loading highly on one factor (having factor-loading greater than or equal to 0.40) 
(DeVellis, 2012; Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Confirmatory factor analysis of pilot tool. In this analysis, researchers were interested in 
the fit of the model they proposed and how the specific number of factors and items loaded onto 
each factor (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This fit of the data was validated by a number of indices 
including the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted GFI (AGFI), the normalized fit index 
(NFI), and the non-normalized fit index (NNFI), with indices at or above 0.90 (Sorra & Nieva, 
2004). The root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) was 0.4, which is considered a good 
fit, as the closer the RMSEA is to zero, the better the fit (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). After further 
refinement, researchers arrived at a final confirmatory factor model featuring 12 dimensions (two 
outcome dimensions and 10 safety culture dimensions), with each dimension having three to four 
items, or questions, for a total of 42 questions in the survey (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). 
Composite scores and intercorrelations of pilot tool. The validity of an instrument is the 
best approximation of the truth (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). By obtaining the mean of the 
responses to each item, composite scores were created for the 12 dimensions (Sorra & Nieva, 
2004). Items were both positively and negatively worded. All negatively worded items were first 
reverse coded so that a higher score would indicate a more positive response for all cases (Sorra 
& Nieva, 2004). All questions used 5-point Likert scales with composite scores ranging from 
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1.0–5.0 (1 being a low score and 5 being a high sore). After calculating these composites scores, 
the safety culture dimensions were correlated with one another. In this pilot study, the 
intercorrelations fell within the expected moderate to high range of 0.23–0.60, which supported 
the tool’s parsimony and construct validity (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Dimensions with correlations 
less than 0.20 were considered weakly related to each other. Dimensions with high correlations 
at or above 0.85 suggest the items were measuring the same concept, with items needing to be 
either combined or eliminated. 
 Reliability of pilot tool. The twelve dimensions were found to have acceptable reliability 
(defined as a Cronbach’s alpha greater than or equal to 0.60), with coefficients ranging from 0.6–
0.84 (see Table 2) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The Staffing dimension had the lowest reliability, with 
a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63 (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). In a report by the Institute of Medicine 
(2003), appropriate levels of staffing were identified as a major theme for improving patient’s 
safety during hospitalizations. Although recognized as low, this composite was retained due to 
the importance staffing was given in that report. 
Table 2. Pilot Study Reliability Findings (Sorra & Nieva, 2004, p. 53) 
Patient Safety Culture Dimension Cronbach’s
 ∝ 
Items or 
Questions 
per 
Dimension 
1. Communication Openness 0.72 3 
2. Feedback and Communication About Error 0.78 3 
3. Frequency of Event Reporting  0.84 3 
4. Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 0.80 4 
5. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety 0.83 3 
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Table 2 (cont.)   
6. Nonpunitive Response to Error 0.79 3 
7. Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement 0.76 3 
8. Overall Perceptions of Safety 
0.74 4 
9. Staffing 0.63 4 
10. Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting 
      Safety 
0.75 4 
11. Teamwork Across Hospital Units 0.80 4 
12. Teamwork Within Hospital Units 0.83 4 
 
Conclusion of pilot study. In conclusion, the final HSOPSC includes 12 dimensions and 
42 items, along with additional demographic questions, with solid psychometric properties 
supporting a valid and reliable instrument. Reliability coefficients ranged from 0.63–0.84, with 
construct validity of individual dimensions reflected in correlations in the moderate to high range 
of 0.23–0.60 (see Appendix D). This testing provided solid evidence supporting this tool’s use 
for this research study (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: A Review of Psychometric Analyses  
There were 26 psychometric studies found on the AHRQ’s HSOPSC Research Reference 
List (AHRQ, 2016). Five of these studies were eliminated due to specific criteria that were 
related to the study’s research objectives or because the original HSOPSC had been adapted. In 
the end, 21 psychometric studies were chosen for this evaluation. All psychometric studies were 
performed in adult facilities: three national and 18 international (see Appendix D). To date, there 
are no psychometric studies that were performed on data from pediatric hospital or hospital units.  
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U.S. Psychometric Testing Post-Pilot Study 
In 2006, a comparative database was funded by the AHRQ to serve as a central repository 
for HSOPSC hospital data (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). This database was developed following a 
voluntary public call for data submission. From this call, data were collected from 382 hospitals, 
representing over 100,000 hospital survey respondents, and the first comparative database was 
created (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). In 2007, this database was released to the public with results on 
the survey’s items and composite scores (Sorra & Dyer, 2010).  
To evaluate the factors indicating the dimensions of this tool, Sorra and Dyer (2010) 
performed a psychometric analysis of secondary data from the 2007 database. They examined 
the multilevel psychometric properties of the tool to determine if the survey constructs could 
assess patient safety culture at the individual, unit and hospital levels (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The 
database consisted of responses from 331 U.S. hospitals; 2,267 hospital units; and 50,513 
respondents. The psychometric analysis examined the “psychometric properties of the survey’s 
items and composites, item factor loadings, intraclass correlations (ICCs), design effects, internal 
consistency reliabilities and multilevel confirmatory factor analyses” as well as the 
intercorrelations among hospitals (Sorra & Dyer, 2010, p. 1). The analysis confirmed the 
multilevel nature of the data supporting the 12 dimensions and 42 items found in the pilot study, 
justifying the categories depicted in the model (see Figure 3) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010).  
All levels of analysis had acceptable psychometric properties “defined as Cronbach’s 
alpha equal to or greater than .60” (Sorra & Nieva, 2004, p. 62). Also, one hospital-level model 
dimension for “Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Patient Safety” had a 
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low composite (CFI = 0.82). The psychometrics for all other dimensions in this scale were good 
(Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The average dimension intercorrelations were moderate at 0.42 at the 
individual level, 0.50 at the unit level and 0.56 at the hospital level (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The 
overall psychometric properties support the items and dimensions for this tool. The HSOPSC has 
been considered reliable and valid in the U.S. and internationally (see Appendix D).  
International Review of Psychometric Performance   
The HSOPSC is one of the most commonly used surveys for the measurement of safety 
culture in healthcare settings (Vlayen et al., 2015), with extensive evidence that even after its 
translation for international use, it demonstrates good psychometric properties (Bodur & Filiz, 
2010; Eiras, Escoval, Grillo, & Silva-Fortes, 2014; Hedskold et al., 2013; Ito et al., 2011; Moghri 
et al., 2012; Nie et al., 2013; Nordin, Wilde-Larsson, Nordstrom, & Theander, 2013; Occelli et 
al., 2013; Olson, 2008; Sarac et al., 2011; Smits et al., 2008; Vlayen et al., 2015).  
Reliability of survey. The survey was found to demonstrate overall good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70) both nationally and internationally, with only one dimension 
(Staffing) falling below the acceptable level of a Cronbach’s alpha (Blegen et al., 2010; Eiras et 
al., 2014; Hedskold et al., 2013; Nie et al., 2013; Nordin et al., 2013; Occelli et al., 2013; Sarac 
et al., 2011; Vlayen et al., 2015). Thus, when using this tool in the future, Blegen et al. (2010) 
suggested users should consider using alternative methods for evaluating the Staffing dimension. 
Research also found that when using the French and Dutch translations in psychiatric 
hospitals, the psychometrics of the tool were again acceptable and valuable in this unique setting 
(Vlayen et al., 2015). Researchers in Sweden used the HSOPSC in both hospital and primary 
care settings with reliability composites ranging from 0.66–0.87, which is also considered 
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acceptable (Hedskold et al., 2013). Hedskold et al. (2013) believed that having one tool that 
measures the patient safety culture throughout various care settings would be valuable in Sweden 
because it would allow for comparisons within the country’s national care system’s safety 
improvement programs (Hedskold et al., 2013).  
Validity of survey. In addition to consistently acceptable published reliabilities, the 
international HSOPSC surveys demonstrated good validity, with factor analyses supporting 
between 10–12 dimensions at the individual, unit and hospital levels (Ito et al., 2011; Robida, 
2013; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). In fact, a study conducted in Iran that was translated into Farsi had 
factor structures identical to those of the original study (Moghri et al., 2012). In the majority of 
studies, researchers found that the 12 dimensional structures proposed in the original HSOPSC 
model should be adjusted in translated versions, with the assistance of factor analyses, to address 
the particulars of each population.  
Poorly performing translations of survey. Three international studies reported poor 
performances of translated surveys (Haugen et al., 2010; Perneger, Staines, & Kundig, 2014; 
Pfeiffer & Manser, 2010). Perneger et al. (2014) noted that such suboptimal findings could be a 
reflection of problems with the translation process or more general difficulties with the 
instrument itself. In a German study, Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) found that many items in the 
survey were not applicable to nonclinical staff (i.e., clerical staff and housekeeping) and 
therefore suggested a survey be created to assess patient safety culture relevant to this population 
within the care team. Haugen et al. (2010) found the psychometric properties of the Norwegian 
version needed further investigation before being used in surgical domains.  
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Of particular interest, Waterson et al. (2010) found that the questionnaire may have 
measured different constructs of patient safety culture that were particular within the U.K. This 
team used the original HSOPSC for their study (Waterson et al., 2010). They found that in their 
model, the “Overall Perceptions of Safety” and “Staffing” were linked. This may be attributed to 
the increased tendency to associate staffing levels with patient safety in the U.K., as compared to 
U.S. staffing norms (Waterson et al., 2010). Waterson et al. (2010) commented that the national 
healthcare system combined with specific cultural differences that exist between the U.S. and the 
U.K. may have limited the extent to which the HSOPSC is applicable outside the U.S., 
emphasizing that a country’s unique culture impacts the survey constructs (Waterson et al., 
2010).  
Considerations for tool development. Researchers cautioned against the impulse of 
drawing conclusions when comparing data between different countries (Eiras et al., 2014; Najjar 
et al., 2013; Nie et al., 2013; Vlayen et al., 2015). Multiple studies found that differences exist in 
safety culture perceptions due to the uniqueness of each society and these differences should be 
considered when safety culture tools are applied in different settings and within distinct 
healthcare systems (Najjar et al., 2013; Nie et al., 2013; Pfeiffer & Manser, 2010; Waterson et 
al., 2010). Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) suggested the development of a survey to measure if these 
differences are explained by cultural uniqueness, or whether nuances within countries’ healthcare 
systems would explain such variations.  
Of interest were comments made by Sarac et al. (2011) who noted that healthcare 
delivery not only risks harming patients but also can cause harm to healthcare staff. Sarac et al. 
(2011) suggested examining the effects a hospital’s safety culture has on patients with the current 
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tool, but added that this tool should be adapted to appraise how the safety culture of an institution 
impacts the hospital staff (Sarac et al., 2011). As was discussed in Chapter One, disruptive 
behaviors create a negative culture within hospitals and have been shown to cause injury to 
workers.  
Summary of U.S. and International Psychometric Analyses 
The HSOPSC has met more of the specified psychometric criteria than other instruments 
owing to its systematic testing and worldwide acceptance (Hellings et al., 2010). Reliability of 
the HSOPSC in the U.S. and international studies has ranged from 0.60–0.88, with CFAs 
supporting the 12 dimensions of safety culture determined in the pilot study (Hedskold et al., 
2013; Nordin, et al., 2013; Occelli et al., 2013; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This tool has acceptable 
psychometric properties measuring group culture as well as attitudes of individuals (Blegen et 
al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). 
Researchers found that the results provide evidence to help relevant stakeholders within 
the healthcare milieu develop effective strategies that may assist in improving quality of care and 
ensuring patient safety (Hellings et al., 2010; Robida, 2013; Nie et al., 2013). The HSOPSC was 
valuable as a common instrument for assessing healthcare systems regarding national patient 
safety improvement initiatives and heightening patient safety awareness within organizations 
(Bodur & Filiz, 2010; Hedskold et al., 2013). This tool provides the ability to examine safety 
culture from an individual’s perspective, where stakeholders can learn from past events (Nordin 
et al., 2013; Sarac et al., 2011). 
Limitations of U.S. and international surveys. There are some limitations to this tool. 
The adapted international versions did not perform as well as the original tool. This could be due 
66 
 
 
to a shift in the meaning of items and questions following translation (Perneger et al., 2014). In 
addition to language nuances, there was a cultural uniqueness relating to safety culture that 
should also be considered when applying safety culture tools in different cultural settings (Nie et 
al., 2013; Waterson et al., 2010). Findings in one study indicated that the national and healthcare 
specific differences in the U.K. might have limited the extent to which the U.S. version was 
applicable (Waterson et al., 2010). The HSOPSC model must be adjusted to reflect cultural 
differences within populations being studied. Researchers must use caution when comparing 
measurements between cultures and countries (Eiras, et al., 2014; Najjar et al., 2013).  
Reviews of Database Literature 
The search for peer-reviewed research employed the online databases of CINAHL, 
PubMed, ProQuest and the AHRQ’s HSOPSC Research Reference List, along with personal and 
professional resources (see Figure 4 and Appendix E). Of the 59 abstracts found in these 
searches, 15 international studies were excluded. Only studies evaluating the culture in U.S. 
pediatric hospitals were selected, as the central concept for this study is specific to this 
population. Comparing the U.S. safety culture to other international cultures is limited. 
Adjustments would have to occur to the HSOPSC that would reflect the cultural differences that 
are unique to each country as to accurately reflect the perceptions safety culture of each 
population (Waterson et al., 2010). Of the remaining 44 publications, 12 were omitted since they 
were concerned with adult safety, with another nine eliminated because they referenced pediatric 
safety and not a hospital’s safety culture surrounding pediatric care.  Although 10 articles 
focusing the perspectives on safety culture in the pediatric care setting were uncovered,
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Figure 4. Findings from searches of PubMed, CINAHL and the HSOPSC Research Reference 
List  
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these were presented earlier, in Chapter One. In the end, there were 13 U.S. publications that 
were isolated into three discrete categories. These categories are qualitative research, descriptive 
research and quality improvement (QI) projects with an interest in improving hospital’s safety 
culture. A discussion of each category will follow. 
Exploratory research to improve pediatric safety culture. Of these 13 studies, only 
one was an exploratory qualitative study where 88 providers from 11 EMS agencies participated 
in 14 focus groups (Leonard et al., 2012). Leonard et al. (2012) identified barriers and motivators 
to participate in research using focus groups consisting of pediatric emergency medical service 
providers (see Appendix D). This study found that in the emergency department an 
organization’s culture was a factor in whether pediatric providers participated in research but did 
not discuss the overall safety culture within the ED or the individual agencies. 
Descriptive research to improve pediatric safety culture. Two publications 
related to the care of neonates by Profit et al. (2012a). This research found that the safety 
cultures within neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) varied in terms of the location of 
the NICUs and the position of the staff member within this specialty. The first 
publication was a descriptive cross-sectional study that described staff members’ 
assessment of safety culture in 12 NICUs. This was a convenience sample with the goal 
of exploring the variability of these perceptions within and between these NICUs (Profit 
et al., 2012a). Staff members included critical care and other physicians, fellows and 
residents, critical care registered nurses, charge nurses, nurse managers, pharmacists, 
respiratory therapists and nursing assistants and aides (Profit et al., 2012a). The safety 
culture of these units was measured using the ICU version of the SAQ. Researchers 
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found that significant variations in safety culture existed among NICU caregivers, with 
scores related to the perceptions of management (3%–80% positive; mean 33.3%) and 
stress recognition on the job (18%–61% positive; mean 41.3%) having the least positive 
scores. Such findings suggest caregivers perceive a lack of support from hospital 
management, with management unaware of the stressful conditions that surround the care 
of this population. Physicians viewed safety culture in a more positive light than nurses 
and ancillary personnel. The composite scores were higher between physicians and 
nurses (p = 0.04) and between physicians and ancillary personnel (p = 0.02) (Profit et al., 
2012a). Of particular interest was that the ICU version of the SAQ scored the NICU 
higher than the adult ICU cohorts evaluated in a previous study at the same institutions 
(Profit et al., 2012a). This suggests that in spite of the aforementioned statistics, when 
compared to adult care facilities, NICUs had a more positive safety culture than that in 
adult care units (Profit et al., 2012a).  
The second study by the same team evaluated the extent to which the ICU version 
of the SAQ was consistent in detecting the perceptions of safety culture across 12 NICUs 
(Profit et al., 2012b). This was a descriptive cross-sectional analysis of secondary data 
evaluating 547 (86%) responses to the SAQ (Profit et al., 2012b). Researchers found that 
of the 15 correlations between pairs of safety culture domains, two pairs had strong 
correlations (p ≥ 0.7), seven pairs had moderate correlations (p = 0.4-0.69), three pairs 
had weak correlations (p = 0.2–0.39), with another three pairs showing no correlation at 
all (p ≤ 0.2). Such findings reinforced the largely consistent performance in NICUs 
across the dimensions of safety culture as measured by this tool, also supporting the 
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tool’s usefulness for comparative performance assessments among NICUs (Profit et al., 
2012b). 
Quality improvement initiatives to improve pediatric safety culture. There 
were 10 studies that highlighted QI strategies in pediatric settings. These projects were 
multifaceted with the collective goal of improving the safety of care provided to infants 
and children. Authors of these publications understood that the hospital’s patient safety 
culture impacted the quality of care (Buck, 2008; Donnelly, Dickerson, Goodfriend, & 
Muething, 2009; Edwards, Scott, & Richardson, 2008; Mayer et al., 2011). With that in 
mind, many QI programs addressed plans to improve hospital care processes with 
initiatives that focused on creating collaborative practices that broke through hierarchal, 
autonomous traditions, with the goal of improving outcomes for children.  
Quality improvement for children in deteriorating health. Strategies were 
developed to improve prevention, detection and correction of deteriorating infants and 
children through QI initiatives (Hayes et al., 2012; Sheth et al., 2016). A QI project by 
Hayes et al. (2012) took place throughout 20 U.S. hospitals in which a comprehensive 
change package was introduced to improve care strategies and track the effectiveness of 
interventions on patients’ progress. Changes were based on the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement’s (IHI) plan-do-study-act model (PDSA), emphasizing small tests of 
change over time (Hayes et al., 2012; Langley et al., 2009). These efforts began with the 
implementation of foundational communication techniques, such as SBAR (situation, 
background, assessment, recommendation), and transitioned to more complex changes, 
such as the introduction of a rapid response team for deteriorating children. Although the 
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HSOPSC was used to measure the safety culture perceived by multidisciplinary team 
members at the onset and conclusion of the project, only three safety culture dimensions 
in the HSOPSC were targeted: “Communication Openness,” “Hospital Handoffs and 
Transitions,” and “Nonpunitive Response to Error.” After one year, each hospital was 
analyzed separately. Findings indicated that improvements were found in all three 
dimensions for 14 of the 21 hospitals’ studies. The only statistically significant 
improvement for these 14 hospitals was seen in “Nonpunitive Response to Error” (39% 
for positive responses at onset; 47% positive response following QI initiatives; p = .02). 
Such findings imply that the other two dimensions, “Communication Openness” and 
“Hospital Handoffs and Transitions,” were not significantly changed. 
Quality improvement and the I-Pass Project. Sheth et al. (2016) conducted a 
similar QI project with the goal of improving interprofessional communication by 
establishing a reliable handoff system during the rescue of deteriorating children. As with 
the Hayes et al. (2012) QI project, researchers implemented the PSDA model to bring 
about needed change (Langley et al., 2009). To improve the efficiency and safety of 
children’s transfers from the cardiac intensive care unit (CICU) to an acute care setting, 
the I-PASS (I-illness severity, P-patient summary, A-action list, S-situation awareness 
and contingency plans, S-synthesis by receiver) handoff process was introduced (Moore, 
2014; Sheth et al., 2016).  
Another aspect of the QI initiative was to understand the perceptions of safety 
culture within the institution. This was done by administering the HSOPSC before 
initiatives began (2012) and again at the conclusion of the project (2014). Although the 
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sample was small (46 respondents in 2012; 83 respondents in 2014), the provider’s safety 
culture scores significantly improved for the handoff/transitions domain of the survey 
with the implementation of the I-PASS process (Sheth et al., 2016). Sheth et al. (2016) 
also reported an improvement of family and provider satisfaction but did not provide a 
description of how this was measured or evaluated. In summary, the targeted QI 
initiatives did improve the efficiency of transfer from the CICU to an acute care setting, 
which was measured by improved HSOPSC scores and provider and family satisfaction 
(Sheth et al., 2016).  
Quality improvement and serious safety events. Muething et al. (2012) and 
Peterson et al. (2012) conducted QI initiatives to understand the cultural and system 
changes necessary to reduce serious safety events (SSE). Muething et al. (2012) 
conducted a QI project within a large urban pediatric hospital. Senior leadership was 
actively involved in this plan, with interventions focusing on error prevention, 
restructuring of the patient safety governance, a new root-cause analysis process, the 
implementation of a common database for errors, and an opportunity to learn from errors 
(Muething et al., 2012). There were specific strategic interventions for those areas 
considered high-risk, such as the NICU. Outcome measures were the rate of SSEs and the 
change in patient safety culture (Muething et al., 2012). This team administered the entire 
HSOPSC, along with personal interviews, to better understand the safety culture 
perceptions within the organization.  
After interventions were implemented, the number of SSEs per 10,000 adjusted 
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patient-days decreased from a mean of 0.3–0.9 patient days (p < 0.0001). The number of 
days between SSEs increased from a mean of 19.4 at baseline to 55.2 (p < 0.0001) 
(Muething et al., 2012). Initially, many safety culture dimensions exhibited a decrease in 
positive responses. For example, the patient safety grade dipped from 82.6% in 2005 to 
76.6% in 2007, but increased substantially to 84.0% in 2009 following the introduction of 
QI strategies (Muething et al., 2012). Similar findings were noted with regards to other 
dimensions such as Communication Openness, Feedback and Communication About 
Error, Supervisor and Manager Expectations Promoting Safety, and Frequency of Event 
Reporting (Muething et al., 2012).  
Such drops in measures have been described in other research evaluating adult 
facilities. Hellings et al. (2010) found that in the dimensions of Organizational Learning-
Continuous Improvement and Hospital Handoffs and Transitions, scores declined over 
time, although the exact measures were not supplied. Tiessen (2008) performed a QI in a 
Canadian community hospital. This study noted a decline in the perceptions of QI 
initiatives between the 2005 and 2007 staff evaluations. This drop was related to 
employees’ perception of senior management’s involvement in patient safety issues and 
their commitment to improving the safety culture of the institution. Tiessen (2008) 
suggested this decline might be due to the many organizational changes that took place 
during 2007, which included cost cutting measures and system changes that directly 
impacted staffing and caused staff reductions. These changes were likely responsible for 
the poor response rate (35%) seen in 2007 and the overall poor morale of staff (Tiessen, 
2008).  
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Press Ganey Safety Culture survey and serious safety events. A study in 
Michigan sought to improve the safety culture of a 200-bed children’s hospital through a 
QI initiative addressing processes, practices and measures to sustain improvements 
(Peterson et al., 2012). This was a two-year initiative beginning in 2008. Hospital 
leadership used the safety culture change model developed by the Healthcare 
Performance Improvement (HPI), a consulting firm in Norfolk, Virginia. This program 
was intended to create a new safety leadership infrastructure that fostered transparency of 
both data and safety event details (Peterson et al., 2012). The leading causes for errors 
were system-based and found in the hospital’s culture. Employees were not voicing 
safety concerns due to intimidation (54%), poorly developed or nonexistent processes 
(23%), and the lack of policies and protocols to report errors (12%) (Peterson et al., 
2012). As was seen in previous initiatives, the number of safety events rose after staff 
were trained on the QI processes (SSE = 0.81 per 10,000 patient days), with events 
decreasing by 68% (SSE = 0.26 per 10,000 patient days) at the final phase of the project 
(Hellings et al., 2010; Muething et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2012; Tiessen, 2008). This 
initial increase in the reporting of errors suggests that after training on the QI process, 
employees were more aware of safety issues and reported events more readily. The 
number of events decreased over time, suggesting that real improvement requires time 
and refinement.  
Quality improvement and safety teams. Safety teams were developed in many 
institutions to improve patient outcomes. Runy (2007) described the development of a 
SSE reduction team at a freestanding children’s hospital, with a goal to eliminate SSEs 
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by 2010. This team developed a series of QI interventions, such as processing root cause 
analyses and error-prevention training for clinicians, to reach that goal. Runy (2007) did 
not identify how their institution evaluated their safety culture.  
Delta Team quality improvement initiative. Along with other QI initiatives, 
leadership within another healthcare system understood the importance of creating a safe 
care environment for their NICU population. Hospital leaders addressed units and 
practices associated with poor care outcomes prospectively, through system-based 
solutions (Schwoebel & Creely, 2010). Similar to the team created by Runy (2007), this 
organization created the Delta Team in which patient safety advocates and peer educators 
were empowered to actively participate in developing programs that drive patient safety 
at the unit level (Schwoebel and Creely, 2010). This team focused on implementing staff-
driven solutions that build safety cultures within the NICU (Schwoebel & Creely, 2010). 
The HSOPSC was used to operationalize this concept and aided to identify and track 
areas in need of improvement (Schwoebel & Creely, 2010). Through the Delta Team’s 
efforts, several successful projects were developed that contributed to a safe NICU 
environment. These included the improvement of capillary specimen processing, 
reducing bloodstream infection and a systematic approach to hyperbilirubinemia 
(Schwoebel & Creely, 2010). Although specific statistics supporting these improvements 
were not given, it was noted that for the last 12 months, no neonate experienced a 
bloodstream infection (Schwoebel & Creely, 2010).  
Summary of quality improvement initiatives. Many QI plans created safety teams 
and introduced processes, such as SBAR and I-PASS, to improve the interprofessional 
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collaboration and communication skills of care teams. These changes followed a variety 
of QI strategies with a particular attention to pediatric care practices (Buck, 2008; Hayes 
et al., 2012; Muething et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2012; Runy, 2007; Schwoebel & 
Creely, 2010; Sheth et al., 2016). This evidence suggests that hospital leadership have 
become cognizant of how a hospital’s safety culture impacts patient care and the unique 
safety concerns within pediatric care settings. Quality improvement initiatives provide a 
synergistic effect on the safety culture of institutions, leading to improved levels of staff 
involvement, accountability and transparency at both the leadership and unit levels of 
care (Peterson et al., 2012).  
Summary of Literature Review 
This review of literature examined peer-reviewed studies that pertained to the concept of a 
pediatric hospital safety culture within the last 10 years. The publications indicated that efforts to 
improve the pediatric safety culture require concerted work from hospital leaders and front-line 
staff to improve care collaboration (Buck, 2008; Dickenson et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2012). 
Multifaceted approaches to improving pediatric care were associated with significant 
improvements in the hospital’s safety culture as measured by the HSOPSC, the SAQ and the 
Press Ganey Safety Culture Survey (Hayes et al., 2012; Muething et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 
2012; Profit et al., 2012b; Schwoebel & Creely, 2010; Sheth et al., 2016). Collaborative models 
involving multiple specialty teams can accelerate improvements (Hayes et al., 2012). Through 
QI efforts on event identification, researchers found an increase in the reporting of safety events, 
with enhanced transparency and improved dimensions of safety culture at each institution 
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(Dickenson et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2012; Muething et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2012; 
Schwoebel & Creely, 2010).  
There is a repetitive, resonating voice from these studies affirming that to improve 
care for children, the safety culture in hospitals must improve. Changing the safety 
culture of any hospital takes time. To achieve these goals, a multifaceted 
interprofessional approach that is supported by hospital leadership and front-line 
providers is necessary.  
Gaps in Research 
This literature review has uncovered gaps in the current research. Over a 10-year period, 59 
studies evaluating the safety culture in pediatric facilities were found internationally, with the 
majority of research occurring from 2010 to 2016. From this review, it is clear that research 
concerned with the pediatric hospital safety culture is in the early stages of development. 
Continued research on the effectiveness of improving the safety culture of pediatric hospital’s 
and hospital units, and how the safety culture impacts patient outcomes is crucial (Muething et 
al., 2012; Profit et al., 2012a; Sheth et al., 2016).  
Although there have been multiple research studies that utilized the HSOPSC to measure 
the perceptions of a hospital’s safety culture as it relates to adult care and care outcomes, only 
recently has there been an influx of studies evaluating similar outcome measures from the 
perceptions of pediatric care team members within hospital settings. In addition, much of the 
research in safety culture has not differentiated between the safety cultures that exist within 
specialties. This review of literature notes a lack of research regarding the hospital safety culture 
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within the pediatric specialty and how a poor safety culture impacts the care outcomes of this 
unique population.  
Another gap is related to recent QI projects focused on improving the quality and safety 
of pediatric care. As was demonstrated in Chapter One, the pediatric care environment has 
challenges specific to this population. With age dependent physical and emotional needs, 
practitioners must consider multiple physiologic challenges when delivering care. The Joint 
Commission found that MEs are potentially more harmful and occur more often in children than 
in the adult population (Gonzales, 2010; The Joint Commission, 2008a). Although QI initiatives 
have shown improvements in outcomes and patient’s satisfaction with care, additional studies are 
needed to further evaluate what interventions significantly improve the safety culture in the 
pediatric care settings (Mardon et al., 2010; Muething et al., 2012; Profit et al., 2012a; Sheth et 
al., 2016).  
Of interest in this review of literature was the fact that there were no comparative 
effectiveness research (CER) studies to determine whether the safety culture impacted patient 
care outcomes, care collaboration and the satisfaction of the hospital staff. A CER study 
synthesizes evidence that compares the benefits and harms of new methods to treat and monitor a 
clinical condition (“Comparative effectiveness research,” 2017). Research using a methodology 
of this kind is needed to measure the effectiveness of interventions that target safety culture, 
improving the quality and safety of care in pediatric settings. Such findings could inform 
evidence-based guidelines in promoting quality care practices that are safe in pediatric hospital 
settings.  
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Finally, there was no review of interprofessional perspectives at a national level that 
examined the unique viewpoints of key stakeholders such as administrators, managers, MDs, 
NP/PAs and RNs. These unique perceptions are created not only through personal values, 
attitudes and beliefs, but also through philosophies that impacted them during their academic and 
clinical experiences, which are formative for each professional group. Exploring differences in 
the conceptualization of safety culture from these perspectives will help target current and future 
education and care strategies to create a unified safety culture within pediatric care settings. To 
date, there is a gap in the patient safety literature that examines the safety culture within pediatric 
hospitals and specialty units on a national level from the perception of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers. This study will address this gap. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODS 
Introduction 
This chapter will present a detailed description of the methods used to address the Aims 
and hypotheses. Methods include a description of the study design, the research sample, the 
measures taken to protect human rights, and a description of the secondary data source (i.e., the 
2016 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
Culture (HSOPSC) comparative database). This chapter will conclude with descriptions of the 
variables and details regarding the procedures used for data collection, data cleaning and the data 
analyses. There are four research aims in this study: 
Aim1: Describe the 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as 
perceived by RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers employed within U.S. pediatric 
hospitals and specialty units. 
Aim 2: Determine whether there is a significant difference in the perception of the 10 
safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as experienced by RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs 
and Administrators/Managers working within pediatric hospitals and specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is a difference in the perception of the 10 safety culture dimensions 
and two outcome dimensions as experienced by pediatric RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers working within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty units. 
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Aim 3: Determine the association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome 
dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals and 
specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals 
and specialty units. 
Aim 4: Determine the association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units. 
Conceptual Model for Analysis 
A conceptual model provides a clear and logical relationship for these four aims (see 
Figure 5) (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady, & Newman, 2013). In the conceptual model for 
this study, 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions comprise employees’ 
perceptions of safety culture are described in Aim 1. These perceptions of safety culture were 
represented by four groups of healthcare professionals working within pediatric hospitals or 
specialty units throughout the U.S. Aim 2 determined whether there was a significant difference 
in these perceptions per professional group. The association of 10 safety culture dimensions to 
the two outcome dimensions was examined in Aim 3 (Frequency of Events Reported) and Aim 4 
(Overall Perceptions of Safety). For these analyses, three covariates were introduced: (a) the bed 
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size of the hospital, (b) whether the hospital was a teaching or non-teaching facility, and (c) the 
region within the U.S. where the hospital was located. These characteristics and their impact on 
the two outcome dimensions were also examined in Aim 3 and Aim 4.  
Figure 5. Conceptual model for analysis  
 
 
 
Research Design and Study Sample 
This study was a retrospective, descriptive cross-sectional clustered design using a 
nonprobability convenience sample from the AHRQs HSOPSC 2016 comparative database 
(Famolaro et al., 2016; Hulley et al., 2013; Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Lucas, 2011). Surveys 
were administered and cleaned by each hospital, following specific instructions. Data were then 
submitted to a central location managed by Westat®, where a second level of cleaning was 
performed. This final dataset represented hospitals throughout the U.S. that self-selected to 
participate in the HSOPSC comparative database.  
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Obtaining the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Database  
Westat®, an independent contractor, provided a national repository for this tool (Westat, 
2017). To obtain the database for this study, Westat® required a formal written request, which 
was approved (see Appendix F). The 2016 U.S. HSOPSC dataset was approved and received 
electronically in June 2017 from Westat®.  
Human Subjects Protection 
Hospital leadership had the freedom to choose what population would be asked to 
participate in the HSOPSC, with individual participation being voluntary. The organizations also 
had the freedom to choose whether to participate in the comparative database. All participating 
hospitals submitted individual-level survey data. All hospital leadership that submitted data for 
the 2016 Comparative Database signed a data use agreement maintained at Westat® allowing 
their de-identified data to be made accessible for healthcare research (Sorra et al., 2016). Copies 
of the databases were downloaded into a protected server maintained by Loyola University 
Chicago, and all written material were stored in a locked cabinet, with the researcher having the 
sole key. 
Although human subjects were involved in the data collection, only de-identified data 
were used for this research, which were supplied by Westat® (Sorra et al., 2016). Upon review, 
this study was found exempt by the Internal Review Board at Loyola University Chicago (see 
Appendix G).  
Description of the HSOPSC Comparative Database 
The HSOPSC was made available to the public by AHRQ in November 2004 (Sorra & 
Nieva, 2004). In 2006, the agency made an open call to hospitals throughout the U.S. for the 
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voluntary submission of their hospital survey data. From this request, hospital leadership 
willingly submitted data from over 100,000 respondents for the initial 2007 comparative 
HSOPSC database (Famolaro et al., 2016). The AHRQ also created a central repository for 
comparative databases and contracted with Westat® to maintain these datasets. From 2007-2014, 
HSOPSC data were collected yearly. In 2014, the call for data collection was extended to every 
two years (Famolaro et al., 2016).  
In the 2016 dataset, the American Hospital Association’s designation of a children’s 
hospital was included in the AHRQ’s data collection for the first time. Previously, the 
designation of whether a hospital was a freestanding pediatric hospital was not part of the 
demographics. Although these data were collected by the survey, to protect hospital’s 
anonymity, the data were not made available to this researcher. The identification of pediatric 
professionals on an individual level was available to this researcher in the 2016 HSOPSC 
dataset, which was of particular interest for this study. 
Hospitals followed AHRQ’s strict guidelines before submitting data for the comparative 
database (Famolaro et al., 2016). A description of how the surveys were administered, how the 
study populations were selected, how the survey data were analyzed, and how comparative 
datasets were created are described below (Famolaro et al., 2016). It is important to note that the 
survey implementation guidelines were to be adhered to by hospital researchers and there was no 
way to validate that hospitals followed the guidelines verbatim. 
Hospital Guidelines in Implementing the Survey  
Each hospital distributed surveys as web surveys, on paper, or as a combination of the 
two. As mentioned in Chapter Two, items and questions that used a five-point Likert scale for 
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agreement (strongly disagree to strongly agree) or frequency (never to always) were contained in 
the HSOPSC (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Paper surveys were distributed at staff meetings, 
emphasizing hospital leadership’s support of the project. Surveys dispensed electronically 
utilized respondent’s emails through web-based distributions, introducing each to the project, 
with scheduled notifications reminding staff to participate in the study by completing the survey 
(Sorra et al., 2016). All web-based surveys were pretested prior to administration by using the 
same type of computers hospital staff used, as well as testing the administration of the survey 
with various Internet browsers (Explorer, Safari, Firefox, Chrome, Mozilla and Opera) and 
display settings (Sorra et al., 2016).  
Historically, AHRQ stated that average response rates had been slightly higher for paper 
administration, although comparative data demonstrated hospitals preferred administering the 
surveys via the web (Sorra et al., 2016). Surveys were given individually and anonymously. If 
multiple hospitals were surveyed, a hospital-level identifier was assigned to track the surveys 
from each facility and to allow for the production of feedback reports for each hospital (Sorra et 
al., 2016). Hospitals were able to use outside vendors for the collection of data and were allowed 
up to 10 weeks to complete their project (Sorra et al., 2016).  
 Survey population selection. The survey queried hospital staff. The project directors 
determined the selection of the sample from this population, with the selected sample closely 
representing the population at that facility (Sorra et al., 2016). For hospitals with populations of 
physicians and staff of 500 or less, AHRQ recommended that a consensus survey should be 
conducted in which information is gathered from all hospital employees (Famolaro et al., 2016). 
For hospitals with physicians and staff from 501–999, AHRQ recommended a minimum of 500 
86 
 
 
respondents participate in the survey. For institutions with physicians and staff from 1,000–
2,999, it was recommended that a minimum of 600 respondents participate (Sorra et al., 2016). 
These target sample sizes were based on the assumptions that the sample was simple random or 
systematic random, with a response rate of 50% and a confidence interval +/- 5% (Sorra et al., 
2016).  
Samples included staff in particular professional categories, such as nursing, or in 
particular units, such as the operating room or the pediatric unit (Sorra et al., 2016). When the 
sample was determined by research teams, a list consisting of participants’ first and last names, 
internal addresses, hospital areas or units, and their staffing category or job title was created and 
stored in a secured location within their facility. In addition, researchers who conducted web-
based surveys or used emails to send pre-notifications also kept records of participants’ email 
addresses in a similar location that was secure (Sorra et al., 2016). Employees who no longer 
worked at the facility, were on administrative or sick leave, or who left the facility were removed 
from the list by hospital researchers prior to administering the survey (Sorra et al., 2016).  
Analysis and first level of data cleaning by hospitals. The first data cleaning for the 
comparative database took place at the hospital level. Researchers at hospitals and hospital 
organizations either conducted their own data entry, analysis and report preparation or contracted 
with a company to do the same. When the paper surveys were returned, researchers excluded 
surveys that had blank areas or contained the same answer for all the questions. Also, surveys 
that were illegible, mismarked or had double responses were excluded and discarded (Sorra et 
al., 2016).  
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Creating datasets. Once the surveys were cleaned, a response rate was calculated and a 
dataset was created. The data for paper survey administration were entered into a data file using 
SAS®, SPSS®, Microsoft Excel®, or by sending the data in an easily imported file to Westat®, 
using the electronic address of databasesonsafetyculture@westat.com. All data were stored on 
the Westat® protected server (Sorra et al., 2016). 
For paper survey administration, surveys were de-identified with numbers assigned to all 
surveys and all information linking the number to a respondent’s name destroyed (Sorra et al., 
2016). For web surveys, hospital personnel involved in the survey administration assured 
participants that responses were coded and captured accurately in computer-based data files and 
that surveys were administered anonymously (Sorra et al., 2016). Although there was the ability 
at the end of the survey for free text comments, these comments were not captured in the AHRQ 
dataset and therefore were not included in this study.  
Second level of data cleaning by Westat®. Westat® conducted a second cleaning of 
data. In this process, Westat® ran response frequencies on each hospital’s data looking for 
outliers, missing variables or other anomalies (Sorra et al., 2016). When data problems were 
noted, hospitals were contacted and asked to make corrections and resubmit their data (Sorra et 
al., 2016). Each participating hospital was sent a copy of its data frequencies to verify that the 
dataset Westat® received was correct (Sorra et al., 2016). All respondents supplying the same 
answers within or across survey sections with a nondifferentiation in ratings, or who answered 
only demographic items, were deleted before analysis (Sorra et al., 2016). Westat® also 
excluded hospitals that did not administer the entire survey, did not ask what unit the respondent 
worked in, or only had one unit that responded to the survey (Sorra et al., 2016; Sorra & Dyer, 
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2010). Units within hospitals were dropped if there were fewer than three respondents or if the 
unit was identified as “other” or “many different work units.” In these cases, individuals did not 
belong to the same unit and therefore should not be grouped together for analysis (Sorra & Dyer, 
2010; Sorra et al., 2016).  
Justification of Sample Size 
The 2016 HSOPSC dataset has been shown to have an adequate sample size for this 
study with data collected between June 2013 and July 2015. Within the dataset, there were 680 
hospitals that submitted data from 447,584 respondents (Famolaro et al., 2016). Of that subset, 
31,509 (7%) of respondents worked in 102 children’s hospitals and pediatric hospital units 
registered by the American Hospital Association (Famolaro et al., 2016). Data representing the 
responses of pediatric organizational leaders and practitioners can be extracted from the main 
dataset, thereby providing the study samples for this research. The 2016 U.S. database supports 
the statistical power to test complex multivariable analyses for this study (Trzesniewski et al., 
2011).  
Development of the 2016 HSOPSC Pediatric Datasets 
To address the aims, pediatric variables were filtered from the 2016 U.S. HSOPSC 
dataset creating pediatric subsets for RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers. These 
pediatrics subsets could then be merged into one large pediatric dataset, as required for analysis. 
Details on how the data were transformed to filter pediatric variables are described below.  
Variables 
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There are two independent variables—professional role and hospital characteristics—and 
12 dependent variables—the 10 safety culture dimensions and the two outcome dimensions. 
Each will be conceptually and operationally defined below.  
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Independent Variables 
The responses of persons that self-identified as having worked within a pediatric hospital 
or work area, at one of the four professional levels (RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers), were the independent variables. These professional groups were 
studied for their effects on the dependent variables, the 12 safety culture dimensions. 
Extraction of the independent variables. Section A in the HSOPSC includes questions 
related to each respondent’s work area or unit (see Appendix B). Respondents self-identified the 
department or clinical area of the hospital where they spent most of their work time or provided 
most of their clinical services, with pediatric specialty as an option. This was initially coded as 
‘e’ in the original survey and dataset, but transformed to ‘6’ for statistical analysis (see Appendix 
B) (Famolaro et al., 2016).  
The covariates of hospital bed size, teaching status and region within the U.S. were 
demographic characteristics relating to the four types of professionals and were also extracted 
from the original dataset. These covariates were chosen to determine whether the perceptions of 
RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers differed depending on the size, location and 
teaching status of their pediatric hospital or specialty unit within the U.S. These three covariates 
were also independent variables in the analyses.  
Dependent Variables  
Extraction and transformation of dependent variables. The 10 safety culture 
dimensions and two outcome dimensions were the dependent variables, described in detail in 
Chapter Two (see Figure 3). Table 3 outlines each dimension and the associated nomenclature 
that identifies the items or questions in the survey that pertains to each dimension. For example, 
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the four items or questions that pertain to the dimension of Teamwork Within Hospital Units can 
be found within the HSOPSC, in section A, items 1, 3, 4 and 11 (see Table 3 and Appendix B).  
Table 3. HSOPSC Categories, Culture Categories, Dimensions and Items 
Safety Culture Dimensions Survey Items and Questions  
 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
 
A1, A3, A4, A11 
Organizational Learning-Continuous 
Improvement 
 
A6, A9, A13 
Staffing A2, A5, A7, A14 
 
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
 
A8, A12, A16 
Hospital Management Support for 
Patient Safety 
 
F1, F8, F9 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and 
Actions Promoting Safety 
B1, B2, B3, B4 
 
Feedback and Communication About 
Error 
 
 
C1, C3, C5  
Communication Openness C2, C4, C6 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units F2, F4, F6 F10 
  
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions F3, F5, F7, F11 
  
Two Outcome Dimensions 
 
Frequency of Event Reporting 
 
                                
 
D1, D2, D3 
Overall Perceptions of Safety A10, A15, A17, A18 
 
The items and questions in the HSOPSC were measured for agreement (strongly disagree 
to strongly agree) or frequency (never to always) using a five-point Likert scale (Sorra & Nieva, 
2004). Items included in the survey (see Appendix B) were both positively worded (“People 
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support one another in this unit”) and negatively worded items (“We have patient safety 
problems in this unit”) (Famolaro et al., 2016). Prior to release of the 2016 HSOPSC dataset, 
Westat® transformed negatively worded responses to a positive Likert scale (Famolaro et al., 
2016). 
Dimensions  
 The following section conceptually and operationally defines the dependent variables, 
which are the safety culture dimensions. The corresponding items and questions in the survey 
that relate to each dimension are also listed below (Sorra et al., 2016; Sorra & Nieva, 2004).  
Your Work Area. Hospital units, or Work Areas, were defined as places within the 
organization that were not considered departments and provide specialized patient care 
(“Hospital units,” 2012). Examples were the intensive care unit, a surgical unit, or the NICU. 
Work Area includes five dimensions, which are defined and operationalized below.  
1. “Teamwork Within Hospital Units” is defined as the hospital staff within a unit being 
supported by, and respectful of, one another. This was operationalized with survey items 
A1, A3, A4 and A11. 
2. “Staffing” is defined as perceived adequate staff numbers to meet workload in order to 
provide quality patient care. This was operationalized with survey items A2, A5, A7 and 
A14. 
3. “Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement” is defined as the perception that 
employees can learn from their mistakes, which in turn can lead to positive changes. This 
was operationalized with survey items A6, A9 and A13. 
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4. “Nonpunitive Response to Error” is defined as staff understanding that any mistakes they 
had made in the past would not be held against them, and that written reports of such 
events would not be kept in their personnel file. This was operationalized with survey 
items A8, A12 and A16. 
5. “Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety” is defined as the staff’s perception 
that their hospital management provided a work climate that promoted patient safety and 
confirmed to employees that patient safety was a top priority. This was operationalized 
with survey items F1, F8 and F9. 
Supervisor/Manager. This category is defined as a person who guides hospital 
employees as a team. This category was defined by one dimension, which are described and 
operationalized below.  
1. “Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety” is defined as the 
perception hospital staff has of their supervisors and managers regarding activities that 
improve patient safety. This was operationalized with survey items B1, B2, B3 and B4. 
Communication. Communication is defined as the exchange of information, thoughts 
and feelings among people using speech or other means while providing patient care (Kourkouta 
& Papathanasiou, 2014). This category had two dimensions, which are defined and 
operationalized below.  
1. “Feedback and Communication About Error” is defined as the staff’s perception of being 
informed of recent errors and receiving feedback on how such errors can be prevented. In 
addition, staff believed that they were informed of changes that were put into place to 
prevent future events. This was operationalized with survey items C1, C3 and C5. 
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2. “Communication Openness” is defined as staff members perceiving they could freely 
speak up if they saw something that negatively affected patient care. They also were free 
to question authority. This was operationalized with survey items C2, C4 and C6. 
Your Hospital. The hospital category refers to the institution in which sick or injured 
persons are given medical or surgical treatment and where respondents of the survey were 
employed (“Hospitals,” 2017). This category had two dimensions, which are defined and 
operationalized below.  
1. “Teamwork Across Hospital Units” is defined as hospital units cooperating and 
coordinating patient care activities with one another, in the best interest of their patients. 
This dimension also includes whether hospital systems foster teamwork between hospital 
units. This was operationalized with items or questions F2, F4, F6 and F10. 
2. “Hospital Handoffs and Transitions” is defined as a dimension that relates to whether 
practitioners believe important patient information has been transferred from one care 
provider to another, across hospital units and during the change of shifts. This was 
operationalized with items or questions F3, F5, F7 and F11. 
Outcome Dimensions 
There were two additional dependent variables, which were the outcome dimensions: 
“Frequency of Event Reporting” and “Overall Perceptions of Safety.” These dimensions are 
defined and operationalized below.  
1.  “Frequency of Event Reporting” is defined as the staff’s perception of how frequently 
errors occur and the prevalence of reporting such errors. This outcome dimension was 
operationalized with survey items D1, D2 and D3. 
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 2. “Overall Perceptions of Safety” is defined as the general sense employees had of their 
organization’s error prevention procedures and systems. This outcome dimension was 
operationalized with items or questions A8, A10, A15 and A17.  
Data Analysis 
 The 2016 HSOPSC dataset was obtained from Westat®, which contained responses from 
all levels of hospital employees in all specialty areas throughout the country. Data related to the 
pediatric setting was extracted from that dataset and further divided into professional groupings 
of pediatric administration/managers, MDs, PAs/NPs and RNs. Data were analyzed by using the 
latest version of the statistical software program SPSS®. In the following section, the 
assumptions for parametric testing will be discussed. This will be followed by the research aims 
and analyses that are pertinent to address each aim.  
Large Datasets and Testing Assumptions 
A cross-sectional study of secondary data is well suited for describing variables and their 
distribution patterns. Secondary data, or data collected for other reasons, provides researchers the 
ability to evaluate quality markers within institutions over time (Burkhart, et al., 2016). Such 
methods can identify the impact of quality innovations that are independent of other variables 
within the organization’s settings (Burkhart, et al., 2016). Large samples, such as that in this 
study, provide the statistical power to test complex multivariable and multivariate analyses and 
provide the opportunity to investigate low prevalence behaviors on small population subgroups 
typically understudied (Trzesniewski et al., 2011). This design was valuable in providing 
descriptive information about the prevalence of safety culture from representatives of the 
pediatric care specialty at a national level (Hulley et al., 2013; Trzesniewski et al., 2011). Such 
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information has historically been valuable for policy research for which typical goals are to 
provide findings specific to target policy audiences, such as that within the pediatric specialty 
(Trzesniewski et al., 2011). A cross-sectional study of secondary data is well suited for 
describing the perceptions and distribution patterns of safety culture dimensions from the 
viewpoint of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers in U.S. pediatric hospitals and 
specialty units. The assumptions were that the sample was random or systematic random, with a 
response rate of 50% and a confidence interval of +/− 5% (Sorra et al., 2016). 
Aim 1 and Analysis  
Describe the 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as perceived by 
RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers employed within U.S. pediatric hospitals and 
specialty units. 
Analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics, including mean, standard deviation 
and sample size (Pallant, 2010).  
Aim 2: Hypothesis and Analysis  
Determine whether there is a significant difference in the perception of the 10 safety 
culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as perceived by RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers working within pediatric hospitals and specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is a significant difference in the perception of the 10 safety culture 
dimensions and two outcome dimensions as perceived by RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers working within pediatric hospitals and specialty units. 
Analysis for Aim 2 involved several steps using multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and post hoc tests using multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) and 
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Tukey’s Honestly Significant Different (HSD) pairwise comparisons. Such testing compares the 
groups, underscoring whether the mean differences between the groups on the combination of 
dependent variables may have occurred by chance (Field, 2011; Pallant, 2010). MANOVA 
provided data noting whether there was a statistically significant difference between the four 
professional groups as they relate to the 10 safety culture dimensions and two outcome 
dimensions. MANCOVA provided data noting whether there was a statistically significant 
difference between the four professional groups as they relate to the 10 safety culture dimensions 
and two outcome dimensions, using a 4 x 12 matrix (roles by dimensions), considering three 
hospital covariates of bed size, teaching status and region within the U.S. 
Tukey’s (HSD) was included to provide a more stringent one-way between-groups 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) due to the large number of different comparisons and to guard 
against a Type 1 error, particularly due to large differences in group sample sizes (Pallant 2010). 
In summary, the MANCOVA controlled for the covariates, while the Tukey’s HSD did not 
control for the covariates. Both tests were used to evaluate differences across professional roles. 
Testing was performed at the 0.05 level of significance. It was determined at the onset of this 
study that the Likert scales would be considered interval measures (Jamieson, 2004; Knapp, 
1990).  
Aim 3: Hypothesis and Analysis  
Determine the association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome 
dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals and 
specialty units.  
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Hypothesis: There is an association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals 
and specialty units. 
Analysis for Aim 3 involved parametric testing with partial correlations between the 10 
safety culture dimensions and the first outcome dimension of the perceived Frequency of Event 
Reporting by pediatric practitioners in the U.S. while controlling for the impact of the Overall 
Perceptions of Safety. Partial correlation was used to explore the relationships between two 
variables while statistically controlling for a confounding variable (Pallant, 2010). This test is 
useful when it is suspected that a relationship between two variables may be influenced by a 
confounding variable (Pallant, 2010). A positive correlation indicates that when one variable 
increases, so does the other. A negative correlation indicates that as one variable increases, 
another will decrease (Pallant, 2010). A partial correlation allows for control of the possible 
effects of other confounding variables by removing these variables. This allows a more accurate 
picture of the relationship between the variables of interest (Pallant, 2010). It is noted that 
although a relationship between the two variables may be detected, findings are descriptive and 
does not indicate causality (Pallant, 2010). 
Aim 4: Hypothesis and Analysis  
Determine the association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome 
dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units. 
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Analysis for Aim 4 is similar to that for Aim 3. The association will be determined 
between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of 
Safety while controlling for the impact of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting (Pallant, 
2010). Once again it is noted that although a relationship between the two variables may be 
detected, findings are descriptive and does not indicate causality (Pallant, 2010). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the analysis and findings for this study. It begins with a description 
of the sample, followed by the analysis findings of the four study aims.  
Sample 
 The 2016 database had a total of 447,584 hospital staff respondents, of which 6,862 
identified as working within the pediatric specialty. Within the pediatric specialty, there were 
397 Administrators/Managers, 832 MDs, 341 PAs/NPs and 5,292 RN (see Table 4). Pediatric 
registered nurses had the largest number of responses (77.1 %), followed by MDs (12.1%), 
administrators/managers (5.8%) and PAs/NPs (5 %). 
Table 4. Sample per Professional Level  
Respondent Category N      Percent 
Administrators/Managers  397       5.8 
Physicians  832     12.1 
Physician assistants/Nurse practitioners   341       5.0 
Registered Nurses 5,292      77.1 
Total 6,862   100 
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Samples were taken from five regions in the U.S.: New England and Mid-Atlantic, South 
Atlantic, East Central, West Central and Mountain and Pacific (see Table 5). The majority of 
these responses from pediatric employees were found in the New England/Mid-Atlantic and 
South Atlantic regions of the U.S. with a combined total of 3,355 responses (48.8%). The region 
where pediatric hospitals and specialty units were located was considered a covariate in this 
analysis. 
Table 5. Frequency and Percent of Responses per U.S. Region  
Region Frequency of 
Responses 
           Percent 
 
New England/Mid-
Atlantic 
 
 
1,639 
 
23.8 
South Atlantic 1,716 25.0 
East Central 1,549 22.5 
West Central    952 13.8 
Mountain & Pacific  1,019 14.8 
Missing*       13     0.19 
Total               6,875                 100 
* Missing data due to program calculations within SPSS 
The bed size of the hospital where pediatric professionals were employed was a 
consideration in this study (see Table 6). Hospitals with 300 beds or more accounted for 55.6%, 
or 3,823 responses from pediatric RNs, PA/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers. The size of 
the hospital was the second covariate in this study. 
102 
 
 
Table 6. Frequency and Percent of Responses per Bed Size of U.S. Pediatric Hospitals  
Bed Size Frequency of Responses                    Percent 
6-49   212   3.1 
50-99   550   8.0 
100-199    930 13.5 
200-299 1,360 19.8 
300-399    621   9.0 
400 and more 3,202 46.6 
Missing*      13     0.19 
Total 6,875                       100 
*Missing data due to program calculations within SPSS  
A third covariate within the 2016 HSOPSC data subsets was whether pediatric hospitals 
or specialty units were located within a teaching or nonteaching facility, creating the third 
covariate in this analysis (see Table 7). In this sample, there were 83.1 % of the responses 
employed at teaching hospitals. 
Table 7. Frequency and Percent of Responses per Teaching Status of U.S. Pediatric Hospitals 
 
Type of Hospital Frequency of Responses                  Percent 
Non-Teaching 1,163 16.9 
Teaching 5,712 83.1 
Missing*      13     0.19 
Total 6,875                       100 
*Missing data due to program calculations within SPSS 
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Aim 1 Findings 
 Descriptive statistics of the four professional groups are presented per dimension. When 
analyzing data for the descriptive means and standard deviations, as well as for MANOVA, 
MANCOVA, and for partial correlations, SPSS® drops all surveys that were not answered 
completely. Therefore, the final sample sizes used for the multiple analyses were below that 
found in the descriptive statistics due to SPSS® program calculations. For the sample of RNs, 
there were 732 (14%) fewer responses in the analysis when compared to the original descriptive 
statistics. For the sample of PAs/NPs, there were 87 (26%) fewer responses in the analysis when 
compared to the original descriptive statistics. For the sample of MDs, there were 200 (24%) 
fewer responses in the analysis when compared to the original descriptive statistics. For the 
sample of Administrators/Managers, there were 70 (18%) fewer responses in the analysis when 
compared to the original descriptive statistics. 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
As shown in Table 8, this dimension had an overall mean of 4.14 with a standard 
deviation of 0.66. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension very high, with only 
one professional group (RNs) rating this dimension below the overall mean.  
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Table 8. Teamwork Within Hospital Units per Professional Group 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2   4.10 0.675 
PA/NP   254   4.4 4.14 0.604 
MD   632 11.0 4.24 0.613 
Adm/Mgr   327    5.7 4.38 0.582 
Total 5773      100 4.14 0.664 
 
Staffing 
As shown in Table 9, this dimension had an overall mean of 2.66 with a standard 
deviation of 0.536. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension low, with two 
professional groups (PAs/NPs and Administrators/Managers) rating this dimension below the 
overall mean. 
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Table 9. Staffing per Professional Group 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 2.67 0.535 
PA/NP   254   4.4 2.62 0.540 
MD   632 11.0 2.74 0.506 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 2.56 0.580 
Total 5773     100 2.66 0.536 
 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement 
As shown in Table 10, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.86 with a standard 
deviation of 0.655. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension high, with two 
professional groups (RNs and PAs/NPs) rating this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 10. Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.83 0.662 
PA/NP   254   4.4 3.85 0.622 
MD   632 11.0 3.91 0.598 
Adm/Mgr   327    5.7 4.22 0.585 
Total 5773 100 3.86 0.655 
 
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
As shown in Table 11, this dimension had an overall mean of 2.71 with a standard 
deviation of 0.933. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension low, with one 
professional group (RNs) rating this dimension above the overall mean. 
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Table 11. Nonpunitive Response to Error 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 2.77 0.938 
PA/NP   254   4.4 2.60 0.849 
MD   632 11.0 2.53 0.851 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 2.24 0.890 
Total 5773 100 2.71 0.933 
 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety 
As shown in Table 12, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.41 with a standard 
deviation of 0.485. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension above neutral, with 
one professional group (RNs) rating this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 12. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.39 0.495 
PA/NP   254   4.4 3.43 0.452 
MD   632 11.0 3.46 0.448 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 3.59 0.381 
Total 5773 100 3.41 0.485 
  
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety  
As shown in Table 13, this dimension had an overall mean of 2.96 with a standard 
deviation of 0.408. Means around 3.0 were considered neutral. All professional groups, on 
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average, rated this dimension neutral, with two professional groups (PAs/NPs and MDs) rating 
this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 13. Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 2.96 0.412 
PA/NP   254   4.4 2.91 0.412 
MD   632 11.0 2.94 0.402 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 2.97 0.352 
Total 5773 100 2.96 0.408 
 
Communication Openness 
As shown in Table 14, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.23 with a standard 
deviation of 0.448. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension neutral, with two 
professional groups (RNs and PAs/NPs) rating this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 14. Communication Openness 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.21 0.452 
PA/NP   254   4.4 3.28 0.417 
MD   632 11.0 3.27 0.407 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 3.43 0.437 
Total 5773 100 3.23 0.448 
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Feedback and Communication About Error 
As shown in Table 15, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.80 with a standard 
deviation of 0.802. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension high, with two 
professional groups (RNs and PAs/NPs) rating this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 15. Feedback and Communication About Error 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.77 0.807 
PA/NP   254   4.4 3.71 0.750 
MD   632 11.0 3.80 0.774 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 4.17 0.729 
Total 5773 100 3.80 0.802 
 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units  
As shown in Table 16, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.10 with a standard 
deviation of 0.332. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension neutral, with little 
differences between the means of the four professional groups. 
Table 16. Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.10 0.332 
PA/NP   254   4.4 3.08 0.371 
MD   632 11.0 3.08 0.295 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 3.07 0.370 
Total 5773 100 3.10 0.332 
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Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
As shown in Table 17, this dimension had an overall mean of 2.64 with a standard 
deviation of 0.792. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension low, with one 
professional group (Administrators/Managers) rating this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 17. Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 2.65 0.780 
PA/NP   254   4.4 2.72 0.793 
MD   632 11.0 2.65 0.837 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 2.46 0.854 
Total 5773 100 2.64 0.792 
 
Frequency of Event Reporting 
As shown in Table 18, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.80 with a standard 
deviation of 0.811. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension high, with two 
professional groups (PAs/NPs and MDs) rating this dimension below the overall mean. 
Table 18. Frequency of Event Reporting 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.81 0.811 
PA/NP   254   4.4 3.63 0.842 
MD   632 11.0 3.74 0.790 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 3.98 0.783 
Total 5773 100 3.80 0.811 
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Overall Perceptions of Safety  
As shown in Table 19, this dimension had an overall mean of 3.01 with a standard 
deviation of 0.411. All professional groups, on average, rated this dimension neutral, with one 
professional group (RNs) rating this dimension above the overall mean. 
Table 19. Overall Perceptions of Safety 
Professional 
Group 
Sample 
Size 
Percent Mean Standard 
Deviation 
RN 4560 79.2 3.02 0.413 
PA/NP   254   4.4 2.97 0.374 
MD   632 11.0 2.98 0.392 
Adm/Mgr   327   5.7 2.99 0.435 
Total 5773 100 3.01 0.411 
 
Aim 2 Findings 
Determine whether there is a significant difference in the perception of the 10 safety 
culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions as perceived by pediatric RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs 
and Administrators/Managers working within pediatric hospitals and specialty units. MANOVA 
and MANCOVA pairwise comparisons along with post hoc testing using and Tukey’s HSD were 
used per dimension for each set of professional groups. Tables reflecting these comparisons will 
follow.  
Multivariate Testing 
MANOVA and MANCOVA were run to determine if a statistical significance was 
present between the safety culture dimensions and RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and 
Administrators/Managers. There was a statistical significance between the four professional 
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groups and the 12 safety culture dimensions, which include the two outcome dimensions, using 
MANOVA and controlling for the covariates of bed size, teaching status and geographic region 
using MANCOVA (see Table 20). There was a statistically significant difference for both 
analyses. 
Table 20. Multivariate Statistics for Professional Groups 
Statistical 
Test 
Test Value F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
MANOVA Wilks’ 
Lambda 
0.95 8.94 36 17013 < 0.001 
 
MANCOVA Wilks’ 
Lambda 
0.95 8.40 36 17261 < 0.001  
 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
As shown in Table 21 for MANOVA, there were statistically significant differences 
between RNs-MDs, PAs/NPs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, PA/NPs-Administrators/ 
Managers and MD-Administrators/Managers. When controlling for covariates (MANCOVA), 
statistical significance did not change for the six pairings. When controlling for multiple 
comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there were statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs, 
RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MD- Administrators/ 
Managers. Using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test, statistical significance changed for the pairwise 
comparison between the PAs/NPs-MDs for this dimension, going from statistically significant to 
insignificant. There were no statistically significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs for the 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units dimension.  
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Table 21. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of Professional Groups for Teamwork Within Hospital 
Units Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
RN & PA/NP    0.362    0.307    0.799 
RN & MD < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & MD    0.045    0.037     0.185 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
MD & Adm < 0.003    0.004    0.014 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Staffing 
As shown in Table 22, there were statistically significant differences among professional 
groups for the Staffing dimension. When controlling for covariates (MANCOVA), there were 
statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs, PAs/NPs-MDs, RNs-
Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. Similarly, when controlling for 
multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there were statistically significant differences between 
RNs-MDs, PAs/NPs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. 
There were no statistically significant differences for RNs-PAs/NPs and PAs/NPs-
Administrators/Managers for the Staffing dimension. 
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Table 22. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Staffing Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP 0.145 0.177 0.462 
RN & MD 0.002 0.001 0.011 
PA/NP & MD 0.002 0.002 0.013 
RN & Adm 0.001 0.002 0.004 
PA/NP & Adm 0.241 0.264 0.643 
MD & Adm       < 0.001     < 0.001       < 0.001 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement 
As shown in Table 23, there were statistically significant differences between 
professional groups for the Organizational Leaning and Continuous Improvement dimension. 
When controlling for covariates (MANCOVA), there were statistically significant differences 
between RNs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and 
MDs-Administrators/Managers. Similarly, when controlling for multiple comparisons (Tukey’s 
HSD), there were statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/ 
Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. There were 
no statistically significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs and PAs/NPs-MDs for the 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement dimension. 
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Table 23. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP    0.490    0.649    0.901 
RN & MD    0.003    0.004    0.017 
PA/NP & MD    0.280    0.214    0.702 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
MD & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
As shown in Table 24, there were statistically significant differences between 
professional groups for the Nonpunitive Response to Error dimension. When controlling for 
covariates (MANCOVA), there were statistically significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs, 
RNs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-
Administrators/Managers. Similarly, when controlling for multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), 
there were statistically significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs, RNs-MDs, RNs-
Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-
Administrators/Managers. There was no statistically significant difference for PAs/NP-MDs. 
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Table 24. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Nonpunitive Response to Error Dimension 
 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP    0.004    0.010    0.020 
RN & MD < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & MD    0.303    0.281    0.732 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
MD & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety 
As shown in Table 25, there were statistically significant differences between profession 
roles for the Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety dimension. When controlling for 
covariates (MANCOVA), there were statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs, 
RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/ 
Managers. Similarly, when controlling for multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there were 
statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs- 
Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. There were no statistically 
significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs and PAs/NPs-MDs. 
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Table 25. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety Dimension 
 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP    0.227    0.390    0.621 
RN & MD    0.002    0.004    0.012 
PA/NP & MD    0.484    0.371    0.897 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001    0.001 
MD & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety 
As shown in Table 26, there were no statistically significant differences between the four 
professional groups for the Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety 
dimension.  
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Table 26. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP 0.063 0.152 0.245 
RN & MD 0.175 0.345 0.528 
PA/NP & MD 0.400 0.481 0.835 
RN & Adm 0.560 0.290 0.937 
PA/NP & Adm 0.067 0.067 0.257 
MD & Adm 0.182 0.138 0.541 
 
Communication Openness 
As shown in Table 27, there were statistically significant differences between the 
professional groups for the Communication Openness dimension. When controlling for 
covariates (MANCOVA), there was a statistically significant difference between RNs-MDs, 
RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/ 
Managers. Similarly, when controlling for multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there were 
statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-
Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. There were no statistically 
significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs and PAs/NPs-MDs for the Communication 
Openness dimension.  
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Table 27. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Communication Openness Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP      0.720    0.734    0.984 
RN & MD < 0.001 < 0.001    0.002 
PA/NP & MD    0.089    0.092    0.323 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001    0.001 
MD & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Feedback and Communication About Error 
As shown in Table 28, there were statistically significant differences for the Feedback 
and Communication About Error dimension. When controlling for covariates (MANCOVA), 
there were statistically significant differences between RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs- 
Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. Similarly, when controlling for 
multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there were statistically significant differences between 
RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-
Administrators/Managers. There were no statistically significant differences between RNs-
PAs/NPs, RNs-MDs and PAs/NPs-MDs for the Feedback and Communication About Error 
dimension.  
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Table 28. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Feedback and Communication About Error Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP    0.149     0.099    0.471 
RN & MD   0.402     0.532    0.836 
PA/NP & MD    0.083      0.073    0.307 
RN & Adm < 0.001   < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001   < 0.001    0.001 
MD & Adm < 0.001   < 0.001 < 0.001 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
Table 29. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Teamwork Across Hospital Units Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
 
RN & PA/NP 0.254      0.249 0.665 
RN & MD 0.148      0.146 0.470 
PA/NP & MD 0.871      0.867 0.998 
RN & Adm 0.084      0.077 0.309 
PA/NP & Adm 0.761      0.746 0.990 
MD & Adm 0.582      0.563 0.947 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
As shown in Table 29, there were no statistically significant differences between the four 
professional groups for the Teamwork Across Hospital Units dimension.  
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Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
As shown in Table 30, there were statistically significant differences between 
professional groups for the Hospital Handoffs and Transitions dimension. When controlling for 
covariates (MANCOVA), there were statistically significant differences between RNs-
Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-
Administrators/Managers. When controlling for multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there 
were statistically significant differences between RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs- 
Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. There were no statistically 
significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs, RNs-MDs and PAs/NPs-MDs for the Hospital 
Handoffs and Transitions dimension.  
Table 30. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Hospital Handoffs and Transitions Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
RN & PA/NP    0.158    0.214    0.492 
RN & MD    0.996    0.745    1.000 
PA/NP & MD    0.222    0.205    0.613 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
MD & Adm 0.001 < 0.001 0.003 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
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Frequency of Event Reporting 
As shown in Table 31, there were statistically significant differences between 
professional groups for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting dimension. When 
controlling for covariates (MANCOVA), there were statistically significant differences between 
RNs-PAs/NPs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-
Administrators/Managers. When controlling for multiple comparisons (Tukey’s HSD), there 
were statistically significant differences between RNs-PAs/NPs, RNs-Administrators/Managers, 
PAs/NPs-Administrators/Managers and MDs-Administrators/Managers. There were no 
statistically significant differences between RNs-MDs and PAs/NPs-MDs for the perceived 
Frequency of Event Reporting dimension.  
Table 31. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting Dimension 
Professional 
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD 
RN & PA/NP    0.001    0.001    0.003 
RN & MD    0.040    0.063    0.168 
PA/NP & MD    0.067    0.065    0.260 
RN & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
PA/NP & Adm < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
MD & Adm 0.001 < 0.001 0.003 
Note: Bold type indicates p < 0.05 
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Overall Perceptions of Safety 
As shown in Table 32, there were no statistically significant differences between the four 
professional groups for the Overall Perceptions of Safety dimension.  
Table 32. Pairwise and Post-Hoc Testing of RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers 
for the Overall Perceptions of Safety Dimension 
  Professional   
Groups 
Pairwise 
MANOVA 
 
Pairwise 
MANCOVA 
 
Multiple 
Comparisons 
Tukey’s HSD  
RN & PA/NP 0.069 0.086 0.264 
RN & MD 0.060 0.061 0.235 
PA/NP & MD 0.615 0.673 0.958 
RN & Adm 0.250 0.309 0.658 
PA/NP & Adm 0.538 0.528 0.927 
MD & Adm 0.836 0.753 0.997 
 
Aim 3 Findings 
Determine the association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome 
dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals and 
specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of perceived Frequency of Event Reporting within U.S. pediatric hospitals 
and specialty units.  
Analysis for this aim involved parametric testing with partial correlations between the 10 
safety culture dimensions within U.S. pediatric hospital and specialty units and one group of all 
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four pediatric professionals (RNs, PAs/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers) while 
controlling for Overall Perceptions of Safety (see Table 33). The percent of variance that the 10 
dimensions account for of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting dimension range from 
0.88% to 24.4% as shown in Table 33. The following will discuss each dimension.  
Table 33. Partial Correlations of the Percent of Variance Contributing to perceived Frequency of 
Event Reporting When Controlling for Overall Perceptions of Safety 
*p < 0.001 
  
  
Safety Culture Dimension Percent of Variance 
Contributing to Perceived 
Frequency of Event 
Reporting 
 
    Percent of Variance   
   Contributing to Perceived 
   Frequency of Event 
    Reporting Controlling for  
   Overall Perceptions of 
Safety 
1. Teamwork Within 
      Hospital Units  
 
 9.24*  9.30* 
2. Staffing   0.88*  0.97* 
 
3. Organizational Learning: 
     Continuous Improvement 
 
15.29* 15.29* 
4. Nonpunitive Response to 
     Error  
 
7.08* 
 
7.34* 
 
5. Hospital Management 
      Support for Patient 
      Safety 
 
4.71* 
 
4.67* 
 
6. Supervisor/Manager 
      Expectations and Actions 
      Promoting Safety 
 
 0.31* 
 
 0.29* 
 
7. Communication 
     Openness 
 
 8.01* 
 
 8.01* 
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Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units accounted for 9.24% of the variance for the perceived 
Frequency of Event Reporting by the four professional groups (see Table 33). When controlling 
for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety, the change in the variance increased to 9.30%, 
confirming that the perceptions of Teamwork Within Hospital Units accounted for a meaningful 
variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting dimension by the group of four 
professional groups. 
Staffing 
The Staffing dimension within hospital units accounted for 0.88% of the perceived 
Frequency of Event Reporting by the four professional groups (see Table 33). When controlling 
for the effects of the Overall Perceptions of Safety outcome dimension, the change in the 
variance increased to 0.97%, an increase of 10.2%, confirming that the perceptions of Staffing 
Table 33 (cont.)   
Safety Culture Dimension  Percent of Variance 
Contributing to Perceived 
Frequency of Event Reporting 
 
   Percent of Variance   
Contributing to Perceived  
Frequency of Event 
Reporting Controlling for 
Overall Perceptions of 
Safety 
   
 
8. Feedback and Communi- 
     cation About Errors  
 
24.40* 
 
24.40* 
 
9. Teamwork Across 
      Hospital Units 
 
  0.03* 
 
 0.03* 
 
10. Hospital Handoffs and 
       Transitions 
 
10.82* 
 
10.96* 
*p < 0.001   
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consistently accounted for a weak variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting 
dimension by the group of four professionals. 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement 
The Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement dimension within hospital units 
accounted for 15.29% of the variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the 
group of four professionals. There was no change in variance when controlling for the effects of 
Overall Perceptions of Safety outcome dimension, confirming that perception of the 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement dimension accounted for a meaningful 
variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four professionals.  
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
The Nonpunitive Response to Error dimension within hospital units accounted for 7.08% 
of the variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four 
professionals. When controlling for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety dimension, the 
change in the variance increased to 7.34%, an increase of 3.7%, confirming that the perception of 
the Nonpunitive Response to Error dimension accounted for a meaningful variance of the 
perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four professionals. 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety 
The Hospital Management Support Promoting Patient Safety dimension within hospital 
units accounted for 4.71% of the variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the 
group of four professionals. When controlling for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety, 
the change in the variance decreased to 4.67%, a decrease of 0.85%, confirming that the 
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perception of Hospital Management Support Promoting Patient Safety dimension accounted for a 
mild variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four professionals. 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety 
The Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety dimension within 
hospital units accounted for 0.31% of the variance of the perceived Frequency of Event 
Reporting by the group of four professionals. When controlling for the effects of Overall 
Perceptions of Safety, the change in the variance decreased to 0.29%, a decrease of 6.5%, 
confirming that perception of the Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting 
Safety dimension accounted for a weak variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting 
by the group of four professionals. 
Communication Openness 
For the dimension of Communication Openness within hospitals, the perceived 
Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four professionals accounted for 8.01% of the 
variance. When controlling for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety, there was no change 
in the variance confirming that the perception of Communication Openness dimension accounted 
for a meaningful variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four 
professionals. 
Feedback and Communication About Error 
For the dimension of Feedback and Communication About Error within hospitals, the 
perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four professionals accounted for 24.4% 
of the variance. When controlling for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety, there was no 
change in the variance confirming that the perception of the Feedback and Communication 
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About Error dimension accounted for a strong variance of the perceived Frequency of Event 
Reporting by the group of four professionals. 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
For the dimension of Teamwork Across Hospital Units, the perceived Frequency of 
Event Reporting by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.03% of the variance. When 
controlling for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety, there was no change in the variance 
confirming that the perception of the Teamwork Across Hospital Units dimension accounted for 
a weak variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group of four 
professionals. 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
For the dimension of Hospital Handoffs and Transitions, the perceived Frequency of 
Event Reporting by the group of four professionals accounted for 10.82% of the variance. When 
controlling for the effects of Overall Perceptions of Safety, the change in the variance increased 
to 10.96%, an increase of 1.3%, confirming the perceptions of Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
accounted for a meaningful variance of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting by the group 
of four professionals. 
Aim 4 Findings 
Determine the association between the 10 safety culture dimensions and the outcome 
dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty units.  
Hypothesis: There is an association between 10 safety culture dimensions and the 
outcome dimension of Overall Perceptions of Safety within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units. 
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Analysis for this aim involved parametric testing with partial correlations between the 10 
safety culture dimensions within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty units and one group of 
four pediatric professionals (RNs, PAs/NPs, MD and Administrators/Managers) while 
controlling for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting (see Table 34).  
Table 34. Percent of Variance Contributing to Overall Perceptions of Safety When Controlling 
for the Perception of the Frequency of Event Reporting  
Dimension  Percent of Variance 
Contributing to Overall 
Perceptions of Safety 
 
Percent of Variance 
Contributing to Overall 
Perceptions of Safety 
Controlling for Frequency of 
Event Reporting 
1. Teamwork Within Hospital 
      Units   
  0.001* 0.01* 
2. Staffing  4.12* 4.20* 
3. Organizational Learning:  
     Continuous Improvement 
 
 
0.27* 
 
0.25* 
4. Nonpunitive Response to 
     Error  
 
 
2.04* 
 
2.34* 
5. Hospital Management 
     Support for Patient Safety 
0.38* 0.36* 
 
6. Supervisor/Manager 
    Expectations and Action 
    Promoting Safety 
 
1.46* 
 
1.44* 
 
7. Communication Openness 
 
0.13* 
 
0.10* 
 
8. Feedback and Communi- 
     cation About Errors  
 
0.06* 
 
0.03* 
 
9. Teamwork Across Hospital 
     Units 
 
0.90* 
 
0.90* 
 
10. Hospital Handoffs and 
       Transitions 
 
0.27* 
 
0.37* 
*p < 0.05 
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The percent of variance that the 10 dimensions account for of the Overall Perceptions of 
Safety dimensions range from 0.001–4.20 as shown in Table 34. The following will discuss each 
dimension.  
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
For the Teamwork Within Hospital Units dimension, Overall Perceptions of Safety 
reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.001% of the variance. When 
controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the change in the 
variance increased to 0.01%, confirming that perceptions of Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
had a weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals.  
Staffing 
For the Staffing dimension, Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four 
professionals accounted for 4.12% of the variance. When controlling for the effects of the 
perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the change in the variance increased to 4.20%, an 
increase of 0.08%, confirming that perceptions of Staffing had a mild effect on Overall 
Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals. 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement 
For the Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement dimension, Overall 
Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.27% of the 
variance. When controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the 
change in the variance decreased to 0.25%, a decrease of 7.4%, confirming that perceptions of 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement had a weak effect on Overall Perceptions of 
Safety reported by the group of four professionals. 
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Nonpunitive Response to Error 
For the Nonpunitive Response to Error dimension, Overall Perceptions of Safety reported 
by the group of four professionals accounted for 2.04% of the variance. When controlling for the 
effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the change in the variance increased to 
2.34%, an increase of 14.7%, confirming perceptions of Organizational Learning-Continuous 
Improvement had a weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four 
professionals. 
Hospital Management Support Promoting Safety 
For the Hospital Management’s Support Promoting Safety dimension, Overall 
Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.38% of the 
variance. When controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the 
change decreased to 0.36%, a decrease of 5.3%, confirming perceptions of Hospital Management 
Support Promoting Safety had a weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the 
group of four professionals. 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety 
For the Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety dimension, the 
Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 1.46% of 
the variance. When controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the 
change in the variance decreased to 1.44%, a decrease of 0.15%, confirming that perceptions of 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions of Management Promoting Safety had a weak 
effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals.
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Communication Openness 
For the Communication Openness dimension, Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by 
the group of four professionals accounted for 0.13% of the variance. When controlling for the 
effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the change in the variance decreased to 
0.10%, a decrease of 23.1%, confirming that perceptions of Communication Openness had a 
weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the group of four professionals. 
Feedback and Communication About Error 
For the dimension of Feedback and Communication About Error, Overall Perceptions of 
Safety reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.06% of the variance. When 
controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the change in the 
variance decreased to 0.03%, a decrease of 50%, confirming perceptions of Feedback and 
Communication About Error had a weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the 
group of four professionals.  
Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
For the Teamwork Across Hospital Units dimension, Overall Perceptions of Safety 
reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.90% of the variance. When 
controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, there was no change in 
the variance confirming that employee’s perception of Teamwork Across Hospital Units had a 
weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety as reported by the group of four professionals. 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
For the dimension of Hospital Handoffs and Transitions, Overall Perceptions of Safety 
reported by the group of four professionals accounted for 0.27% of the variance. When 
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controlling for the effects of the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, the change in the 
variance increased to 0.37%, an increase of 37%, confirming employee’s perception of Hospital 
Handoffs and Transitions had a weak effect on Overall Perceptions of Safety reported by the 
group of four professionals.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
For this study, a secondary data analysis of the 2016 HSOPSC database was performed to 
describe the safety culture within U.S. pediatric hospitals and specialty units from the 
perceptions of RNs, PA/NPs, MDs and Administrators/Managers. It was hypothesized that the 
safety culture of a pediatric hospital or hospital unit was perceived differently based on 
professional groups within that institution. In addition, it was hypothesized that the safety culture 
of pediatric hospital or hospital units was associated with the perceived Frequency of Event 
Reporting and Overall Perceptions of Safety within those institutions.  
Chapter Five will begin with the limitations of the study followed by a presentation of the 
findings as they relate to current hospital leadership, nursing practice, healthcare policy and 
healthcare’s academic institutions. The chapter concludes with considerations on future research 
surrounding safety cultures within pediatric hospital settings. 
Limitations of Study 
There are inherent limitations in the use of secondary data; thus, the study design 
included several limitations. This was a descriptive, cross-sectional design, which presents a 
snapshot of the perception of safety culture and does not reflect causality (Hully et al., 2013). 
This was a convenience sample of hospitals that self-selected to participate in the database
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(Hully et al., 2013). Under the requirements put forth by AHRQ, only hospitals that administered 
the survey independently were included in the database. However, although these hospitals were 
not randomly selected samples of all U.S. hospitals, the characteristics of the participating 
hospitals (i.e., teaching status, bed size, region within the U.S. and whether the hospital was a 
nongovernment not for profit institution) were reported to be similar to those within the 
distribution of hospitals registered by the American Hospital Association (Sorra et al., 2016).  
Another limitation was how the surveys were administered. Investigators overseeing 
survey distribution were not required to undergo any training; therefore, there was no way to 
validate that each hospital followed AHRQs data collection procedures. Although there were 
specific administrative guidelines for hospital officials to follow, there was no way to ensure 
compliance with the guidelines.  
The surveys were also administered in a combination of methods, which would be 
another limitation. Hospitals used paper surveys, Web-based and a combination of the two, with 
these various modes leading to disparities of the responses (Famolaro et al., 2016). Some 
hospitals conducted a census survey, while others surveyed only particular populations within 
the facility. AHRQ required hospitals with less than 500 physicians and staff to administer a 
census survey, and the methods used per hospital are not available (Famolaro et al., 2016). 
Therefore, there is no process to evaluate if these data collection methods affected the results of 
this study’s data.  
Another weakness is that the AHRQs 2016 database provided by Westat® could have 
been incomplete, inaccurate or measured in ways not ideal for addressing the research aims of 
this study. Such important variables were limitations and could not be measured or recorded 
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(Hulley et al., 2013). However, Westat® did provide a detailed description of the data cleaning 
methods. 
Finally, PAs/NPs were chosen, as they form a predetermined professional category in the 
HSOPSC dataset. This study does not provide a strategy that compares the perspectives of NPs 
to PAs or compare the NP and PA perspectives with other professional groups. There could be 
inconsistencies within these two professional groups that might have altered the findings.  
Discussion of Findings 
A graphical summary of the overall means for each professional group is presented per 
dimension in Figure 6. Dimensions will be discussed based on their overall means of 
professional respondents, categorized as high (means ≥ 3.3), neutral (means from 2.8–3.2), or 
low (means ≤ 2.7).  
 
136 
 
 
Figure 6: Descriptive means for professional groups and 12 safety culture dimensions  
 
The following sections will provide an integration of the research findings for Aims 1-4, as 
summarized in Table 35. 
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Table 35. Pediatric HSOPSC 2016 Unit Measures, Categories and Findings for Aims 1-4  
Safety Culture 
Dimensions 
Measure of 
Unit or 
Hospital  
Category Aim 1 
Mean of 
Prof 
Groups 
Aim 2 
Differences 
Between Roles 
Aim 3  
% of 
Variance for 
Frequency of 
Event 
Reporting 
Aim 4  
%  of 
Variance 
for Overall 
Perceptions 
of Safety 
Teamwork 
Within Hospital 
Units 
Unit  Work Area 4.14 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
9.24 0.01 
Organizational 
Learning-
Continuous 
Improvement 
Unit  Work Area 3.86 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
15.29 0.25 
Feedback and 
Communication 
About Error 
 
Unit  Communi-
cation 
3.80 Frontline-Adm 
 
24.40 0.03 
Hospital 
Management 
Support for 
Patient Safety 
Unit  Work Area 3.41 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
4.67 0.36 
Communication 
Openness 
Unit  Communi-
cation 
3.23 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
8.01 0.10 
 
Teamwork 
Across Hospital 
Units 
Hospital  Hospital 3.10 No differences 0.03 0.90 
Supervisor/ 
Manager 
Expectations and 
Actions Pro-
moting Safety 
Unit  Supervisor-
Manager 
2.96 No differences 0.29 1.44 
Nonpunitive 
Response to 
Error 
Unit Work Area 2.71 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
7.34 2.34 
Staffing Unit Work Area 2.67 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
PA/NP-MD 
0.98 4.20 
Hospital 
Handoffs and 
Transitions 
Hospital Hospital 2.64 Frontline-Adm 
 
10.96 0.37 
Outcome Dimensions 
Frequency of 
Event Reporting 
Unit  Outcome 
Measure 
3.80 Frontline-Adm 
RN-MD 
  
Overall 
Perceptions of 
Safety 
Unit  Outcome 
Measure 
3.01 No differences   
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Safety Culture Dimensions with High Means  
There were five dimensions with high overall means of professional respondents (≥ 3.3). 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units, Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement, Hospital 
Management Support for Patient Safety, Feedback and Communication About Error, and the 
perceived Frequency of Event Reporting (see Figure 6). These high means suggest that 
respondents perceived their work areas or unit positively. The supportive findings for each 
dimension as they relate to the four aims are found in Table 35 and are described below.  
Teamwork Within Hospital Units. This dimension measures the degree to which 
employees perceive they support one another, treat each other with respect, and work together as 
a team (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Findings indicated that all four professional 
groups rated this dimension high with an overall mean of 4.14. However, frontline professionals 
rated this dimension statistically significantly lower than hospital Administrators/Managers. This 
indicates that frontline professional groups agree that teamwork exists in units, but this 
perception is less than that of Administrators/Managers. It is also interesting to note that RNs and 
MDs perceived this dimension differently, with RNs rating this dimension significantly lower 
than MDs. Teamwork Within Hospital Units related to one outcome measure with 9.24% of the 
variance accounting for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting. This indicates that when 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units was perceived, groups were more apt to report adverse events. 
However, this dimension has a very weak variance accounting for 0.01% of Overall Perceptions 
of Safety, suggesting that a positive unit culture did not impact professionals’ perception of 
safety (see Table 35). 
Findings of this study are inconsistent with what was found in the literature in that the 
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literature did not report Teamwork Within Hospital Units high, or positive, in pediatric hospitals 
and specialty units. Peterson et al. (2012) examined the perceptions of safety culture within the 
NICU and found that these unique sites faced barriers related to teamwork. Such barriers 
included siloed care with vertical structuring that allowed for little collaboration. Sustainable 
improvements in interprofessional collaboration demand committed leaders and resource 
allocation that support improvement efforts at the bedside (Weingart et al., 2013; World Health 
Organization: Health workforce, 2010). 
The positive safety culture found in this research could be related to QI initiatives 
recently established to improve children’s safety, along with The Joint Commission’s (2008b) 
focus on creating more cooperative work environments (Korner et al., 2015; Sheth et al., 2016; 
Thomas & Galla, 2013). This study indicated a discrepancy between Administrators/Managers 
and frontline professionals, indicating a need for further research to determine the cause or the 
specificity of these differences. 
Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement. This dimension measures the 
degree to which employees believed their organization learns from mistakes and whether such 
errors have the possibility of leading to changes that can elevate the effectiveness of hospital care 
(Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Findings indicated that all professional groups rated 
this dimension high with the overall mean of 3.86. This indicates that pediatric professionals 
perceived their units as having positive safety cultures where employees learned from their 
errors. Once again, the means of frontline professionals are statistically significantly lower than 
those of hospital Administrators/Managers, with RNs rating this dimension statistically 
significantly lower than MDs. Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement was related to 
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one outcome measure with 15.29% of the variance accounting for the perceived Frequency of 
Event Reporting (see Table 35). This indicates that AEs were reported when professionals 
perceived they worked within a learning culture and where improvements in children’s care were 
the end result. However, this dimension has a very weak variance accounting for 0.25% of 
Overall Perceptions of Safety, suggesting that the positive culture did not impact the perception 
of safety for these professionals (see Table 35). 
These findings support Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model/Human Factor Model (1998) that 
states that human failures are evident. Therefore, to improve a system, human errors must be 
addressed within nonpunitive environments that encourage learning through system-oriented 
appraisals that are shared throughout the organization (Reason, 1990; The Joint Commission, 
2008b). This study indicated a discrepancy between Administrators/Managers and frontline 
professionals, indicating a need for further research to determine the cause or the specificity of 
these differences. 
Feedback and Communication About Error. This dimension measures the degree to 
which staff are informed of errors, are provided feedback on how errors can be prevented, and 
are informed of changes that were put into place to prevent future events (Blegen et al., 2009; 
Sorra & Dyer, 2010). All professional groups viewed Feedback and Communication About Error 
positively, with an overall mean of 3.80, but frontline professionals rated this dimension 
statistically significantly lower than hospital Administrators/Managers (see Table 35). Feedback 
and Communication About Error related to one outcome measure with 24.40% of the variance 
accounting for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting. This large variance suggests that 
when professionals perceived environments where they could learn from errors, they were more 
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likely to report errors. This dimension has a very weak variance accounting for 0.03% of Overall 
Perceptions of Safety indicating Feedback and Communication About Error had a very weak 
impact on professionals’ perception of safety within the unit (see Table 35). The lack of a 
relationship between the perceptions of these four professional groups may indicate that although 
frontline professionals are reporting errors, real change in promoting children’s safety was not 
perceived. This study indicated a discrepancy between Administrators/Managers and frontline 
professionals, indicating a need for further research to determine the cause or the specificity of 
these differences. 
Error reporting must be done within respectful settings that recognize the benefit of such 
communication (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; National Patient Safety Foundation, 
2015; World Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010). Findings from this study 
demonstrate the need for leadership within pediatric hospitals and specialty units to strengthen 
relationships between all professional groups where learning from mistakes takes place through 
system-oriented assessments that are shared throughout the organization (American Academy of 
Pediatrics, 2011; Reason, 1990).  
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety. This dimension measures the 
degree to which hospital management provides a work environment that promotes patient safety, 
confirming patient safety is a top priority (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). All 
professional groups viewed Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety somewhat 
positively, with an overall mean of 3.41, but frontline professionals viewed this dimension 
statistically significantly lower than hospital Administrators/Managers (see Figure 6). Also, RNs 
viewed Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety significantly lower than did MDs. 
142 
 
 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety is related to one outcome measure with 4.67% 
of the variance accounting for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting, suggesting that 
having the support of management did influence the reporting of AEs within the unit (see Table 
35). This dimension had a very weak variance accounting for 0.36% of Overall Perceptions of 
Safety, suggesting that positive work areas and units had little impact on professionals’ 
perception of safety (see Table 35). 
Findings from this study are consistent with The Joint Commission’s 2017 Sentinel Event 
Report where the commission set standards that address the perception discrepancy between 
frontline professionals and that of hospital leadership. In this report, The Joint Commission 
affirmed that hospital “leadership’s first priority is to be accountable for effective care while 
protecting the safety of patients, employees, and visitors” (The Joint Commission, 2017, p. 1). 
Findings indicate that this standard is not being met. This study indicated a discrepancy between 
Administrators/Managers and frontline professionals, supporting a need for further research to 
determine the cause or the specificity of these differences, particularly in pediatric settings. 
Safety Culture Dimensions with Neutral Means 
There were four dimensions with neutral means (2.8–3.2): Communication Openness, 
Overall Perceptions of Safety, Teamwork Across Hospital Units, and Supervisor/Manager 
Expectations and Actions Promoting Patient Safety. A discussion of the findings that support 
each dimension will follow. Overall, these neutral means suggest similar perceptions of safety 
culture exist between the four professional groups. 
Communication Openness. This dimension measures the degree to which respondents 
perceive that staff members can freely speak up if they see something that negatively affects 
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patient care and are free to question authority about a safety breach (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & 
Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). All professional groups perceived this dimension as neutral, 
with an overall mean of 3.23, indicating that staff members were unsure about their ability to 
freely speak up and report a safety breech within their hospital work area or unit (see Table 35). 
Frontline professionals viewed this dimension statistically significantly lower than hospital 
Administrators/Managers. Such findings demonstrate that frontline professionals may be more 
hesitant to report safety breaches than what was perceived by hospital administrators/managers. 
In addition, RNs viewed Communication Openness significantly lower than MDs, indicating 
inconsistent perceptions of communication between these two professional groups. 
Communication Openness is related to one outcome measure with 8.01% of the variance 
accounting for the perceived Frequency of Event Reporting. This finding implies that 
professionals are willing to report errors in hospital milieus they perceive as having transparent 
communication and reporting systems. Communication Openness had a very weak variance 
accounting for 0.10% of Overall Perceptions of Safety, suggesting that the transparency of 
communication within the unit did not impact professionals’ perception of safety (see Table 35). 
These findings are consistent with previous research, which has identified that poor work 
environments that lack open communication has contributed to 80% of the sentinel events 
influencing the continuity and planning of care (Rosenstein, 2011; The Joint Commission, 
2008b; Weingart et al., 2013). Failures in communication are the leading cause of AEs in the 
healthcare setting (Weingart et al., 2013). To reduce errors, a systems approach addressing 
obstructive communication must be implemented (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; 
Rosenstein, 2011; The Joint Commission, 2008b). This study indicated a discrepancy between 
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Administrators/Managers and frontline professionals, indicating a need for further research to 
determine the cause or the specificity of these differences. 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units. This dimension measures the degree to which 
respondents believe that hospital units cooperate and coordinate with one another to provide the 
best care for patients and whether hospital systems foster teamwork between hospital units 
(Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). All respondents perceived this dimension as neutral, 
with an overall mean of 3.10, with no statistically significant differences among respondent 
professional groups (see Table 35). This suggests that all professional groups were uncertain as 
to whether children’s care was coordinated during hospital transfers between units and specialty 
services. This poor recognition of Teamwork Across Hospital Units is in sharp contrast to the 
positive perception of the Teamwork Within Hospital Units dimension. As discussed earlier, 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units rated safety culture highly within hospital units. Teamwork 
Across Hospital Units had very weak variances for both outcome dimensions with 0.03% of the 
variance accounting for Frequency of Event Reporting and 0.90% of the variance accounting for 
Overall Perceptions of Safety. This study found that all professional levels recognized that the 
transition processes were weak in pediatric care facilities but, interestingly, did not relate to the 
perception of safety outcomes (see Table 35). 
Larrison et al. (2017) states that formal partnerships alone do not create seamless 
integration between healthcare providers. True collaboration and care integration requires 
resolving differences in organizational culture, workflow and information sharing (Larrison et 
al., 2017; Li & Robertson, 2011). Errors during patient transfers are well supported in the 
literature, and research indicated that by introducing standardized handoff tools with scripted 
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transport processes, the transitioning of a child across hospital units improved (Bleakley, 2010; 
Baines, DeBruijne, Langelaan, & Wagner, 2013; Chassin & Loeb, 2013; National Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015). Such improvements addressed the latent failures within the hospital systems, 
boosting communication across hospital units (Reason, 1990). By implementing changes in the 
care process, improved care practices were demonstrated across hospital settings (Peterson et al., 
2012; Weingart et al., 2013). Findings from this study found neutral means and no statistical 
significance for this dimension indicating further research to determine the cause or specificity 
for such perceptions within pediatric settings is necessary.  
 Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety. This dimension 
evaluated hospital staff’s perception of their supervisor or manager’s expectations and actions 
towards promoting patient safety and their willingness to promote safe care (Blegen et al., 2009; 
Sorra & Dyer, 2010). All respondents perceived this dimension as neutral, with an overall mean 
of 2.96, with no statistically significant differences among respondents (see Table 35). In 
addition, this dimension accounted for very weak variances for the two outcome dimensions 
examined, with 0.29% of the variance accounting for Frequency of Event Reporting and 1.44% 
of the variance accounting for Overall Perceptions of Safety. Such neutral findings suggest that 
leadership in promoting safety culture is perceived as weak in pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units and does not relate to safety outcomes (see Table 35). 
Recent publications on organizational leadership state that hospital administrators and 
managers have an essential role in the development of environments that encourage error 
reporting in an effort to identify safety hazards (Health and Safety Executive, 2005; Reason, 
1990; The Joint Commission, 2017). Having leaders who are visible and committed to patient 
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safety is vital to building a safety culture (Health and Safety Executive, 2005; The Joint 
Commission, 2017). Findings indicate that leadership visibility was perceived as neutral in this 
study, suggesting that frontline professionals found their unit supervisors and managers 
disinterested or unengaged in establishing a culture of safety. Leadership needs to seek and 
inspire others through transparent communication and accepting the responsibility for any safety 
flaws. Supervisors/Managers must lead by example, placing the well-being of patients and 
employees one of their core values (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; National Patient 
Safety Foundation, 2015; The Joint Commission, 2017; Townsend, 2007). More research is 
needed to better understand the forces driving these neutral perceptions to improve collaborative 
pediatric work settings. 
Safety Culture Dimensions with Low Means 
There were three dimensions with low means (≤ 2.7): Nonpunitive Response to Error, 
Staffing, and Hospital Handoff and Transitions. These low means suggest that respondents 
perceived a negative safety culture within their work areas or unit. A discussion of the findings 
for each dimension will follow. 
Nonpunitive Response to Error. This dimension is defined as staff understanding that 
any mistakes they had made in the past would not be held against them, and that written reports 
of such events would not be held in their personnel file (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 
2010). Within pediatric hospitals and specialty units, all frontline professional groups rated this 
dimension low, with an overall mean of 2.71 (see Table 35). This indicates that respondents 
generally felt their mistakes were held against them with reports retained in their personnel files. 
Frontline professionals rated this dimension higher than Administrators/Managers. When 
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comparing particular professional groups, RNs rated this dimension higher than MDs. This 
indicates that frontline respondents perceived their work areas and units as less punitive 
environments than did their Administrators/Managers, with RNs having a less punitive 
perception than MDs. Nonpunitive Response to Error related to both outcome dimensions with 
7.34% of the variance, accounting for the perceived Frequency of Event Reported and 2.34% of 
variance, accounting for Overall Perceptions of Safety. This demonstrates that even within 
punitive work environments, frontline professionals are concerned about safety and will report 
errors within their work areas and units (see Table 35). 
These findings are inconsistent with previous research in which employees have been 
found to not voice safety concerns, or report errors due to intimidating, poorly developed, or 
nonexistent processes that lack policies and protocols for reporting (Peterson et al., 2012). This 
shift could be explained by the recent attention placed on hospitals to encourage employees to 
speak up. Hospitals now concentrate on creating environments that collect, analyze and 
disseminate data about medical errors and AEs within nonpunitive settings (American Academy 
of Pediatrics, 2011; The Joint Commission, 2008b). Only those who intend to harm or 
deliberately fail to observe hospital policies and procedures are to be held accountable 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011). This study indicated a discrepancy between responses 
of Administrators/Managers and frontline professionals, indicating further research is necessary 
to determine the cause or the specificity of these differences. 
Staffing. This dimension measures respondent perceptions of whether there is enough 
trained staff to handle the workload (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 
2010). The overall mean for Staffing is low at 2.66, with significant differences between 
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professional groups. MDs rated safe staffing significantly higher than RNs, PA/NPs and 
Administrators (see Table 35). This indicates poor and diverse perspectives of safe staffing to 
handle the workload. Staffing has a very weak variance accounting for 0.97% of the perceived 
Frequency of Events Reported. However, this dimension did account for 4.20% of the variance 
of Overall Perceptions of Safety, indicating that Staffing was perceived as a small component of 
overall safety (see Table 35). 
These findings are consistent with the literature. Research has identified that children’s 
care is safer when there is an adequate nurse-to-patient ratio (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). Findings 
from this study suggest that hospital leadership within pediatric care settings has yet to address 
the critical need for safe staffing with well-trained professionals. For perceptions to improve, the 
staffing needs within work areas and units must be addressed with appropriate care ratios and 
educational preparation. 
These findings are also consistent with research in the adult hospital setting, indicating 
that adequate and prepared nursing staff improved hospital work environments and lowered 
hospital mortality (Aiken et al., 2011; Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). This suggests that adequate 
staffing for low patient-to-nurse ratios can markedly improve both patient outcomes and the 
work environments for the nursing staff (Aiken et al., 2011; Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). A key step 
to improving children’s safety during hospitalizations may lie in hospital leadership’s ability to 
recognize the necessity of providing adequate nurse-to-patient ratios within all pediatric care 
settings. Further research to determine the cause or the specificity of these differences is 
necessary. 
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Hospital Handoffs and Transitions. This dimension relates to whether practitioners 
believe important patient information has been transferred from one care provider to another, 
across hospital units and during the change of shifts (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; 
Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The overall mean for this dimension is 2.64, the lowest mean of the 12 
dimensions, suggesting that the handoff and transition processes were poor (see Table 35). Once 
again, frontline professionals perceive this dimension more problematic than did the 
Administrators/Managers. This suggests that the perception of errors that occurred when children 
were transferred from one unit to another, or from one specialty to another, were perceived more 
negatively by frontline professionals than by Administrators/Managers. These findings are 
similar when compared to the dimension of Teamwork Across Hospital Units, where frontline 
professionals perceived the poor delivery of important patient information between units and 
specialties. Hospital Handoffs and Transitions is related to one safety culture outcome 
dimension, with 10.96% of the variance accounting for the perceived Frequency of Event 
Reporting. This implies that patient information was perceived as being lost during the handoff 
and transition process, but this did not impact a professional’s willingness to report such errors. 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions had a very weak variance accounting for 0.37% of Overall 
Perceptions of Safety indicating this dimension did not impact employees’ perception of their 
organization’s error prevention procedures and systems (see Table 35).  
These findings are consistent with current patient safety literature. Children’s care is 
highly specialized, which can lead to inadequate treatments through poorly coordinated transfer 
processes. The transfer of pertinent health information is fragmented or nonexistent in the U.S., 
increasing the risks of an AE to patients of all ages (Baines et al., 2013; Cox et al., 2013; 
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National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; World Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010; 
Peterson et al., 2012; Zeidel, 2011). These findings also support the need for more QI initiatives, 
in that QI initiatives have introduced processes that improve poor handoff procedures, thereby 
reducing errors in children’s care. In a QI study by Sheth et al., (2016), the I-PASS handoff 
process was introduced and found to be successful in improving the efficiency and safety of 
children’s transfers (Moore, 2014). Instituting similar practices should be considered throughout 
U.S. pediatric care milieus to avert preventable errors that may occur during transfer processes 
(Baines et al., 2013; Cox et al., 2013; National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; Zeidel, 2011). 
This study indicated a discrepancy between Administrators/Managers and frontline 
professionals, indicating a need for further research to determine the cause or the specificity of 
these differences 
Outcome Dimensions 
There are two outcome dimensions that were analyzed: Frequency of Event Reporting 
and Overall Perceptions of Safety. The findings for each will be discussed below. 
Frequency of Event Reporting. This dimension measures the staff’s perception of how 
frequently errors are reported, regardless of degree of harm (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 
2010). This research found that event reporting took place when teamwork was strongly 
perceived within the unit. All professional groups rated this outcome dimension high, with an 
overall mean of 3.80. Frontline professionals rated this dimension significantly lower than 
Administrators/Managers (see Table 35). This implies that hospital Administrators/Managers 
differ in their perception of the volume and efficacy of error reporting as it contributes to the 
safety culture of the hospital. These findings are consistent with publications that suggest 
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positive safety settings were related to increased reporting of medication errors and the 
willingness of professionals to advocate for patient safety (DiCuccio, 2015; Hansen et al., 2011; 
Mardon et al., 2010; Sorra et al., 2012; The Evidence Center, 2011).  
Overall Perceptions of Safety. This dimension is defined as the general sense 
individuals have of their organization’s error-prevention procedures and systems (Blegen et al., 
2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). All professional groups perceived the institutions’ Overall 
Perceptions of Safety as neutral, with an overall mean of 3.01, and no statistically significant 
differences between the professional groups (see Table 35). This implies that all respondents 
agree that safety culture is neither poor nor embraced by their organizations.  
Summary 
It is interesting to note that only the dimensions of Staffing and Nonpunitive Response to 
Error related to respondents’ Overall Perceptions of Safety—Staffing accounting for 4.20% of 
variance, and Nonpunitive Response to Error accounting for 2.34% of the variance. This 
suggests that appropriate staffing and a nonpunitive environment helps to minimally support a 
perception of safety. These findings are consistent with existing research. A study from Canada 
found that nursing leadership and staffing levels had an impact on nurses’ perceptions of their 
hospital organizations which in turn impacted behaviors directly affecting patient outcomes 
(Spence-Laschinger & Leiter, 2006; The Evidence Center, 2011). Research by Clarke, Sloane 
and Aiken (2002) also found that nurses on units with inadequate staffing and poor 
organizational support, compared with nurses on well-staffed units, were twice as likely to report 
risk factors, injuries and near-misses. The safety culture of the work area or unit directly affects 
professionals’ perception of safety (Spence-Laschinger & Leiter, 2006; The Evidence Center, 
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2011). Of note is the lack of relationships between eight dimensions of safety culture and Overall 
Perceptions of Safety. To understand these findings further research is warranted. 
Implications for Hospital Cultures, Leadership and Pediatric Practice 
Findings support that significant differences exist between the perceptions of safety 
culture between frontline professionals and Administrators/Managers within U.S. pediatric 
hospitals. In addition, an understanding of the perception of the pediatric safety culture in the US 
has a wide-range of implications for organizational leadership, healthcare policy, nursing 
practice, and educational systems that support future pediatric care professionals.  
Safety Climates and Safety Cultures 
A safety culture is “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behavior that can determine the commitment to and the style and 
proficiency of an organization’s health and safety management system” (see Figure 1) (Health 
and Safety Commission, 1993; Health and Safety Executive, 2005; National Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015, p. xii). “Organizational climate is a distinct construct concerned with the way 
organizational members perceive the social environment within that organization and its impact 
on their individual psychological well-being” (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 3; see also James & James, 
1989). These include the attitudes, values and perceptions of individuals and groups at all levels 
of the organization (see Figure 1) (Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Health and Safety 
Executive, 2005). When employees share perceptions within the organization and work area, a 
climate emerges (Glisson, Landsverk, et al., 2008; Glisson, Schoenwald, et al., 2008; Jordan et 
al., 2009; Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008; Neal & Griffin, 2006).  
Jordan et al., (2009) found that residential treatment center climates displaying high role 
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conflicts and a low appreciation for justice, equality and role clarity obstruct the development of 
positive professional associations and can contribute to poor patient outcomes. Singer et al. 
(2009) had similar findings and went on to state that frontline professionals with better 
perceptions of safety climate were predictive of having lower risks of experiencing patient safety 
events.  
This study found that frontline professionals shared common perceptions about their 
work areas and units that contributed to the overall culture. In comparison, Administrators/ 
Managers viewed these same dimensions either substantially more negatively or positively than 
frontline professionals and were not perceived as being part of the healthcare team (see Figure 6 
and Table 35). This disconnect between professional groups may lead to policies that may fail to 
support hospitals’ safety culture due to a lack of fully appreciating the complexities surround 
children’s care on the part of hospital Administrators/Managers. There is a need for all parties 
involved in children’s care to collaborate on the best evidence-based practices for that care, 
putting aside economic measures that could fuel managerial conclusions. 
For a full understanding of the stressors and necessities frontline professionals experience 
at the sharp end of care, hospital leaders must become more familiar with care practices so that 
policies and regulations that support the situational aspects of the institution’s safety culture are 
suited for the tasks (Health and Safety Executive, 2005). Townsend (2007) recommends leaders 
to work alongside their employees to not only understand what pressures surround the position, 
but to partner with employees. It is by devoting a day, a week, or two days a month in working 
within the NICUs or the hospital kitchen, as a clerk or dietary line worker, that will inform 
leaders of the nuances surrounding patient care. Through effective delegation of important 
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matters, hospital Administrators/Managers can create cultures in which people grow (Townsend, 
2007).  
Implications for Leadership Policy and Practice 
This research uncovered a substantial gap between the perceptions of hospital leaders and 
frontline professionals for 9 of the 12 dimensions. By strengthening the relationships between 
these professional groups, the safety culture within the pediatric hospital settings could improve, 
thereby impacting the quality of care (DiCuccio, 2014). This research also found that frontline 
professionals perceived hospital leaders as being unsympathetic to the stressors of their 
profession, rating their hospitals and specialty units neutral or low for 7 of the 12 dimensions 
(see Figure 6 and Table 35).  
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions had the lowest means of the 12 dimensions. When 
evaluating scores on specific items in this dimension, frontline professionals differed from 
Administrators/Managers that believed, “Things ‘fall between the cracks’ when transferring 
patients from one unit to the another” and that “Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes” (Appendix A). Frontline professionals went on to show their frustration in 
delivering quality care when rating specific items in the Staffing dimension. For this dimension, 
frontline professionals recognized care processes for infants and children that were not 
understood by their hospital Administrators/Managers. Frontline professionals perceived that 
there was not “…enough staff to handle the workload,” that “Staff in this unit work longer hours 
than is best for patient care,” and that staff worked in “…crisis mode, trying to do too much, too 
quickly” (Appendix A).  
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This gap between frontline professionals and the Administration/Management was 
consistent with the literature. Research found that organizations with dominant cultures 
characterized by hierarchical managerial systems report more negative safety cultures than those 
with more team focused governances (Hannah, Schade, Lomely, Ruddick, & Bellamy, 2008; 
Prenestini, Calciolari, Lega, & Grilli, 2015). Excellent “leadership requires risk taking, 
innovation, self-awareness, and ingenuity” (Burkhart, Solari-Twadell, & Hass, 2008, p. 33). For 
the safety cultures to improve within pediatric care settings, hospital administrators and 
managers must take steps to better understand the pediatric care milieu and develop policies and 
care practices that support programs such as TeamSTEPPS®, to improve interprofessional 
practices. TeamSTEPPS® is an evidenced based set of teamwork tools designed to optimize 
interprofessional team functions to improve patient outcomes (AHRQ, 2017).  
Leadership Qualities 
Townsend (2007) defines a leader as one who “manifests vision, integrity, and courage in 
a consistent pattern of behavior that inspires trust, motivation and responsibility on the part of 
followers, who in turn become leaders themselves” (p. XIII). Healthcare leaders have a 
responsibility to provide environments supporting effective care, while protecting the safety of 
patients, employees and visitors (The Joint Commission, 2017). A hierarchal structure can 
reduce the volume of communication, as certain possible channels may not be available. With 
the flow of patient care information impeded, the exchange of crucial data necessary to 
improving the safety culture within children’s care facilities is also hampered (Hannah et al., 
2008; Reason, 2000; Singer et al., 2009; The Joint Commission, 2017). Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
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Model/Human Factor Model (1998) guides leaders to improving care outcomes through the 
identification of latent factors that hinder success. 
Given the gap between frontline professionals and hospital leadership, it is necessary to 
change how these groups relate. The human condition is difficult to change but organizations can 
change the conditions in which human’s work (Reason, 1990). The focus in HROs is on 
minimizing variability and its effects. In doing so, hospital employees must be empowered to 
speak up and report errors and near misses (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; Reason, 
2000). This study found 5 of the 12 dimensions supported teamwork and interprofessional 
collaboration in which care professionals learned from their errors. These positively rated 
dimensions were Teamwork Within Hospital Units, Organizational Learning-Continuous 
Improvement, Feedback and Communication About Error, Frequency of Event Reporting and 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety. With high safety culture ratings, frontline 
professionals were found to perceive their work areas and units as learning cultures, in which 
there was high degree of error reporting.  
Organizations with just cultures reward employees and encourage the reporting of errors 
through nonpunitive work environments and reward incentives (American Academy of 
Pediatrics, 2011; Reason, 2000). By recognizing latent failures, improvements in the situational 
aspects of an organization’s culture have the potential to be achieved, reinforcing positive safety 
cultures.  
Leadership Must End Punitive Practices  
This research found that all respondents viewed their work area or unit as having punitive 
cultures with the dimension of Nonpunitive Response to Error rated low. For a culture that learns 
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from its errors, leadership must promote just cultures that operate within cultures that value event 
reporting (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011). Organizations with a just culture reward 
employees and encourage reporting errors through nonpunitive work environments with reward 
incentives (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; Reason, 2000). Previous research has 
identified that hospital staff will hesitate to report an error in punitive cultures and where 
feedback regarding change is not addressed (Burhans & Alligood, 2010; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; 
The Joint Commission, 2008b). Hospitals too often penalize staff for blameless acts while failing 
to implement processes for those responsible for serious errors (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). The act 
of blaming individuals within the care environment must be discarded for hospital cultures to 
improve (Barata, Benjamin, Mace, Herman, & Goldman, 2007; Buck, Kurth, & Varughese, 
2014; Brilli, Allen, & Allen, 2014; Landro, 2010; Martin & Abore, 2016; Mueller, 2014; Suresh 
& Edwards, 2012). Hospital leaders in the pediatric milieu have yet to succeed in creating 
cultures where employees learn from errors, which may explain the lack of trust among hospital 
staff (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). More research is needed to guide leaders in methods to create 
nonpunitive learning environments that support safety cultures. 
Policies Impact Error Reporting 
Findings indicated that learning cultures within nonpunitive environments are associated 
with the reporting of more AEs. This is consistent with the literature in which the fear of 
retaliation was found to deter error reporting and undermined the safety culture within hospital 
settings worldwide (Institute of Safe Medication Practices, 2003; The Joint Commission, 2008b; 
Leape, 2006; World Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010). Findings from this research 
support the premise that event reporting will increase when individuals can learn from the event 
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within nonpunitive cultures, and where communication within their units is transparent. 
However, the low rating for the Nonpunitive Response to Error dimension indicates a need for 
policies that support the safe reporting of events or concerns that can lead to patient harm.  
Research suggests that event reporting is found in environments where management is 
perceived as supportive. Patients still suffer from preventable harm every day (Chassin & Loeb, 
2013; Rosenstein, 2011). Three attributes must exist for a safety culture to fully support high 
reliability and consistent safe care: trust, report and improve (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
2011; Chassin & Loeb, 2013; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Employees must exhibit enough trust in 
their peers and hospital administrators/managers to report errors and unsafe conditions 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Such trust is established 
through organizations that value how employees feel, creating cultures that support reporting 
behaviors and respond in timely ways to solve identified harms. These improvements are 
communicated consistently to employees who first reported the issue, and then throughout the 
establishment (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). Organizations with a just culture have nonpunitive work 
environments with reward incentives for event reporting (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
2011; Reason, 2000). This study found that frontline professionals continued to report events 
even within safety cultures they rated as negative. Further research is needed to determine the 
professional ethics and motivations behind these actions and practices that support reporting.  
Policies Impacting Situational Aspects of Safety Culture 
Findings indicated that five of the 12 dimensions rated pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units as having strong psychological and behavioral aspects of safety culture but require more 
development of situational aspects of children’s care with more effective hospital leadership (see 
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Figure 1). Seven of the 12 dimensions rated the safety culture of pediatric hospitals and specialty 
units as neutral to low with perceptions of frontline professionals apart from those of 
Administrators/Managers. This gap represents a weakness within the situational aspects of the 
safety culture model contributing to poor safety cultures. Improving the situational aspects of a 
safety culture are essential to guide individuals through hospital policies, procedures, regulations 
and organizational structures for the delivery of safe patient care.  
Findings from this study suggest that a lack of integration between the psychological, 
behavioral and situational aspects of safety culture has contributed to the nation’s poor safety 
culture within pediatric care facilities. The situational aspect of a hospital’s safety culture must 
support organizational structures that values learning within respectful, caring environments. 
With such understanding, policy improvements that relate to situational aspects of an 
organization’s safety culture can be developed and integrated into care processes. A non-
hierarchal management model would support the concept of collective wisdom in which 
professionals are heard for the sole purpose of improving their patient’s care (Carter, 2016). Such 
steps will not only improve the safety of children’s care but the safety culture within pediatric 
hospitals and specialty units for all professional groups.  
Implications for Interprofessional Collaboration  
Findings in this study found that although the unit culture was strong for collaboration 
within hospital units, with five of the 12 dimensions that support cooperative care having 
positive ratings, the overall pediatric hospital culture was poor in the U.S. For these five 
dimensions, the psychological and behavioral aspects of a safety culture were found to be 
positive for frontline professionals, but this cooperative work environment was not demonstrated 
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between frontline staff and hospital Administrators/Managers (see Figure 6 and Table 35). 
Although frontline professionals clustered in their perceptions, for the remaining seven 
dimensions, they rated each neutral or low, suggesting poor safety cultures. These poor safety 
cultures were also found in the responses from Administrators/Managers, with this group once 
again not part of the cooperative care environment. 
For effective collaboration, hierarchical interactions must be transformed, allowing for 
open communication, cooperation, assertiveness, negotiation and the coordination of children’s 
care (Fewster-Thuente & Velsor-Friedrich, 2008; Chassin & Loeb, 2013; World Health 
Organization: Health workforce, 2010; Wells, Johnson & Salyer, 1998). Such models place a 
value on the unique knowledge and experiences each professional group brings to the pediatric 
team (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013).  
Healthcare differs from other high-tech industries in that human factors that can cause 
errors are more widespread (Catchpole, 2013). Healthcare carries conflicting inherent goals from 
preserving life and relieving distress, to achieving efficiency and patient satisfaction (Catchpole, 
2013). Still largely dependent on human interaction, healthcare is more complex than other 
broadly equivalent HROs such as aviation (Catchpole, 2013). The care of hospitalized children 
involves complex exchanges between professionals and specialties with care teams trained 
within and between hospital work areas and units. Team performance is optimized through 
understanding the goal and performance expectations surrounding patient care with informed 
communication practices (Mayer et al., 2011).  
Previous research found that communication throughout hospital units exists within 
hospital cultures that respect and learn from competent professionals at all levels of care 
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(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011). Additional research is needed in ways to improve 
collaboration between pediatric professional groups and across pediatric specialties within 
learning cultures that strive for excellence. 
Interprofessional Collaboration Impacted by Roles  
This study found teamwork and collaboration were perceived similarly between RNs and 
PAs/NPs for 9 of the 12 dimensions and between PAs/NPs and MDs for 8 of the 12 dimensions 
(Table 35). Other parings between professional groups differed in their perceptions. Findings 
uncovered that the perception of teamwork differed between RNs and MDs for 6 of the 12 
dimensions and between each of the frontline professionals and hospital Administrators/ 
Managers for 9 of the 12 dimensions. This variability in the perception of communication has 
been shown in the literature to undermine collaboration efforts between these professional 
groups and contribute to inadequate collaboration practices, poor patient satisfaction and 
preventable AEs (Rosenstein, 2011; The Joint Commission, 2008b; Salas et al., 2008; Siedlecki 
& Hixson, 2015; Thomas & Galla, 2013; Tillet, 2013).  
Poor teamwork impacts the effectiveness, safety and outcome of children’s care 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011). To improve interprofessional communication, 
hospitals are introducing evidence-based frameworks such as that of TeamSTEPPS® (AHRQ, 
2017; Thomas & Galla, 2013). Such interactive interprofessional programs have been found to 
improve patient safety through incremental and transformational changes that enhances 
teamwork in hospital work areas and units (AHRQ, 2017; Thomas & Galla, 2013). Introducing 
such programs into the pediatric care milieu would assist in bridging communication gaps 
between RNs and MDs as well as support current collaborative practices. 
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Improving collaboration is supported by a meta-analysis by Salas et al. (2008) in which 
team training was found to be an appropriate intervention for influencing team processes and 
performance (Salas et al., 2008). This study found that it is crucial for hospital administrators and 
managers to lead their employees by promoting, implementing and sustaining evidence-based 
frameworks such as that of TeamSTEPPS®. Through such initiatives, leadership can drive and 
monitor changes within their organization through activities that are aligned with their mission 
and vision (Thomas & Galla, 2013). 
This study also uncovered that RNs viewed themselves apart from the roles of PA/NPs 
for two dimensions: Nonpunitive Response to Error and the perceived Frequency of Event 
Reporting. For these dimensions, RNs perceived their errors were held against them with reports 
placed in their personnel file, which was not the perception of PAs/NPs. The roles of RNs and 
PAs/NPs differ. Often PAs/NPs work within the physician medical model, and other times 
within the hospital’s managerial structures. Such role variations could account for the differences 
between RNs and PAs/NPs. Additional research is needed to further understand these findings.  
Implications for Nursing Practice 
There are particular implications, derived from this study, that impact nursing care. 
Nurses perceive that they are part of the pediatric care team within supportive safety cultures. 
Frontline providers perceiving the culture of safety for nine of the 12 dimensions similarly 
supported this perception. In addition, nurses were found to report AEs as a means to correct 
poor care processes and learn from errors. This was highlighted in the dimension Feedback and 
Communication About Error, where 24.4% of the variance accounted for the perceived 
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Frequency of Event Reporting. The implications of these findings will be discussed further 
below.  
Nursing Profession and Supportive Hospital Cultures  
A hospital’s culture plays a large role in determining whether employees perceive their 
environment to be happy and healthy (Tsai, 2011). Nurse executives can influence organizational 
culture and foster not only high-quality care but also environments that encourage the personal 
growth of the nursing staff (Burkhart et al., 2008). When the interactions between professional 
groups are successful, enormous contributions are seen within the team through effective 
communication and collaborative practices. Such accomplishments are not only valuable to the 
organization by improved patient care, but enrich individuals’ personal enjoyment in their 
positions (Leape et al., 2009; Tsai, 2011). Nurses that work within teams that value their work 
find their roles satisfying (Tsai, 2011). Additional efforts by hospital leadership to improve 
interprofessional collaboration have the potential to create positive hospital safety cultures for 
pediatric nurses in the U.S. that can ultimately improve patient care. 
Nurses and Disruptive Care Milieus 
The dimension of Nonpunitive Response to Error measured whether professionals 
believed their mistakes were held against them and whether these errors were addressed 
punitively. Findings for this dimension found that nurses believed their errors were held against 
them, and that reports of such errors would be placed in their personal file and revisited at the 
time of their review. Siedlecki and Hixson (2015) found that such negative perceptions have 
been shown to impact the delivery of patient care. These researchers establish a relationship 
between how nurses perceived interactions within the clinical setting and within their practice 
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environments, which impacted the quality of patient care (Siedlecki & Hixson, 2015). Negative 
work cultures often led to poor care delivery. 
Feeling safe to report an error in a nonpunitive work setting is necessary in HROs. High-
reliability organizations have pioneered the business of recognizing errors through effective 
communication and teamwork, which enables personnel at all levels of care to contribute to the 
identification of indicators that may contribute to patient harm (Institute of Medicine, 2003; 
National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015). Although RNs perceived themselves as part of the 
interprofessional team, there were differences between how they perceived collaborations 
between the other professional groups in this study. This study supports the need for continued 
efforts to improve communication between professional groups in nonpunitive care settings with 
programs such as TeamSTEPPS® to improve the quality of care in pediatric settings. 
Implications for Education 
 This study has implications for U.S. academic settings. In this study, the differing 
perceptions regarding safety culture among four professional groups within pediatric hospital 
settings highlight the need for interprofessional education to prepare a “collaborative practice-
ready” workforce (World Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010, p. 7). For collaborative 
practices to ensue, the health workforce must be better prepared. Educational programs that 
concentrate on improving collaborative practices and decreasing punitive practices would begin 
to address some of the deficiencies this study has found. The World Health Organization (World 
Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010) and its partners recognize innovative educational 
strategies are needed in the area of interprofessional collaboration. Healthcare leaders carry a 
willingness to contextualize, commit and champion interprofessional education through new 
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learning strategies that improve attitudes and interpersonal skills regarding teamwork and 
collaboration (Parsell & Bligh, 1999; Vandergoot, Sarris, Kirby, & Ward, 2017; World Health 
Organization: Health workforce, 2010). Such interprofessional learning takes place “when two or 
more professions learn with, from and about each other to improve collaboration and the quality 
of care” (Vandergoot et al., 2017, p. 1; Centre for the Advancement of Interprofessional 
Education, 2002). The workforce needs “collaborative practice-ready” practitioners from 
different professional backgrounds that are trained to work together with patients, families, 
careers and communities to supply excellence in care (Reed et al., 2017; World Health 
Organization: Health workforce, 2010, p. 7). Integrated health and education policies will 
promote such effective educational practices and shape effective culture and attitudes of health 
workers (World Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010). Through IPL, evidence-based 
frameworks such as Team Strategies and Tools to Enhance Performance and Patient Safety 
(TeamSTEPPS®) have the potential to transform organizational cultures within medical and 
nursing academic institutions, increasing their understanding of their specific professional roles 
for team-based care, which can be applied in the practice setting (Reilly et al., 2014; Thomas & 
Galla, 2013; Reed et al., 2017).  
Implications for Future Research 
This study explored the differences in conceptualizing safety cultures within pediatric 
hospitals and specialty units from interprofessional perspectives on a national level. Findings 
suggest that within the pediatric hospital setting, a positive safety culture exists but these 
perceptions differ by professional role and between hospital units and specialty services. To 
166 
 
 
determine the nuances surrounding these professional groups and how they relate to the 12 safety 
culture dimensions in pediatric care facilities, additional research is required.  
Educational Research Promoting Interprofessional Collaborative Learning 
This study found that safety culture perspectives are unique to professional levels and 
that collaboration between professionals remains poor. Such findings support the need for 
additional research that is dedicated to operationalizing the concepts of safety culture within 
collaborative learning environments that employ effective interprofessional communication 
techniques that improve collaboration. Models such as that of the TeamSTEPPS® has been 
successful in improving communication and teamwork skills between healthcare professionals 
(Mayer et al., 2011; Reed et al., 2017). Implementation research designed to determine the best 
strategies to improve interprofessional communication within the pediatric care setting has the 
potential to improve the safety culture in these unique settings.  
Pediatric Safety Cultures Improved Through Evidence-Based Research Strategies  
Research is needed to develop, implement and test strategies that improve the safety 
culture within pediatric hospitals and specialty units. A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative designs would explore the many factors that underlie cultural values and the deeper 
social assumptions that underlie the descriptive findings of this study (Sorra & Dyer, 2010; 
Vlayen et al., 2015). Although many studies support evidence-based clinical practices that 
validate better quality care in controlled environments, translating these findings into practice 
has been found to be challenging due to the many variables that affect organizational culture and 
the multifactorial attributes of the pediatric care domain (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
2011; Burkhart et al., 2016; Gawande, 2002; Woods et al., 2005). Secondary data analysis of 
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objective data from safety culture questionnaires and electronic health records provides an 
opportunity to evaluate quality indicators over time and can identify the impact innovations may 
have independent of organizational and patient-related variables (Burkhart et al., 2016; Butler & 
Hupp, 2016; Larrison et al., 2017; Martin & Abore, 2016).  
In addition to quantitative studies, qualitative approaches involving observations, focus 
groups, and interviews should be initiated (Burkhart & Vlasses, 2017; Leonard et al., 2012; 
Sheth et al., 2016). Burkhart and Vlasses (2017) evaluated nurse-led, patient-centered, 
interprofessional teams that worked collaboratively to understand the needs of an underserved 
population. This qualitative participatory action research (PAR) used a method called 
photovoice, which revealed deeper values and challenges of patient participants as well as 
congruence between patient and provider perspectives. A PAR that evaluates pediatric 
professionals’ perspectives regarding practice environments and how hospital leadership 
supports their efforts would provide valuable new knowledge for safety culture literature and 
health care system redesigns (Burkhart & Vlasses, 2017).  
There are inherent stressors in the pediatric specialty due to the high risks and children 
(The Joint Commission, 2008a). Pediatric hospitals and specialty units must continue to research 
the emotionally charged situations that involve infants and factors that support positive safety 
cultures and seek out areas of weakness to prospectively address any care limitations through 
systems-based solutions.  
Research Examining Differences Between Adult and Pediatric Safety Culture 
Research is necessary to compare the safety culture perceptions of pediatric professionals 
to professionals within the adult care setting. Items and dimensions that support a positive safety 
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culture in an adult setting could be compared to findings in this study highlighting practices that 
are shared or are contrary. Once shared, findings would be valuable new knowledge for each 
care setting, with adult practitioners learning from successful care practices of pediatric 
providers, and vice versa. With such comparisons, successful care strategies could be identified, 
shared and implemented in an effort to construct environments that are consistent, unified and 
safe for patients of all ages. These strategies could be particularly helpful in hospitals that treat 
both adults and children.  
Further Understanding for Overall Perceptions of Safety and Poor Variance Findings 
Research is needed in examining the factors surrounding the little to no variance 
accounted for by Overall Perceptions of Safety for the dimensions examined—Teamwork Within 
Hospital Units, Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement, Hospital Management 
Support Promoting Safety, Communication Openness, Feedback and Communication About 
Error, Teamwork Across Hospital Units, and Hospital Handoffs and Transitions. Findings 
suggest that these dimensions did not impact respondents’ Overall Perceptions of Safety. This is 
curious, as it is inconsistent with the overall conceptual framework of the HSOPSC and requires 
more research to understand this finding and determine what additional factors may relate to 
Overall Perceptions of Safety.  
Supportive Institutional Policy Development 
Finally, additional studies examining the relationships between frontline professionals 
and that of hospital Administrators/Managers are necessary. This study found a gap exists in the 
understanding of the care environment as experienced by frontline professionals and hospital 
leadership. Hospital Administrators/Managers develop the policies, procedures, regulations, 
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organizational structures and managerial systems that contribute to a safety culture (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2005). To improve the safety culture within pediatric care facilities today, 
research is needed to determine strategies to improve relationships between frontline 
professionals and the hospital administrator and managers that develop the policies and 
procedures directing care. It is with such non-hierarchal initiatives that the gap between frontline 
professionals and hospital leadership is minimized. Improving such relationships can only be 
achieved by working alongside care professionals, where an understanding of their job 
specificities is appreciated. Additional research between these groups could identify areas that if 
addressed would improve safety culture perspectives within the pediatric care setting, creating 
quality environments that are supportive and reliable. 
Conclusion 
In creating safety cultures, hospital practitioners are guided by the principled ethical 
culture to primum non nocere, where the adherence to rules, laws and standards is the ethical 
criterion that underlies all care (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013, p. 8; Victor & Cullen, 1987). 
This straightforward principle can be traced back to the philosophical tenets of Socrates, 
Aristotle, Cicero and Ockham, who introduced an introspective dimension for individuals to 
choose to do the right act, for the right reason (Audi, 2001e; Audi, 2001a; Audi, 2001b; Audi, 
2001c). The principle of primum non nocere is supported by right reason and guides the altruistic 
motivation practitioners have in caring for and helping other human beings (The Joint 
Commission, 2008b).  
Ethical frameworks value open discussions and support collaboration. These relationships 
carry the freedom and responsibility of making individual choices about safety by both the 
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employer and the employee (Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008). A distinct culture emerges when 
members of a work area share similar perceptions of conflict, justness and transparency within 
their roles (Glisson, Landsverk et al., 2008; James & James, 1989; Jordan et al., 2009). Creating 
cultures that include the values, attitudes and perceptions of hospital administrators/managers 
within pediatric care milieus will influence employees at all levels of care to comply with safety 
rules and participate in safety enhancing initiatives that prevent harm and improve the overall 
safety culture throughout the institution (Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008; Victor & Cullen, 1987). 
For hospital safety cultures to become entrenched within U.S. pediatric care milieus, all 
levels of the care team, including administration/management, must appreciate and work within 
common ethical frameworks to ensure the best care is provided consistently to all persons, at all 
levels of care. In identifying gaps in pediatric hospital safety culture, this research can inform 
initiatives to guide nursing and interprofessional education, practice, policy and research toward 
the goal of improving care for children. 
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APPENDIX A 
HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE (HSOPSC) 
DIMENSIONS AND ITEMS/QUESTIONS 
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Category & Dimensions HSOPSC Items/Questions 
Work Area  
Organizational Learning-Continuous 
Improvement 
 We are actively improving patient safety 
 Mistakes have led to positive changes here 
 After we make changes to improve patient safety, 
we evaluate their effectiveness 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units  People support one another in this unit 
 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we 
work together as a team to get the work done 
 In this unit, people treat each other with respect 
 When one area in the unit gets busy, others help out 
Hospital Management Support for 
Patient Safety 
 
 Hospital management provides a work climate that 
promotes patient safety 
 The actions of hospital management show that 
patient safety is a top priority 
 Hospital management seems interested in patient 
safety only after an adverse event happens (R) 
Nonpunitive Response to Error  Staff feel their mistakes are held against them (R) 
 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is 
being written up, not the problem (R) 
 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in 
their personnel file (R) 
Staffing  We have enough staff to handle the workload 
 Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for 
patient care (R) 
 We use more agency/temporary staff than is best 
for patient care (R) 
 We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, 
too quickly (R) 
Supervisor/Manager    
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and 
Actions Promoting Safety 
 
 My supervisor/manager says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done according to established 
patient safety procedures 
 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety 
 Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if 
it means taking shortcuts (R) 
 My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety 
problems that happen over and over (R) 
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Hospital  
Teamwork Across Hospital Units  Hospital units don’t coordinate with each other (R) 
 There is good cooperation among hospital units 
that need to work together (R) 
 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other 
hospital units 
 Hospital units work well together to provide the 
best care for patients (R) 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions  Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring 
patients from one unit to another (R) 
 Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes (R) 
 Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units (R) 
 Shift changes are problematic for patients in this 
hospital (R) 
Communication  
Feedback and Communication About 
Error 
 
 
 We are given feedback about changes put into 
place based on event reports 
 We are informed about errors that happen in this 
unit 
 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from 
happening again 
Communication Openness 
 
 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that 
may negatively affect patient care 
 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions 
of those with more authority 
 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something 
does not seem right (R) 
Two Outcome Dimensions   
Frequency of Event Reporting  How often is a mistake reported that was corrected 
before affecting patients? 
 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to 
harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
 When a mistake is made that could harm the 
patient, but does not, how often is this reported? 
Overall Perceptions of Safety  It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t 
happen around here (R) 
 Patient safety isn’t sacrificed for productivity 
 We have patient safety problems in this unit (R) 
 Our procedures and systems prevent errors  
(R) denotes reverse coding 
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen, Gearhart, O’Brien, Sehgal, & Alldredge, 2009) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
REVIEW OF SAFETY CULTURE TOOLS 
 
  
  
Survey 
 
Description Dimensions/Factors Target 
Population 
Reliability Validity 
1. Safety 
Attitudes 
(SAQ) 
Questionnaire 
(ICU version)  
(Sexton et al., 
2006)   
65 Questions  
5-point   
Likert Scale  
 
Teamwork climate 
Safety climate 
Job satisfaction 
Stress recognition 
Perception of management 
Working conditions 
Hospital  
Personnel 
Raykov’s p  
ICC of 0.90 
 
Construct 
validity 
using factor 
analysis 
2. Veteran 
Affairs, 
Patient Safety 
Culture 
Survey 
(PSCS) 
(Shiner et al., 
20016) 
  
65 Questions  
5-point 
Likert Scale 
& 
Yes/no & 
uncertain 
scale 
 
 
Overall Perceptions of Safety 
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
Education, training & resources 
Shame 
Communication and Openness 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
Organizational Learning-Continuous 
Improvement 
Feedback and Communication About Error 
Job satisfaction 
Patient safety in comparison to other hospitals 
Perceptions of patient safety at your facility 
Senior management awareness and actions in 
promoting safety 
Frequency of Event Reporting 
Hospital  
Personnel 
Test-retest 
reliability 
with ICC 0.7 
or greater for 
13 of 14 
dimensions 
Not reported 
3. Veterans 
Health 
Administra-
tion Patient 
Safety 
Questionnaire 
112 Questions  
5-point  
Likert Scale  
 
 
Management commitment  
Overall Perceptions of Safety  
Nonpunitive Response  
Reporting 
Human factors  
Communication and Openness 
Hospital  
Personnel 
Not available 
(sent request 
to library) 
Not reported 
1
8
0
 
1
8
1
 
  
4. AHRQ 
Hospital 
Survey on 
Patient Safety 
Culture 
(HSOPSC) 
(Sorra & 
Nieva, 2004) 
42 items 
5-point  
Likert Scale 
 
 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations 
   and Actions Promoting Safety 
Organizational Learning-Continuous 
Improvement 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
Communication Openness 
Feedback and Communication About Error 
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
Staffing 
Hospital Management Support for Patient 
Safety 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
Frequency of Event Reporting 
Overall Perceptions of Safety 
Hospital  
Personnel 
Cronbach’s 
alpha was 
acceptable at 
0.63–0.84 
High 
internal 
consistency 
by factor 
analysis  
5. Press 
Ganey Safety 
Culture 
Survey 
(Peterson et 
al., 2012) 
Number of 
items not 
available 
 
Overall Perceptions of Safety 
Frequency of Event Reporting 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions  
   Promoting Safety 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units 
Communication Openness 
Feedback and Communication About Error 
Nonpunitive Response to Error 
Staffing  
Hospital Management Support for Patient 
Safety 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions 
Patient safety grade 
Number of events reported  
Hospital Personnel Not reported Not 
reported 
6. Teamwork 
& Patient 
Safety 
24 closed items  
5-point  
Likert Scale 
Perceived effect of teamwork 
Support for team communication & decision 
making 
Hospital  
Personnel 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.62–
0.87 
Construct 
validity 
using 
1
8
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Attitudes 
Questionnaire 
(Kaissi et al., 
2003) 
 
 
 
 
Level of teamwork in my department 
Leadership & assertiveness 
factor 
analysis 
7. Operating 
Room 
Management 
Attitudes 
Questionnaire 
(ORMAQ) 
(Flin, et al., 
2003) 
60 Questions  
5-point 
Likert Scale 
 
Leadership structure 
Confidence assertion 
Information sharing 
Stress & fatigue 
Teamwork  
Work values 
Error 
Organizational climate 
Operating  
Room  
Personnel 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.18–
0.54   
Interitem 
matrix too 
low for 
exploratory 
factor 
analysis 
8. Trainee  
Supplemental 
Survey for 
Children’s 
Hospital in 
Boston 
(Singla et al., 
2006)  
41 Questions  
5-point  
Likert Scale 
 
Communication Openness 
Adequacy of training 
Supervision 
Residents  
Training  
Programs 
Not reported Not 
reported 
9. Culture of 
Safety Survey 
(Weingart et 
al., 2004) 
34 Questions 
5-point  
Likert Scale 
 
Leadership 
Salience 
Nonpunitive environment 
Reporting & communication 
Hospital personnel Cronbach’s 
alpha “poor” 
(range not 
reported);  
t-test not 
statistical 
significant 
for initial & 
follow up 
means  
Not 
reported 
1
8
3
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APPENDIX D 
HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE:  
PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSES 
 
  
U.S. Citations Purpose Design Sample Reliability/Validity Conclusion 
 
1. Sorra & 
Nieva, 2004 
Pilot study:  
Hospital 
survey on 
patient safety 
culture 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
U.S. hospitals 
 
Descriptive 
cross-
sectional 
21 hospitals    
6 states 
1,437 
respondents 
from all staff 
levels 
  
Cronbach ∝ For 
composites ranged 
from 0.63–0.83 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 12 
dimensions and 42 
items fit the data 
 
-Confirmed existence 
of multiple dimensions  
-Evidence suggested 
many a priori item 
groupings fell into 
distinct factors  
-Released for public 
use in 2004 
2. Blegen, et 
al., 2009 
AHRQ’s 
hospital 
survey on 
patient safety 
culture: 
Psychometric 
analysis 
Psychometric 
analysis 
Test-retest   1 unit in 3 
hospitals 
 
Cronbach ∝ For 
composites ranged 
from 0.48–0.83 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 11 factors 
after staffing was 
removed, and 42 
items that fit the data. 
Staffing was included 
in 12 dimensions due 
to its significance to 
patient safety. 
-Subscales measuring 
safety culture 
dimensions found to be 
moderately reliable & 
valid at the individual 
respondent level, 
reflecting the group 
level phenomenon of 
which tool was 
designed 
-Moderate to strong 
validity & reliability 
w/exception of 
Staffing   
-Useful in assessing 
safety culture across 
time, specialty, unit or 
institution  
-Did not link safety 
culture scores to 
independently 
measured outcomes 
1
8
5
 
  
 
3. Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010  
Multilevel 
psychometric 
properties of 
the AHRQ 
hospital 
survey on 
patient safety 
culture 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
U.S. hospitals 
Secondary 
analysis of 
2007 
HSOPSC 
database 
331 U.S.  
non-teaching 
public 
hospitals 
Cronbach ∝ For 
composites ranged 
from 0.62–0.85 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 12 
dimensions and 42 
items fit the data 
 
-Acceptable 
psychometric properties 
at individual, unit & 
hospital levels of 
analysis 
-Instrument measuring 
group culture and not 
just individual attitudes 
 
1
8
6
 
  
  International 
Citations 
Purpose Design Sample Reliability/Validity Conclusion 
1. Vlayen et al., 
2015 
Measuring 
safety culture in 
Belgian 
psychiatric 
hospitals: 
Validation of 
the Dutch and 
French 
translations of 
the Hospital 
Survey on 
Patient Safety 
Culture  
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Dutch & French 
translations for 
Belgian 
psychiatric 
hospitals   
Test-retest 44 psychiatric 
hospitals with 
6,658 national 
respondents at 
first test & 
8,353 
respondents at 
retest  
Cronbach ∝ For 
composites ranged 
from 0.50–0.85 for 
Dutch & from 0.52–
0.87 for the French 
translations 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting the 
original 42 items 
with12 dimensions 
that fit the data for 
Dutch & French 
translations  
 
-Dutch & French 
translations of 
HSOPSC were 
found to be valid 
& reliable for 
measuring patient 
safety culture in 
psychiatric 
hospitals 
2. Perneger  
et al., 2014 
Internal 
consistency, 
factor structure 
and construct 
validity of the 
French version 
of the Hospital 
Survey on 
Patient Safety 
Culture 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
French 
translation 
Descriptive 1 Multisite 
hospital 
system 
1171 hospital 
staff  
Cronbach ∝ For 
composites ranged 
from 0.57–0.86 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 42 items 
with 10 dimensions, 
rather than the 
original 12 fit the data 
-French version 
did not perform 
as well as 
original in 
psychometric 
analyses 
-Most 
coefficients lower 
in French version 
than U.S. version 
-May reflect 
shifts in item’s 
meaning after 
translation 
 1
8
6
 
1
8
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3. Eiras et al., 2014 
The hospital survey 
on patient safety 
culture in 
Portuguese hospital: 
Instrument validity 
and reliability  
 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Portuguese 
translation  
Descriptive 3 Hospitals 
with 1,323 
staff 
respondents  
Cronbach ∝ for 
composites 
ranged from 
0.48–0.90 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting 42 
items with 10 
dimensions fit 
the data 
-Has acceptable 
reliability for 12 
dimensions 
-Original model 
must be adjusted 
for Portuguese 
population 
scenarios  
-Portuguese tool 
in early stages of 
development 
 
4. Nie et al., 2013 
Hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture in China 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Chinese 
translation 
Descriptive 32 Hospitals 
1160 
respondents 
Cronbach’s α for 
composites 
ranged from 
0.47-0.74 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting 10 
dimensions & 29 
items fit the data 
 
-Psychometric 
properties are 
acceptable & 
considered useful 
for measuring 
patient safety 
culture 
-Chinese version 
found a positive 
attitude towards 
patient safety 
culture exists 
-Uniqueness of 
safety culture 
should be 
considered when 
applying safety 
culture tools in 
different cultural 
settings 
 
1
8
8
 
  
  5. Nordin, 2013 
Swedish hospital 
survey on patient 
safety culture: 
Psychometric 
properties & health 
care staff’s 
perception 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Swedish version 
Descriptive 9 Hospital 
healthcare 
divisions in a 
county 
council 
2,120 staff 
Cronbach ∝ for 
composites 
ranged from 
0.60-0.87 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting 12 
dimensions & 44 
items fit the 
data. 
 
-Psychometric 
properties are 
acceptable & 
considered useful 
for measuring 
patient safety 
culture 
-Suitable for 
clinical research 
& allows for 
cross-national 
comparisons 
-To improve 
safety culture, it 
is imperative that 
stakeholders 
learn from prior 
events  
6. Najjar et al., 
2013 
The Arabic version 
of the hospital 
survey on patient 
safety culture: a 
psychometric 
evaluation in a 
Palestinian sample 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Arabic 
translation  
Descriptive 13 Hospitals 
2,022 
respondents 
Cronbach’s α for 
composites 
ranged from 
0.63–0.84 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting an 
11-factor model 
fit the data & not 
original 12 
 
-Resulted in an 
11 factor, 42 item 
model  
-Good validity & 
acceptable 
reliability 
-Use caution 
when linking data 
of countries & 
cultures 
1
8
9
 
  
  7. Hedskold et al., 
2013 
Psychometric 
properties of the 
hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture, HSOPSC, 
applied on a large 
Swedish health 
care sample 
 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Swedish 
translation  
Descriptive 84,215 
respondents from 
national database 
of hospital & 
primary care 
facilities; 
number of 
facilities not 
given 
Cronbach’s α for 
composites 
ranged from 
0.66–0.87 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting 14 
dimensions, 48 
items & 3 
outcome 
measures fit the 
data 
-Successfully 
used in hospitals 
& primary care  
-One common 
instrument allows 
comparisons 
within health care 
systems as tool 
assesses national 
patient safety 
improvement 
initiatives 
8. Robida, 2013 
Hospital survey 
on patient safety 
culture in 
Slovenia: A 
psychometric 
evaluation 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Slovenian 
translation  
Descriptive  3 hospitals 976 
responses  
Cronbach’s α for 
composites 
ranged from 
0.36-0.88 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting the 
original 12 factor 
model with 42 
items is 
necessary to best 
judge patient 
safety fit the data 
 
-After translation, 
the original 12-
dimension model 
was a good fit for 
use in Slovenia 
1
9
0
 
  
  9. Occelli et al., 
2013 
Validation of the 
French version of 
the hospital survey 
on patient safety 
culture 
questionnaire. 
International  
 
 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
French 
translation 
Descriptive  7 Hospitals 
  
Cronbach’s α for 
composites ranged 
from 0.46–0.84 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting a 
hypothesized 
model of 40 items 
& 10 dimensions 
fit the data 
-Added 3 items to 
original survey 
- Considered 
valid & reliable 
-Will guide future 
research on the 
development of 
safety culture 
plans 
 
10. Moghri et al., 
2012 
The psychometric 
properties of the 
Farsi version of the 
“hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture” in Iran’s 
hospitals 
Psychometric 
analysis of Iran’s 
translation  
Descriptive  4 Academic 
hospitals  
420 nurses, 
doctors, lab 
& radiology 
staff 
Cronbach’s α for 
composites ranged 
from 0.57–0.80 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting with 12 
dimensions & 42 
items fit the data 
 
-Considered valid 
& reliable for this 
population 
-Good tool 
identifying 
perceptions of 
safety culture in 
Iran’s hospitals  
11. Sarac et al., 
2011 
Hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture: 
psychometric 
analysis on a 
Scottish sample 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Scottish National 
Health Service 
dataset 
Descriptive  7 Hospital 
1,969 staff  
 
Cronbach’s α for 
composites ranged 
from 0.64–0.84 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence support-
ing the use of 
original 12 dimen-
sions with 42 
items fit the data.  
 
-Found evidence 
supporting the use 
of original U.S. 
survey, without 
modifications  
- First step towards 
examining the 
safety culture as it 
relates to the 
hospital staff 
1
9
1
 
 
  
12. Ito et al., 2011 
Development and 
applicability of the 
hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture (HSOPSC) 
in Japan   
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Japanese 
version  
Descriptive 13 Hospitals 
6,396 staff 
respondents 
Cronbach’s α 
for composites 
ranged from 
0.44-0.88 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting 12 
dimensions & 
42 items fit the 
data 
 
-Factor structure 
of Japanese & 
U.S. HSOPSC 
are close to 
identical 
-Japanese dis-
plays acceptable 
levels of internal 
reliability/validity 
can be introduced 
in Japan.  
13. Bodur & Filz, 
2010 
Validity and 
reliability of 
Turkish version of 
“hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture” and 
perception of 
patient safety in 
public hospitals in 
Turkey 
 
 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Turkish version  
Descriptive 3 Public 
hospitals 
309 nurses 
& 
physicians  
Cronbach’s α 
for composites 
ranged from 
0.57-0.86 
 
Factor analysis 
found solid 
evidence 
supporting 10 
dimensions 
with 42 items 
fit the data 
 
-Valid & reliable 
in determining 
patient safety 
culture  
-Will be useful in 
tracking 
improvements & 
heightening 
patient safety 
culture awareness  
14. Haugen et al., 
2010 
Patient safety in 
surgical 
environments: 
Cross-countries 
comparison of 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Norwegian 
version for the 
surgical setting 
in Netherlands 
Descriptive 1 Hospital  
575 
surgical 
staff 
 
Cronbach’s α for 
composites ranged 
from 0.59-0.85 
 
Factor analysis found 
when comparing to 
the 2004 U.S. 
-Psychometric 
properties need 
further study to 
be regarded as 
reliable in 
surgical 
environments 
1
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psychometric 
properties and 
results of the 
Norwegian version 
of the hospital 
survey on patient 
safety 
findings, 10 of 12 
dimensions were 
lower in Norwegian 
study than the U.S. 
study. 
 
-Surgical units in 
Norway & 
Netherlands are 
perceived more 
negatively than in 
U.S. 
15. Waterson et al., 
2010  
Psychometric 
properties of the 
hospital survey on 
patient safety 
culture 
Psychometric 
analysis of U.S. 
HSOPSC for 
use in U.K. 
Descriptive 3 Hospital  
1,437 
surgical 
staff 
Cronbach ∝ for 
composites ranged 
from 0.58-0.83 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 9 factors 
model for 27 items 
fit the data.  
Original model did 
not fit the U.K. data 
satisfactorily 
 
-Caution needed 
when using U.S. 
HSOPSC version 
in U.K.  
-Findings indicate 
national & 
healthcare specific 
differences in the 
U.K. may limit the 
extent to which the 
U.S. version is 
applicable 
16. Pfeiffer & 
Manser, 2010 
Development of 
the German version 
of the hospital 
survey on patient 
safety culture: 
Dimensionality and 
psychometric 
properties 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
German version  
Descriptive 1 
Academic 
hospital 
568 staff 
Cronbach ∝ for 
composites ranged 
from 0.63-0.84 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 8 factors 
with the number of 
items in the tool not 
appreciated 
-Important to 
distinguish unit 
level from 
hospital level 
dimensions 
so added 2 
dimensions on 
both levels 
-Allows for 
interventions to 
improve patient 
safety from unit 
& hospital levels 
1
9
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17. Olsen; 
Ovretveit & Sousa, 
Eds., 2008 
Quality & safety 
improvement 
research: Methods 
& research practice 
from the 
international 
quality 
improvement 
research network 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Norwegian 
translation of 
U.S. version 
Descriptive 1 Hospital 
1,919 staff 
Cronbach ∝ for 
composites ranged 
from 0.64-0.82 
 
Factor analysis found 
solid evidence 
supporting 10 
dimensions and 42 
items fit the data. 
Researchers found 
there to be 4 
measures, and not 2 
as in the U.S. 
analysis  
 
-Results 
complied with 
conventional 
reliability & 
validity criteria  
-Factorial 
structure of 
HSOPSC 
supports this 
version’s use, in 
Norwegian 
hospitals 
18. Smits et al., 
2008 
The psychometric 
properties of the 
‘HSOPSC’ in 
Dutch Hospitals 
Psychometric 
analysis of 
Dutch version  
Descriptive 8 Hospi- 
   tals 
583 staff  
Acceptable reliability 
scores and good 
construct 
(composites not 
provided) 
 
Factor analysis 
supports 11 items 
dimensions 
 
Items per dimension 
not mentioned  
-Acceptable 
reliability & 
validity, which is 
similar to the 
original U.S. 
factor structure 
-The tool is 
appropriate 
instrument to 
assess patient 
safety culture in 
Dutch hospitals 
-Survey measures 
unit culture & not 
just individual 
attitudes 
 
1
9
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APPENDIX E 
 
DATABASE REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
  
 
  
 
U.S. Perspectives on Pediatric Safety Culture 
Author/Date of Publication Perspectives  
1. Butler & Hupp, 2016 
Pediatric quality and safety: A nursing 
perspective 
Nursing must maintain a commitment to safe, quality care.  Nurses can influence 
organizations to elevate the quality & safety of patient care, which will result in 
improved outcomes.  Nurse leaders have a responsibility to empower staff to 
participate in initiatives that improve the care environment so that care is 
collaborative with other disciplines. Hospital leadership can provide a culture & an 
environment for nurses on the frontline of care to actively participate in strategies & 
implementations that improve the quality & safety of care. 
2. Martin & Abore, 2016 
Measurement standards and peer 
benchmarking: One hospital’s journey 
A history of measurement standards & benchmarking, with a particular focus on the 
improving care in pediatric specialty, was led by AHRQ. Pediatric Quality Indicators 
(PQIs) developed by AHRQ, serves to benchmark institutions against valid, national 
standards in an effort to accelerate improvement efforts & inter-institutional 
communication regarding performance variation.  Authors suggest measuring the 
safety culture of hospitals to better understand factors that hinder care will support 
patient safety initiatives, improving PQIs. The improvement efforts of two major 
children’s hospitals are highlighted, both demonstrating measurable advances in 
organizational process & culture. 
3. Brilli, Allen, & Davis, 2014 
Revisiting the Quality Chasm 
Authors present a strategic plan intended to inspire & motivate hospital staff to 
improve safety & quality improvement efforts. This initiative is understandable & 
from the perspective of the patient & family. The five dimensions of safe pediatric 
care would be framed around: “Do not harm me; Cure me; Treat me with respect; 
Navigate my care; & Keep us well” (p. 763-764). 
4. Buck, Kurth, & Varughese, 2014 
Perspectives on quality and safety in 
pediatric anesthesia 
Improvement strategies must be supported by a strong organizational culture that is 
clearly articulated by leadership, within a learning culture that enables change 
processes by identifying, testing & evaluating already implemented procedures.  
HSOPSC assisted hospital leaders in the complexity of measuring their organization’s 
safety culture, with the intention of continuous improvement. Authors suggest using 
the Model for Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) to assist in improvement processes 
1
9
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such as tracking the safety of pediatric anesthesia & setting up quality improvement 
projects to monitor the efficacy & safety. 
5. Dickenson et al., 2012  
A systematic approach to improving 
medication safety in a pediatric intensive 
care unit 
This is a review of literature & hospital experiences relating to medication errors in 
an ICU at a freestanding children’s hospital. The goal was to improve medication 
safety in the pediatric ICU.  Authors found that efforts of leadership & frontline staff 
were necessary to improve medication safety. The causes of errors are many & vary 
among institutions. Patient-centered standardized care principles that engaged staff 
were found to be key in improving patient safety.   
6. Mueller, 2014  
Quality and safety in pediatric 
hematology/oncology 
Principles of quality & safety are the bedrock of pediatric hematology oncology care 
but errors continue to occur. Poor communication & punitive cultures with the fear of 
retribution remain problematic.  This article reviews why specialists in pediatric 
hematology & oncology should lead the field of quality & safety in healthcare & 
outlines steps to assist in achieving this goal. 
7. Surish & Edwards, 2012 
Central line-associated bloodstream 
infections in neonatal intensive care: 
Changing the mental model from 
inevitability to preventability 
Discusses prevalence of central line-associated blood stream infections (CLABSI) in 
the NICU, causing significant morbidity & mortality in this patient population. 
CLABSIs are now considered a preventable medical error. Examines steps an NICU 
can take to prevent them, suggesting a change in the mental model of care from one 
of inevitability to one that cultivates safety to empower staff. 
8.  Landro, 2010 
New focus on averting errors: Hospital 
culture  
 
Discussion on how the National Quality Forum has set standards for hospital 
personnel to address traumatized staffers that were involved in malpractice claims & 
errors causing patient harm. Hospitals with just culture strive to find a middle ground 
between blame-free & punitive cultures.  New models of care promoting a just culture 
will assist in identifying risky behaviors or decisions long before the event reaches 
patient.  
9.  Buck, M. L, 2008 
Improving pediatric medication safety part 
II: Evaluating strategies to prevent 
medication errors 
This author describes an assessment of particularly effective initiatives that can 
improve the safety of medication administration for the pediatric population. Such 
approaches include computerized prescriber order entries, standardization of smart 
pump technology, improved oversight & prescriber education, & increasing parental 
involvement in the care process. 
1
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10. Delaney & Hardy, 2008 
Challenges faced by inpatient 
child/adolescent psychiatric nurses 
Authors discuss a work environment that was engineered by inpatient psychiatric 
nurses which was environmentally & psychologically safe for staff & adolescent 
patients.  Researchers took the four dimensions that were involved with keeping adult 
units safe & adapted them to the child/adolescent inpatient psychiatric units. These 
dimensions were (1) Unit ideology; (2) the patient population & the experience of the 
staff interacting with that population; (3) maintaining a safe unit space with structured 
times; (4) reducing the need for restraints.  This article discusses the challenges 
nurses face with each safety dimension & entrenched unit cultures that hinder positive 
changes. 
11. Barata, Benjamin, Mace, Herman, & 
Goldman, 2007 
Pediatric patient safety in the 
prehospital/emergency department setting 
 
An overview of the problems & possible solutions that threaten pediatric safety in the 
emergency department (ED). Authors endorse a system’s approach to improving 
safety culture where healthcare teams work to effectively collaborative, thereby 
reducing errors.  Safe environments that provide quality care will reduce ED 
morbidity & mortality.   
  
1
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Qualitative Publications on Pediatric Safety Culture 
Study Method Sample Aims Findings Limitations 
Leonard et al., 
2012 
A qualitative 
assessment of 
factors that 
influence 
emergency 
medical services 
partnerships in 
prehospital 
research 
Exploratory study 
using focus groups 
14 focus groups 
involved 88 
prehospital 
providers (EMS) 
from 11 agencies 
over 1 year (year 
not specified).  
Also 35 interviews 
with administrators 
& researchers 
conducted 
Explore the barriers 
of participation in 
research at their 
particular agencies 
for EMS providers 
within the Pediatric 
Emergency Care 
Applied Research 
Network (PECARN) 
of hospitals 
Researchers 
identified 
individual’s 
knowledge, values & 
beliefs that may 
influence 
participation. 17 
factors may reduce 
EMS staff’s 
participation in 
research. These 
include 
organizational 
cultures towards 
change, as resistant 
cultures have 
organizational 
structures that may 
be unsupportive.  
Also, EMS staff may 
not have a clear 
purpose for the 
research, or be 
concerned that 
participating might 
harm the patient.  12 
factors were 
identified that would 
increase the 
Work is needed to 
validate & assess 
generalizability of 
developed model for 
prehospital settings 
not affiliated with 
PECARN 
1
9
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likelihood of 
participation, such as 
if the research 
benefited patient care 
or improved care 
outcomes. Findings 
may help future 
researchers 
successfully plan, 
implement & 
complete prehospital 
research projects. 
Quantitative Publications on Pediatric Safety Culture 
Study Method Sample Aims Findings Limitations 
Profit et al., 
2012a 
Neonatal 
intensive care 
unit safety 
culture varies 
widely 
Prospective cross-
sectional utilizing 
SAQ 
12 NICU's with 
547 caregiver 
respondents 
between July & 
August 2004 
Describe NICU 
caregiver 
assessments of safety 
culture, explore the 
variability of these 
perceptions within & 
between NICUs & 
test the association of 
these perceptions 
with caregiver 
characteristics. 
Significant variation 
exists in safety 
culture dimensions 
among NICUs. Trend 
noted respondents’ 
positions were 
associated with 
composite (p=0.06). 
When comparing 
position & 
composite, nurses & 
ancillary staff rated 
safety culture at 8.2 
(p=0.04) & 9.5 
(p=0.02) points less 
than physicians. 
There was wide 
Sample was small & 
not random; 
Association between 
safety attitudes & 
other variables do 
not necessarily 
indicate causality; 
Results to be 
measured within 
context of its 
observational 
design. Findings 
may be confounded 
by unobserved 
variables: income, 
personal experiences 
2
0
0
 
  
variation (up to 20 
points) in mean 
scores across 
dimensions. Across 
12 NICUs, good 
teamwork climate 
reported by 54%, 
good safety climate 
55%, & positive job 
satisfaction 63%. 
Lowest scores seen in 
positive perceptions 
of management 33%, 
administration 
supports daily efforts 
37%, & sufficient 
staffing 43%.  
Findings suggest 
opportunities for 
safety culture 
improvements exists, 
as measured by the 
SAQ 
Profit et al., 
2012b 
The safety 
attitudes 
questionnaire as 
a tool for 
benchmarking 
Prospective cross-
sectional utilizing 
SAQ 
12 NICU's with 
547 caregiver 
respondents 
between July & 
August 2004 
Determine if SAQ 
dimensions of safety 
culture are consistent 
when used as a 
NICU performance 
measure 
Safety culture 
permeates many 
aspects of patient 
care & organizational 
functioning. The 
SAQ may be useful 
for comparative 
performance 
More research is 
needed to under-
stand the NICU 
safety culture, 
clinical & 
operational 
processes & health 
outcomes 
2
0
1
 
  
safety culture in 
the NICU  
 
assessments among 
NICUs 
 
Quality Improvement Initiatives on Pediatric Safety Culture 
Study Method Sample Aims Findings Limitations 
Sheth et al., 2016 
Change in 
efficiency and 
safety culture 
after integration 
of an I-PASS-
supported 
handoff process 
QI initiative using 
a pretest- posttest 
design of provider 
& family 
satisfaction 
surveys & 
HSOPSC 
following 
interventions to 
measure culture 
changes 
122 Pediatric 
patient transfers 
from 
cardiovascular ICU 
to an acute care 
unit at a free 
standing children’s 
hospital from 
7/2012 to 1/2013 
Determine if a 
standardized 
multidisciplinary 
handoff process (I-
PASS) had an effect 
on care efficiency, 
safety culture & 
provider & patient 
satisfaction 
Transfer efficiency 
improved from 378 
+/- 167 minutes to 24 
+/- 21 minutes, an 
84% reduction in 
time. Provider's 
safety culture scores 
statistically 
improved: "Things 
fall between the 
cracks when 
transferring patients 
from one unit to 
another" had  + 
response (39.8%, 
p=0.005) & 
"Problems often 
occur in the exchange 
of information across 
hospital units" had a 
+ response (38.8%, 
p=0.031). Family 
satisfactions surveys 
improved: 
information 
Additional studies 
needed to evaluate I-
PASS handoff 
process & impact on 
patient harm, 
operational 
productivity & cost 
effectiveness 
2
0
2
 
  
conveyed 41% to 
70% (p=0.02); 
opportunity to ask 
questions 46% to 
74% (p<0.01); 
amount of 
information 
conveyed 50% to 
73% (p=0.04); 
Provider satisfactions 
surveys improved: 
amount of 
information 
conveyed 34% to 
41% (p=0.03); 
opportunity to ask 
questions 5% to 34% 
(p<0.01) 
Muething et al., 
2012 
Quality 
improvement 
initiative to 
reduce serious 
safety events and 
improve patient 
safety culture 
Multifaceted 
Prospective QI 
using the HSOPSC 
to measure culture 
changes 
1 urban pediatric 
freestanding 
hospital with 
>32,000 inpatient 
admissions in 2010 
Multifaceted 
Implementation of 
cultural & system 
changes to reduce 
serious safety events 
(SSEs) within four 
years at  
 
Approach associated 
with significant & 
sustained reduction 
of SSEs & 
improvements in 
patient safety culture 
Multisite research 
necessary to better 
understand the 
impact of particular 
factors & 
significance of 
specific 
interventions 
Hayes et al., 
2012 
Multifaceted QI 
study using 3 
domains of the 
20 children's 
hospitals identified 
1-3 target units for 
Establish reliable 
systems to rescue a 
deteriorating patient. 
Researchers had 
mixed results & did 
not reach goal of 
Patient deterioration 
is a complex process 
requiring sufficient 
2
0
3
 
  
A multicenter 
collaborative 
approach to 
reducing 
pediatric codes 
outside the ICU 
HSOPSC: 
"Communication 
Openness," 
"Nonpunitive 
Response to Error" 
& "Handoffs & 
Transitions" 
study participation 
(i.e. ED, ICU & 
OR) from 7/2007 
through 6/2008 
The focus was on 
prevention, detection 
and correction 
50% reduction in 
codes after 1 year due 
to variability of each 
facility.  HSOPSC 
scored improved for 
14 of 20 hospitals. 
Only statistically 
significant 
improvement seen in 
"Nonpunitive 
Response to Error" 
(39% to 47%, 
p=0.021) with 
remainder of surveys 
not statistically 
significant (p≤0.05).  
A collaborative 
model can accelerate 
improvements in 
safety culture 
time & effort to 
achieve improved 
outcomes. Changing 
culture requires 
more time. This was 
not an RCT with no 
monitoring of sites 
to assure 
compliance 
Peterson et al., 
2012 
A safety culture 
transformation: 
Its effects at a 
children’s 
hospital 
QI using the Press 
Ganey Safety 
Culture Survey to 
measure culture 
changes 
Over 4,000 
employees in one 
200 bed pediatric 
hospital from 2008 
to 2010 
To improve pediatric 
patient safety by 
changing the safety 
culture & 
implementing 
processes, practices 
& measures to 
sustain innovations 
System-based causes 
for failures were: 
culture-not voicing a 
concern due to 
intimidation 54%; 
poorly developed or 
nonexistent processes 
23%; policy & 
protocol 12%; 
common human 
error, including 
critical thinking 33%; 
Retrospective data 
on SSE for children 
were not available. 
Although the entire 
hospital system 
surveyed, data from 
children’s hospital 
were not extractable. 
Some SSEs take 
time to improve, 
i.e., children’s 
2
0
4
 
  
normalized deviance 
21%; communication 
17%; lack of 
attention to detail 
17%; safety event 
reporting rose after 
staff trained on event 
identification and 
transparency 
enhanced. Synergistic 
effects of safety 
culture change 
initiatives led to new 
levels of 
involvement, 
accountability and 
transparency at 
leadership & unit 
levels 
asthma & hand 
hygiene  
 
Mayer et al., 
2011 
Evaluating 
efforts to 
optimize 
TeamSTEPPS® 
implementation 
in surgical and 
pediatric 
intensive care 
units 
Multidisciplinary 
prospective QI 
project utilizing 
interviews, 
observations, 
surveys & clinical 
outcome data. 
HSOPSC to 
measure culture 
changes  
Change teams 
championed by 
hospital leadership; 
Number of 
participants differs 
from 
unit/department & 
evaluation process; 
All staff from 
PICU, SICU & 
respiratory therapy 
participated; 
Sample size for 
To improve team 
performance & 
patient outcomes by 
implementing a 
customized 
TeamSTEPPS® in 2 
hospital micro-
systems: the PICU & 
adult SICU; 3 
surveys 
administered: 
HSOPSC, the 
Employee Opinion 
A customized 2.5-
hour version of 
TeamSTEPPS® 
training in the PICU 
& adult SICU 
demonstrated that 
training was 
successful. For 
purposes of this 
research, only 
dimensions selected 
from HSOPSC were 
“Teamwork Within 
There was no 
control group to 
measure success of 
project. Perceptions 
of clinical outcomes 
can be swayed by a 
host of 
organizational 
influences & 
improvement 
initiatives. Direct 
causal relationship 
between positive 
2
0
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PICU 18 to 50; for 
SICU 18 to 40 
from 2006 through 
2009 
Survey (EOS) & 
Nursing Database of 
Nursing Quality 
Indicators 
(NDNQIs), along 
with personal 
interviews 
Units”, “Overall 
Perceptions of 
Safety” & 
“Communication 
Openness”. For 
PICU: no significant 
change in median 
value for “Teamwork 
Within Units” in 
2009 but significant 
improvement seen in 
median values for 
“Overall Perceptions 
of Safety” 
(F[2,95]=4.63, p-
0.01) and 
“Communication 
Openness” 
(F[2,95]=22.99, 
p<0.01); Comparing 
PICU to SICU: no 
significant change in 
median values for 
“Teamwork Within 
Units” but significant 
improvement in 
median values of 
“Overall Perceptions 
of Safety “ (X2[2, 
N=140]=19.31, 
p=0.03) for 2009 and 
“Communication 
changes & 
TeamSTEPPS® not 
determined 
2
0
6
 
  
Openness (X2[2, 
N=140]=28.92, 
p=0.01) for 2009 
Schwoebel & 
Creely, 2010 
Improving the 
safety culture of 
neonatal care 
through the 
development and 
implementation 
of a staff-focused 
delta team 
Multifaceted 
Prospective QI 
using the HSOPSC 
to measure culture 
changes 
University of PN 
Healthcare System 
(UPHS) of which 
10% of staff 
represented the 
intensive care 
nursery from 2004 
through 2008 
Taskforce charged in 
2004 to create a 
learning program for 
patient safety 
advocates, staff & 
educators that 
empower action at 
the unit level in the 
intensive care 
nursery  (ICN) to 
improve patient 
safety. 
Taskforce created a 
model to improve 
communication & 
unit-based inter-
disciplinary safety 
with tools & 
techniques that 
identified & priori-
tized safety concerns.  
The UPHS evaluated 
the ICN safety 
culture using the 
HSOPSC in 2008 
prior to initi-ation of 
safety strate-gies & 
found that for 
dimensions of  
“Communication 
Openness” (AHRQ = 
62%; UPHS =56%, 
ICN 73%) and 
“Teamwork Within 
Units” (AHRQ=79%; 
UPHS =72%, ICN 
93%) the ICN scored 
higher than the 
university hospital 
Creating a culture of 
patient safety will 
take time. 
Innovations will 
include parents & 
families into the 
safety model with 
patient safety 
material updated on 
a regular basis. 
2
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system and national 
averages. 
Donnelly et al., 
2009 
Improving 
patient safety:  
Effects of a 
safety program 
on performance 
and culture in a 
department of 
radiology 
Comprehensive 
prospective QI 
program using 
HSOPSC to 
measure culture 
changes & safety 
performance by 
measuring SSEs  
“The number of 
institutional & 
radiology employ-
ees who competed 
the survey was 
recorded” p. 187; 
project took place 
2006-2008 
Evaluate the effects 
of a program on 
safety performance 
& culture in a 
pediatric radiology 
department 
Number of SSEs that 
in past involved 
radiology were an 
average of one every 
200 days. After 
implementation of 
program, there was 
one event in 780 days 
(> 2 academic years) 
(p=0.037). Safety 
program had a 
positive effect on 
safety culture.  A 
statistically 
significant positive 
change was seen in 
all 12 HSOPSC 
dimensions (p=0.05). 
No statistically 
In radiology, SSEs 
are not common, 
thus no statistically 
significant 
improvement in 
number of days 
between SSEs. 
Program done in 
phases thus no way 
to determine the 
individual value of a 
particular 
component of 
program 
2
0
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significant outcome 
measure of positive 
change seen in 
“Frequency of Event 
Reporting,” 
suggesting that this 
report is 
cumbersome, time 
consuming and 
unpopular. The 
HSOPSC responses 
were seen to improve 
following the QI 
program. 
Edwards et al., 
2008 
Using staff 
perceptions of 
patient safety as 
a tool for 
improving safety 
culture in a 
pediatric hospital 
system 
Test-retest 
evaluating QI 
initiatives that 
included the use of 
the HSOPSC to 
measure culture 
changes 
Two inpatient 
facilities of 
Children’s 
Healthcare: 1 
academic (235 
beds) & 1 
community (195 
beds) beginning in 
1/2005 through 
4/2006 
A case study of the 
healthcare system’s 
use of the HSOPSC 
to identify areas in 
need of improvement 
& measure the 
impact of QI projects 
on im-proving 
patient safety in 
particular areas  
Survey was an 
effective tool for 
measuring & 
monitoring safety 
culture. The tool 
enabled identification 
of areas in need of 
improvement & 
measured impact of 
implemented 
initiatives in hospital. 
At both collections, 
responses were 
approximately evenly 
distributed.  Overall, 
staff perceptions 
were positive, with 
mean dimension 
Response rate was 
lower than desired; 
Also multiple 
improvement 
interventions were 
implemented during 
the study period 
preventing ability to 
deduce effect any 
particular 
intervention had on 
safety culture 
dimensions. Finally, 
15 months is too 
short to change 
safety culture with 
validation of 
2
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scores ranging from 
3.09 to 3.98 (1-5 
Likert scale, with 1 
being worst). 
Friedman test showed 
significant 
differences across 
safety dimensions 
(x2=490.18; 
p<0.001); 
“Teamwork Within 
Units” (μ=3.98; 95% 
CI 3.91 to 4.05) & 
“Organizational 
Learning-Continuous 
Improvement” 
(μ=3.77; 95% CI 3.71 
to 3.83) had 
significantly higher 
scores (p<0.05) than 
6 other dimensions. 
Low scores needing 
improvement were 
“Nonpunitive 
Response to Error” 
(μ=3.09; 95% CI 3.00 
to 3.18), “Hospital 
Handoffs and 
Transitions” (μ=3.29; 
95% CI 3.21 to 3.36), 
& “Teamwork 
Across Hospital 
changes needing 
more time  
2
1
0
 
  
Units” (μ=3.28; 95% 
CI 3.20 to 3.38), 
confirming a priori 
beliefs  
Runy, 2007 
How one hospital 
is cutting serious 
safety events 
Multiyear QI 
project using 
simulations, safety 
coaching & error 
prevention training 
One freestanding 
children’s hospital 
from 2005 to 2010 
To eliminate SSEs & 
improve safety 
culture  
 
SSEs were reduced 
within the first year 
from an average of 
17 per year to 14; 
statistical composites 
were not included in 
this article.  
Conduct safety 
training through 
simulations for all 
operating rooms; 
complete error 
prevention training 
of ~6,000 front-line 
employees & estab-
lish a safety coach 
program in all in-
patient units by 
2008 
 
2
1
1
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Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)  
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Comparative Database:  
De-identified Data Request Form 
Instructions 
Please use this template to describe the research for which you require de-identified Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture data. Save this completed template with your last name in the 
file name (e.g., “Smith Data Request.doc”) and submit to 
DatabasesOnSafetyCulture@ahrq.hhs.gov (Subject line: Data Request). 
 
Note: Replication of statistics published in the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
Comparative Database Report may not be possible due to post-hoc cleaning. (Documentation of 
post-hoc cleaning is provided with the data files.) 
 
Contact Information of Data Requestor 
Name: Pamela J. Gampetro 
Title: Family Nurse Practitioner, PhD student 
Organization: Loyola University Chicago 
Address: 2532 Wellington Court, Evanston, 60201 
Phone: 847-830-7877 
Fax: n/a 
Email: pgampetro@luc.edu 
 
1. Which year(s)? _____ 2016__________________________ 
2. Title  Secondary Data Analysis of Pediatric Care: Perceptions of Safety Culture in the U.S. in 
2016 
3. Abstract 
Objectives: Children are more at risk of experiencing an adverse event (AE) than an adult while 
hospitalized due to their small size, dependence on adult communication, need for individually 
calculated medication dosages and unique physiological status. In pediatrics hospitalizations, 
medical errors are associated with significant increases in the length of stay, the cost of 
healthcare and death. Studies have evaluated the culture in adult facilities but little is known 
about the culture of pediatric healthcare.  
 
It is hypothesized that the safety culture of a pediatric hospital or hospital unit is perceived in 
manners unique to particular staff positions within that institution.  
It is also hypothesized that the safety culture of pediatric hospital or hospital units impacts the 
safety grade, as well as the number of events that are reported, within that institution. 
215 
 
 
 
Question 1: What is the predominant perception of safety culture, as defined by “your hospital”, 
“your work area/unit”, “your supervisor/manager” and “communication”, as seen in the 2016 
HSOPSC dataset for pediatric hospitals and specialty units? 
 
Question 2: What is the predominant perception of safety culture, as defined by “your hospital”, 
“your work area/unit”, “your supervisor/manager” and “communication”, as seen in the 2016 
HSOPSC dataset for administrators/managers working in pediatric hospitals and specialty units? 
 
Question 3: What is the predominant perception of safety culture, as defined by “your hospital”, 
“your work area/unit”, “your supervisor/manager” and “communication”, as seen in the 2016 
HSOPSC dataset for MDs working in pediatric hospitals and specialty units? 
 
Question 4:  What is the predominant perception of safety culture, as defined by “your hospital”, 
“your work area/unit”, “your supervisor/manager” and “communication”, as seen in the 2016 
HSOPSC dataset for NPs/PAs working in pediatric hospitals and specialty units? 
  
Question 5:  What is the predominant perception of safety culture, as defined by “your hospital”, 
“your work area/unit”, “your supervisor/manager” and “communication”, as seen in the 2016 
HSOPSC dataset for RNs working in pediatric hospitals and specialty units? 
  
Aim 1:  Describe the patient safety grades in pediatric hospitals and specialty units from the 
predominant perception of administrators/managers, MDs, NPs/PAs and RNs in 2016 
   
Aim 2:  Describe the number of events reported in pediatric hospitals and hospital unit’s from the 
predominant perceptions of administrators/managers, MDs, NPs/PAs and RNs in 2016  
 
Proposed Analysis: This is a descriptive cross sectional design of the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture (HSOPSC) dataset. This research will examine the 12 dimensions of safety 
culture from the perceptions of pediatric administrators and MDs, NP’s, PA’s, RN’s in 
2016. Multivariate analysis will be applied with the aim of determining if there is a statistically 
significant difference in the 12 dimensions of safety culture from the perspective of 
administrators/managers, MDs, NPs/PAs and RNs in 2016. Post hoc testing will be performed. 
Independent sample t tests will be used to determine the statistical significance between the 
group means, null and alternative hypotheses.  
 
Implications: A poorly perceived safety culture has been linked to increased medical error rates. 
Analyzing data from U.S. hospitals regarding the perceptions of safety culture will aide in 
identifying barriers to patient safety, which in time should be modified. A fuller understanding of 
the national tendencies surrounding a hospital’s pediatric safety culture will enhance knowledge 
to vital stakeholders, leading to improvements in quality care and the reduction of adverse 
events.   
 
Timeline:  To be completed by 12/31/2017.
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